This paper investigates bilevel optimization models for demand response management, and highlights the often overlooked consequences of a common modeling assumption in the field. That is, the overwhelming majority of existing research deals with the so-called optimistic variant of the problem where, in case of multiple optimal consumption schedules for a consumer (follower), the consumer chooses an optimal schedule that is the most favorable for the electricity retailer (leader). However, this assumption is usually illegitimate in practice; as a result, consumers may easily deviate from their expected behavior during realization, and the retailer suffers significant losses. One way out is to solve the pessimistic variant instead, where the retailer prepares for the least favorable optimal responses from the consumers. The main contribution of the paper is an exact procedure for solving the pessimistic variant of the problem. First, key properties of optimal solutions are formally proven and efficiently solvable special cases are identified. Then, a detailed investigation of the optimistic and pessimistic variants of the problem is presented. It is demonstrated that the set of optimal consumption schedules typically contains various responses that are equal for the follower, but bring radically different profits for the leader. The main procedure for solving the pessimistic variant reduces the problem to solving the optimistic variant with slightly perturbed problem data. A numerical case study shows that the optimistic solution may perform poorly in practice, while the pessimistic solution gives very close to the highest profit that can be achieved theoretically. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to propose an exact solution approach for the pessimistic variant of the problem.
Distributed Solution Approach for a Stackelberg Pricing Game of Aggregated Demand Response
