Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

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Verification of Broadcasting Multi-Agent Systems against an Epistemic Strategy Logic

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.24963/ijcai.2017/14 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Francesco Belardinelli ◽

Alessio Lomuscio ◽

Aniello Murano ◽

Sasha Rubin

Keyword(s):

Model Checking ◽

Secret Sharing ◽

Imperfect Information ◽

Multi Agent Systems ◽

Perfect Recall ◽

Agent Systems ◽

Multi Agent ◽

Strategy Logic

We study a class of synchronous, perfect-recall multi-agent systemswith imperfect information and broadcasting (i.e., fully observableactions). We define an epistemic extension of strategy logic withincomplete information and the assumption of uniform and coherentstrategies. In this setting, we prove that the model checking problem,and thus rational synthesis, is decidable with non-elementarycomplexity. We exemplify the applicability of the framework on arational secret-sharing scenario.

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Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1954543 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 72 (4) ◽

pp. 1341-1356 ◽

Cited By ~ 36

Author(s):

John R. Chamberlin ◽

Michael D. Cohen

Keyword(s):

Social Choice ◽

Choice Theory ◽

Social Choice Theory ◽

Monte Carlo Study ◽

Performance Criteria ◽

Alternative Methods ◽

Choice Functions ◽

Presidential Primary ◽

Formal Framework ◽

Social Choice Functions

This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of “impartial culture” so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four different social choice functions to select a Condorcet winner when voter preference orders have been generated from a spatial representation of ideal points and alternatives. We also investigate the potential of alternative methods of selecting winners in presidential primary elections.

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Model checking for coalition announcement logic

Logical Investigations ◽

10.21146/2074-1472-2018-24-2-59-69 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 24 (2) ◽

pp. 59-69

Author(s):

Н.А. Алешина

Keyword(s):

Model Checking ◽

Imperfect Information ◽

Finite Model ◽

Polynomial Space ◽

Joint Work ◽

Knowledge Change ◽

Public Announcement Logic ◽

Multi Agent ◽

Imperfect Information Games ◽

Simultaneous Moves

This talk is based on joint work with Rustam Galimullin and Hans van Ditmarsh, published in the German Conference on Artificial Intelligence (KI 2018). First I will introduce background and motivation for the work. I will introduce multi-agent Epistemic Logic (EL) for representing knowledge of (idealised) agents, Public Announcement Logic (PAL) for modelling knowledge change after truthful announcements, Group Announcement Logic (GAL) for modelling what kinds of changes in other agents’ knowledge a group of agents can effect, and Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL) which is the main subject of the talk. CAL studies how a group of agents can enforce a certain outcome by making a joint announcement, regardless of any announcements made simultaneously by the opponents. The logic is useful to model imperfect information games with simultaneous moves. It is also useful for devising protocols of announcements that will increase some knowledge of some agents, but also preserve other agents’ ignorance with respect to some information (in other words, preserve privacy of the announcers). The main new technical result in the talk is a model checking algorithm for CAL, that is, an algorithm for evaluating a CAL formula in a given finite model. The model-checking problem for CAL is PSPACE-complete, and the protocol requires polynomial space (but exponential time). DOI: 10.21146/2074-1472-2018-24-2-59-69

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Implementation with ex post hidden actions

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design ◽

10.22574/jmid.2020.12.001 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

pp. 1-35

Author(s):

Caleb Koch ◽

Keyword(s):

Social Choice ◽

Choice Functions ◽

Strategic Actions ◽

Competition Models ◽

Ex Post ◽

Study Implementation ◽

Social Choice Functions ◽

Groves Mechanism ◽

Hidden Actions ◽

Do So

We study implementation in settings where agents take strategic actions that influence preferences over mechanism outcomes and yet are hidden from the mechanism designer. We show that such settings can arise in entry auctions for markets, and that the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not necessarily truthful. In this paper we first formalize so-called ex post hidden actions, we then characterize social choice functions that can be implemented in a way that is robust with respect to ex post hidden actions, and finally we propose a mechanism to do so. The model allows agents to have multi-dimensional types and to have quasi-linear utilities in money. We showcase these results by identifying social choice functions that can and cannot be implemented in entry auctions for Cournot competition models.

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A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.20151700 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 107 (6) ◽

pp. 1430-1476 ◽

Cited By ~ 117

Author(s):

Roland Strausz

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Mechanism Design ◽

Demand Uncertainty ◽

Aggregate Demand ◽

Agency Cost ◽

Expected Returns ◽

Cost Information ◽

Private Cost ◽

Incentive Problems ◽

Do So

Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard. (JEL D21, D81, D82, D86, G32, L26)

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Full Implementation under Ambiguity

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.20180184 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (1) ◽

pp. 148-178

Author(s):

Huiyi Guo ◽

Nicholas C. Yannelis

Keyword(s):

Social Choice ◽

Expected Utility ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Choice Functions ◽

Maxmin Expected Utility ◽

Special Cases ◽

Social Choice Functions ◽

Bayesian Implementation ◽

Pareto Efficient ◽

Choice Set

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)

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