Multi-Operator Spectrum Sharing for Small Cell Networks: A Matching Game Perspective

Game theoretical approaches have been used to develop distributed resource allocation technologies for cognitive heterogeneous networks. In this chapter, we present a novel distributed resource allocation strategy for cognitive small cell networks based on orthogonal frequency-division multiple access. In particular, we consider a heterogeneous network consisting of macrocell networks overlaid with cognitive small cells that opportunistically access the available spectrum. We focus on a regret-matching game approach, aiming at maximizing the total throughput of the small cell network subject to cross-tier interference and quality of service (QoS) constraints. The regret-matching game approach exploits a regret procedure to learn the optimal resource allocation strategy from the regrets of the actions of cognitive users. Furthermore, the regret-matching game approach is extended to the joint resource allocation and user admission control problem. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed regre-matching approaches.

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Spectrum Sharing with Dynamic Cournot Game in Vehicle-Enabled Cognitive Small-Cell Networks

Journal of Computer Networks and Communications ◽

10.1155/2019/4835923 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 ◽

pp. 1-9

Author(s):

Guilu Wu ◽

Huilin Jiang

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Spectrum Sharing ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Small Cell ◽

Dynamic Spectrum ◽

Spectrum Allocation ◽

Spectrum Efficiency ◽

Dynamic Spectrum Allocation ◽

Small Cell Networks ◽

Cell Networks

Cognitive radio technology can effectively improve spectrum efficiency in wireless networks and is also applicable to vehicle small-cell networks. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among a vehicle primary user (V-PU) and multiple vehicle secondary users (V-SUs). This problem is modeled as a competition market, and the solution for V-SUs is designed using a non-cooperative game. A utility function that measures the profit of the V-PU considering quality of service (QoS) is proposed, aiming at maximizing the profit of the V-PU. Nash equilibrium is obtained as the best solution in our game. Then, the realistic vehicle-enabled cognitive small-cell network is considered in building the dynamic spectrum allocation problem. The V-SUs adjust their current strategies gradually and iteratively based on the observations on the strategies of the previous moment. This adjustment parameter is controlled by the frequency of adjustment. The stability analysis of the dynamic game is given out subsequently for dynamic spectrum allocation. The numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic spectrum scheme for vehicle-enabled cognitive small-cell networks and Nash equilibrium point’s existence.

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Spectrum Sharing with Vehicular Communication in Cognitive Small-Cell Networks

International Journal of Antennas and Propagation ◽

10.1155/2020/6897646 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 1-10

Author(s):

Guilu Wu ◽

Hongyun Chu

Keyword(s):

Service Provider ◽

Spectrum Sharing ◽

Small Cell ◽

Competition Model ◽

Bertrand Competition ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Small Cell Networks ◽

Supermodular Game ◽

Primary Service ◽

Cell Networks

An increasing number of vehicles make spectrum resources face serious challenges in vehicular cognitive small-cell networks. The means of spectrum sharing can greatly alleviate this pressure. In this paper, we introduce a supermodular game theoretic approach to analyze the problem of spectrum sharing. The small-cell BS (primary service provider, PSP) and the vehicle (secondary service provider, SSP) can share the spectrum, where the PSP can sell idle spectrum resources to the SSP. This is taken as a spectrum trading market, and a Bertrand competition model is considered to depict this phenomenon. Different PSPs compete with each other to maximize their individual profits. The Bertrand competition model can be proved as a supermodular game, and the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) solution is provided as the optimal price solution. Hence, an improved genetic simulated annealing algorithm is designed to achieve NE. Simulation results demonstrate that the NE point for the price of the primary service provider exists. The change of the exogenous variable is also analyzed on the equilibrium point.

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