scholarly journals Spectrum Sharing with Dynamic Cournot Game in Vehicle-Enabled Cognitive Small-Cell Networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Guilu Wu ◽  
Huilin Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Spectrum Sharing ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Small Cell ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum ◽  
Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Small Cell Networks ◽  
Cell Networks

Cognitive radio technology can effectively improve spectrum efficiency in wireless networks and is also applicable to vehicle small-cell networks. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among a vehicle primary user (V-PU) and multiple vehicle secondary users (V-SUs). This problem is modeled as a competition market, and the solution for V-SUs is designed using a non-cooperative game. A utility function that measures the profit of the V-PU considering quality of service (QoS) is proposed, aiming at maximizing the profit of the V-PU. Nash equilibrium is obtained as the best solution in our game. Then, the realistic vehicle-enabled cognitive small-cell network is considered in building the dynamic spectrum allocation problem. The V-SUs adjust their current strategies gradually and iteratively based on the observations on the strategies of the previous moment. This adjustment parameter is controlled by the frequency of adjustment. The stability analysis of the dynamic game is given out subsequently for dynamic spectrum allocation. The numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic spectrum scheme for vehicle-enabled cognitive small-cell networks and Nash equilibrium point’s existence.

Competitive Spectrum Pricing under Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

2015 ◽  
pp. 884-908
Author(s):  
Hailing Zhu ◽  
Andre Nel ◽  
Hendrik Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum ◽  
Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Economic Framework ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) has been viewed as a promising approach to improving spectrum efficiency. With DSA, Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) that operate in fixed spectrum bands allocated through static allocation can solve their short-term spectrum shortage problems resulting from the bursty nature of wireless traffic. Such DSA mechanisms should be coupled with dynamic pricing schemes to achieve the most efficient allocation. This chapter models the DSA problem where a centralized spectrum broker manages “white space” in the spectrum of TV broadcasters and sells the vacant spectrum bands to multiple WSPs, as a multi-stage non-cooperative dynamic game. Furthermore, an economic framework for DSA is presented and a centralized spectrum allocation mechanism is proposed. The simulation results show that the centralized spectrum allocation mechanism with dynamic pricing achieves a DSA implementation that is responsive to market conditions as well as enabling efficient utilization of the available spectrum.

scholarly journals Multi-Operator Spectrum Sharing for Small Cell Networks: A Matching Game Perspective

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 3761-3774 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tachporn Sanguanpuak ◽  
Sudarshan Guruacharya ◽  
Nandana Rajatheva ◽  
Mehdi Bennis ◽  
Matti Latva-Aho
Keyword(s):  
Spectrum Sharing ◽  
Small Cell ◽  
Small Cell Networks ◽  
Operator Spectrum ◽  
Matching Game ◽  
Cell Networks

Semi-Distributed Joint Power and Spectrum Allocation for LAA Based Small Cell Networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 4141-4153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Yin ◽  
Shengli Liu ◽  
Guanding Yu ◽  
Yanqiong Zhang ◽  
Qimei Chen
Keyword(s):  
Small Cell ◽  
Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Joint Power ◽  
Small Cell Networks ◽  
Cell Networks

scholarly journals Spectrum Sharing with Vehicular Communication in Cognitive Small-Cell Networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Guilu Wu ◽  
Hongyun Chu
Keyword(s):  
Service Provider ◽  
Spectrum Sharing ◽  
Small Cell ◽  
Competition Model ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Small Cell Networks ◽  
Supermodular Game ◽  
Primary Service ◽  
Cell Networks

An increasing number of vehicles make spectrum resources face serious challenges in vehicular cognitive small-cell networks. The means of spectrum sharing can greatly alleviate this pressure. In this paper, we introduce a supermodular game theoretic approach to analyze the problem of spectrum sharing. The small-cell BS (primary service provider, PSP) and the vehicle (secondary service provider, SSP) can share the spectrum, where the PSP can sell idle spectrum resources to the SSP. This is taken as a spectrum trading market, and a Bertrand competition model is considered to depict this phenomenon. Different PSPs compete with each other to maximize their individual profits. The Bertrand competition model can be proved as a supermodular game, and the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) solution is provided as the optimal price solution. Hence, an improved genetic simulated annealing algorithm is designed to achieve NE. Simulation results demonstrate that the NE point for the price of the primary service provider exists. The change of the exogenous variable is also analyzed on the equilibrium point.

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