Network Survivability Analysis Based on Stochastic Game Model

Author(s):  
Wang Chunlei ◽  
Miao Qing ◽  
Dai Yiqi
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-183
Author(s):  
P. Kravets ◽  
V. Lytvyn ◽  
V. Vysotska

Context. In today’s information society with advanced telecommunications through mobile devices and computer networks, it is important to form a variety of virtual organizations and communities. Such virtual associations of people by professional or other interests are designed to quickly solve various tasks: to perform project tasks, create startups to attract investors, network marketing, distance learning, solving complex problems in science, economics and public administration , construction of various Internet services, discussion of political and social processes, etc. Objective of the study is to develop an adaptive Markov recurrent method based on the stochastic approximation of the modified condition of complementary non-rigidity, valid at Nash equilibrium points for solving the problem of game coverage of projects. Method. In this work the multiagent game model for formation of virtual teams of executors of projects on the basis of libraries of subject ontologies is developed. The competencies and abilities of agents required to carry out projects are specified by sets of ontologies. Intelligent agents randomly, simultaneously and independently choose one of the projects at discrete times. Agents who have chosen the same project determine the current composition of the team of its executors. For agents’ teams, a current penalty is calculated for insufficient coverage of competencies by the combined capabilities of agents. This penalty is used to adaptively recalculate mixed player strategies. The probabilities of selecting those teams whose current composition has led to a reduction in the fine for non-coverage of ontologies are increasing. During the repetitive stochastic game, agents will form vectors of mixed strategies that will minimize average penalties for non-coverage of projects. Results. For solve the problem of game coverage of projects, an adaptive Markov recurrent method based on the stochastic approximation of the modified condition of complementary non-rigidity, valid at Nash equilibrium points, was developed. Conclusions. Computer simulation confirmed the possibility of using the stochastic game model to form teams of project executors with the necessary ontological support in conditions of uncertainty. The convergence of the game method is ensured by compliance with the fundamental conditions and limitations of stochastic optimization. The reliability of experimental studies is confirmed by the repeatability of the results obtained for different sequences of random variables.


Author(s):  
Chaojie Li ◽  
Chen Liu ◽  
Xinghuo Yu ◽  
Ke Deng ◽  
Tingwen Huang ◽  
...  

 Demand response (DR) can provide a cost-effect approach for reducing peak loads while renewable energy sources (RES) can result in an environmental-friendly solution for solving the problem of power shortage. The increasingly integration of DR and renewable energy bring challenging issues for energy policy makers, and electricity market regulators in the main power grid. In this paper, a new two-stage stochastic game model is introduced to operate the electricity market, where Stochastic Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash (SSCN) equilibrium  is applied to characterize the optimal energy bidding strategy of the forward market and the optimal energy trading strategy of the spot market. To obtain a SSCN equilibrium, sampling average approximation (SAA) technique is harnessed to address the stochastic game model in a distributed way. By this game model, the participation ratio of demand response can be significantly increased while the unreliability of power system caused by renewable energy resources can be considerably reduced. The effectiveness of proposed model is illustrated by extensive simulations.


2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 1748-1762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan-Zhuo WANG ◽  
Chuang LIN ◽  
Xue-Qi CHENG ◽  
Bin-Xing FANG

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (9) ◽  
pp. 2609-2612
Author(s):  
Xiao LIANG ◽  
Xiang-ru MENG ◽  
Xu-chun ZHUANG ◽  
Wen WU

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-454
Author(s):  
Junjie Lv ◽  
Kun Meng ◽  
Yuanzhuo Wang ◽  
Chuang Lin ◽  
Jingyuan Li

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 825
Author(s):  
Song-Kyoo (Amang) Kim

This paper introduces an extended version of a stochastic game under the antagonistic duel-type setup. The most flexible multiple person duel game is analytically solved. Moreover, the explicit formulas are solved to determine the time-dependent duel game model using the first exceed theory in multiple game stages. Unlike conventional stochastic duel games, multiple battlefields are firstly introduced and each battlefield becomes a shooting ground of pairwise players in a multiperson game. Each player selects different targets in different game stages. An analogue of this new theory was designed to find the best shooting time within multiple battlefields. This model is fully mathematically explained and is the basis with which to apply a stochastic duel-type game in various practical applications.


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