Coverage Guided Multiple Base Choice Testing

Author(s):  
Tugkan Tuglular ◽  
Onur Leblebici
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 14-15
Author(s):  
Lee H. Ensalada

Abstract Symptom validity testing (SVT), also known as forced-choice testing, is a means of assessing the validity of sensory and memory deficits, including tactile anesthesias, paresthesias, blindness, color blindness, tunnel vision, blurry vision, and deafness. The common feature among these symptoms is a claimed inability to perceive or remember a sensory signal. SVT comprises two elements: a specific ability is assessed by presenting a large number of items in a multiple-choice format, and then the examinee's performance is compared to the statistical likelihood of success based on chance alone. These tests usually present two alternatives; thus the probability of simply guessing the correct response (equivalent to having no ability at all) is 50%. Thus, scores significantly below chance performance indicate that the sensory cues must have been perceived, but the examinee chose not to report the correct answer—alternative explanations are not apparent. SVT also has the capacity to demonstrate that the examinee performed below the probabilities of chance. Scoring below a norm can be explained by fatigue, evaluation anxiety, inattention, or limited intelligence. Scoring below the probabilities of chance alone most likely indicates deliberate deceptions and is evidence of malingering because it provides strong evidence that the examinee received the sensory cues and denied the perception. Even so, malingering must be evaluated from the total clinical context.


1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-4

Abstract Symptom validity testing, also known as forced-choice testing, is a way to assess the validity of sensory and memory deficits, including tactile anesthesias, paresthesias, blindness, color blindness, tunnel vision, blurry vision, and deafness—the common feature of which is a claimed inability to perceive or remember a sensory signal. Symptom validity testing comprises two elements: A specific ability is assessed by presenting a large number of items in a multiple-choice format, and then the examinee's performance is compared with the statistical likelihood of success based on chance alone. Scoring below a norm can be explained in many different ways (eg, fatigue, evaluation anxiety, limited intelligence, and so on), but scoring below the probabilities of chance alone most likely indicates deliberate deception. The positive predictive value of the symptom validity technique likely is quite high because there is no alternative explanation to deliberate distortion when performance is below the probability of chance. The sensitivity of this technique is not likely to be good because, as with a thermometer, positive findings indicate that a problem is present, but negative results do not rule out a problem. Although a compelling conclusion is that the examinee who scores below probabilities is deliberately motivated to perform poorly, malingering must be concluded from the total clinical context.


Author(s):  
Lisa K. Fazio ◽  
Elizabeth J. Marsh ◽  
Henry L. Roediger

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Themistoklis Pantazakos

AbstractRecent years have seen enticing empirical approaches to solving the epistemological problem of the theory-ladenness of observation. I group these approaches in two categories according to their method of choice: testing and refereeing. I argue that none deliver what friends of theory-neutrality want them to. Testing does not work because both evidence from cognitive neuroscience and perceptual pluralism independently invalidate the existence of a common observation core. Refereeing does not work because it treats theory-ladenness as a kind of superficial, removable bias. Even if such treatment is plausible, there is likely no method to ascertain that effects of this bias are not present. More importantly, evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that a deeper, likely irremovable kind of theory-ladenness lies within the perceptual modules.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-177
Author(s):  
Raymond S. Nickerson ◽  
Susan F. Butler ◽  
Michael T. Carlin

1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 227-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tirin Moore ◽  
Hillary R. Rodman ◽  
Charles G. Gross

The visual function that survives damage to the primary visual cortex (V1) in humans is often unaccompanied by awareness. This type of residual vision, called “blindsight,” has raised considerable interest because it implies a separation of conscious from unconscious vision mechanisms. The monkey visual system has proven to be a useful model in elucidating the possible neural mechanisms of residual vision and blindsight in humans. Clear similarities, however, between the phenomenology of human and monkey residual vision have only recently become evident. This article summarizes parallels between residual vision in monkeys and humans with damage to V1. These parallels Include the tendency of the remaining vision to require forced-choice testing and the fact that more robust residual vision remains when V1 damage is sustained early in life. NEUROSCIENTIST 4:227–230


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