Conflict and moral change: LGBTQ+ rights education, religion and renegotiation

Author(s):  
Nora Hämäläinen
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter discusses why people often fail to meet their moral goals and identifies the main obstacles in achieving moral change. It shows how psychological processes specific to animals, as outlined in chapters 2–4, interact with broader components of moral psychology. Three main moral psychological factors are discussed: emotions, situational conditions, and self-control. These factors are used to illustrate the frequent failure of reason and higher-level cognition to modify our moral responses, including our treatment of animals. The discussion draws from a wide range of research within empirical moral psychology as well as recent critical discussion of this research among philosophers.


Author(s):  
Jaime Kucinskas

The mindfulness movement’s unobtrusive, consensus-based tactics were effective in popularizing, embedding, and legitimizing contemplative practices in a wide array of powerful social institutions. Yet, using consensus-based tactics and relying upon elite endorsements and support also opened the movement up to criticisms of potential cooptation along many fronts. Although movement leaders succeeded in changing the minds and hearts of many professionals, the movement as a whole failed to produce desired organizational reform. This concluding chapter discusses these implications of these tactics’ strengths and shortcomings not only for the contemplative movement but for other similar movements trying to change institutions through insiders working within and across targeted organizations and movements. These include the movements for LGBTQ rights, women’s equality, and environmental protection.


2006 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANK MORT

ABSTRACT Historians of the sexual and cultural changes associated with the ““permissive”” moment of the 1960s have tended to emphasize a progressive narrative of reform focused on national policies and their social outcomes. This article explores a diffierent dynamic, highlighting the ways in which a series of scandalous and transgressive events, associated with particular networks of metropolitan culture in London, played a significant role in reshaping sexual beliefs and attitudes within English society during the postwar period.


Author(s):  
James F. Childress ◽  
Tom L. Beauchamp

Abstract After briefly sketching common-morality principlism, as presented in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, this paper responds to two recent sets of challenges to this framework. The first challenge claims that medical ethics is autonomous and unique and thus not a form of, or justified or guided by, a common morality or by any external morality or moral theory. The second challenge denies that there is a common morality and insists that futile efforts to develop common-morality approaches to bioethics limit diversity and prevent needed moral change. This paper argues that these two critiques fundamentally fail because they significantly misunderstand their target and because their proposed alternatives have major deficiencies and encounter insurmountable problems.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 662-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Jervell Indregard

AbstractAccording to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Kyle Curran

This paper is concerned with an ambiguous aspect of Kant’s ethics, namely, how moral change is possible. Kant conceives that change is possible, indeed desirable, without making clear the mechanism by which this change occurs. I conclude that one’s moral development must come about through the autonomous rationality of humanity. This allows for the moral law to be held at all times and for the rejection of immoral sentiments and inclinations. Further, it is constant soulsearching that allows one to keep a check on their maxims, facilitating the development of a moral disposition.


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