Behavioral and Game-Theoretic Security Investments in Interdependent Systems Modeled by Attack Graphs

We study the problem of allocating limited security countermeasures to protect network data from cyber-attacks, for scenarios modeled by Bayesian attack graphs. We consider multistage interactions between a network administrator and cybercriminals, formulated as a security game. This formulation is capable of representing security environments with significant dynamics and uncertainty and very large strategy spaces. We propose parameterized heuristic strategies for the attacker and defender and provide detailed analysis of their time complexity. Our heuristics exploit the topological structure of attack graphs and employ sampling methods to overcome the computational complexity in predicting opponent actions. Due to the complexity of the game, we employ a simulation-based approach and perform empirical game analysis over an enumerated set of heuristic strategies. Finally, we conduct experiments in various game settings to evaluate the performance of our heuristics in defending networks, in a manner that is robust to uncertainty about the security environment.

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Optimal and Game-Theoretic Deployment of Security Investments in Interdependent Assets

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Decision and Game Theory for Security ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_6 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 101-113 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Ashish R. Hota ◽

Abraham A. Clements ◽

Shreyas Sundaram ◽

Saurabh Bagchi

Keyword(s):

Game Theoretic ◽

Security Investments

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Game-Theoretic Analysis of Interaction between Dynamic Variable Pricing and Dynamic Traffic Assignment

Applications of Advanced Technologies in Transportation Engineering (2004) ◽

10.1061/40730(144)108 ◽

2004 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Xizhao Zhou ◽

Bayi Zhou ◽

Yan Li

Keyword(s):

Traffic Assignment ◽

Dynamic Traffic Assignment ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Dynamic Traffic ◽

Dynamic Variable ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Variable Pricing ◽

Game Theoretic

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Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2017-3-120-130 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 120-130

Author(s):

A. Lyasko

Keyword(s):

Social Control ◽

Institutional Economics ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Transfer System ◽

Value Transfer ◽

Partner Interaction ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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Influential individuals: Approach to modeling

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2018-9-114-131 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 114-131

Author(s):

O. Yu. Bondarenko

Keyword(s):

Social Interactions ◽

Social Status ◽

Experimental Approach ◽

Expert Knowledge ◽

Formal Models ◽

Leader Influence ◽

Learning Game ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Asymmetric Interactions ◽

Influential Individuals

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.

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