The Domestic Sources of European Anti‐Americanism

2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Fabbrini
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
The United States ◽  
Special Relationship ◽  
European Public ◽  
The Right ◽  
Armed Intervention ◽  
Large Sections

The Terrorist Attacks In New York And Washington Dc On 11 September 2001, and the killing of thousands of people were not sufficient to dispel a mood of suspicion in European public opinion towards America. Of course, during the very first days after the attack, there was widespread grief and sorrow about the event among Europeans. But, as soon as discussion on the right strategy to pursu to combat terrorism began, the initial mood of identification with America started to change. And when America, although backed by a large international coalition and legitimated by two UN resolutions, moved towards an armed intervention in Afghanistan, European anti-Americanism emerged again. Thus, during the armed intervention in Afghanistan, especially when the bombing led to the death of innocent victims, a social mobilization against the American war grew day after day, with its critics apparently losing sight of the fact that a dramatic terrorist attack on America had recently taken place.The interesting question is why does anti-Americanism re-emerge regularly in large sections of European public opinion? This intermittent Anti-Americanism appears more in southern and continental Europe, than in the northern British Isles and Scandinavia, where it is outdone by a more vociferous anti-Europeanism. In the latter countries, anti-Americanism takes the form of uneasiness with the United States. In fact, in spite of Britain's traditional special relationship with the United States, the fact cannot be denied that post-war British elites grudgingly accept their inferior status in that special relationship. But, of course, frustration with America is not the same as anger towards America. In any case, in (continental) Europe, anti- Americanism seems to be one of the few public philosophies that can unite large sections of the left, the right and the Catholic Church. It is a public philosophy which emerges especially in periods of war (and of international crisis in general).

America in Indochina, 1957–1963: British Perceptions, Hopes, and Strategy

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 81-104
Author(s):  
Meghan Nealis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Times ◽  
The Right ◽  
Core Issues

AbstractBritish perceptions of the United States in Indochina between 1957 and 1963 were cautious and constructive. This article examines the perceptions of policymakers in Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's government and public opinion as expressed in the Times of London. British policymakers had basic doubts regarding American policy in Indochina, but Britain remained involved in the region after 1954 and agreed with the United States on defining the problem and on the broad methodological approach to the crisis. London wanted to ensure that Washington pursued the “right” policy in Indochina, that Britain utilized its expertise in post-colonial and counter-insurgency, and that the Anglo- American alliance maintained its importance for both countries. The study of these perceptions reveals some concerns which we would anticipate, but also shows that Britain respected the United States as a leader in the region and that it agreed with the United States on core issues.

The God of the Internet

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Goldsmith ◽  
Tim Wu
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Critical Time ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Government ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Human Operators ◽  
The Right ◽  
E Mail

If you had met Jon Postel in 1998, you might have been surprised to learn that you were in the presence of one of the Internet’s greatest living authorities. He had a rambling, ragged look, living in sandals and a large, unkempt beard. He lived like a modern-day Obi-Wan Kenobi, an academic hermit who favored solitary walks on the Southern California beach. When told once by a reporter that readers were interested in learning more about his personal life, he answered: “If we tell them, they won’t be interested anymore.” Yet this man was, and had been for as long as anyone could remember, the ultimate authority for assignment of the all-important Internet Protocol (IP) numbers that are the essential feature of Internet membership. Like the medallions assigned to New York City taxicabs, each globally unique number identifies a computer on the Net, determining who belongs and who doesn’t. “If the Net does have a God,” wrote the Economist in 1997, “he is probably Jon Postel.” Jon Postel was a quiet man who kept strong opinions and sometimes acted in surprising ways. The day of January 28, 1998, provided the best example. On that day Postel wrote an e-mail to the human operators of eight of the twelve “name servers” around the globe. Name servers are the critical computers that are ultimately responsible for making sure that when you type a name like google.com you reach the right address (123.23.83.0). On that day Postel asked the eight operators, all personally loyal to Postel, to recognize his computer as the “root,” or, in essence, the master computer for the whole Internet. The operators complied, pointing their servers to Postel’s computer instead of the authoritative root controlled by the United States government. The order made the operators nervous—Paul Vixie, one of the eight, quietly arranged to have someone look after his kids in case he was arrested. Postel was playing with fire. His act could have divided the Internet’s critical naming system into two gigantic networks, one headed by himself, the other headed by the United States. He engineered things so that the Internet continued to run smoothly. But had he wanted to during this critical time, he might have created chaos.

Considering Precedent in Louisiana: Balancing the Value of Predictable and Certain Interpretation with the Tradition of Flexibility and Adaptability

2013 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Mary Garvey Algero
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Common Law ◽  
New York State ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
The Common ◽  
Judicial Opinions ◽  
The Right

Despite the fundamental differences between the doctrines employed in common law and civil law (or mixed) jurisdictions when it comes to the respect paid to prior court decisions and their weight or value, United States courts that follow the common law doctrine of stare decisis have embraced some of the flexibility inherent in the civil law doctrine, and civil law and mixed jurisdictions throughout the world, including Louisiana, that use the doctrine of jurisprudence constante seem to have come to value the predictability and certainty that come with the common law doctrine. This Article suggests that Louisiana courts are striking the right balance between valuing the predictability and certainty of interpretation that comes with a healthy respect for precedent and maintaining the flexibility and adaptability of the law by not strictly considering precedent a source of law. This Article discusses the results of an ongoing examination of the sources of law and the value of precedent in Louisiana. The examination involves a study of Louisiana legislation, Louisiana courts’ writings about the sources of law and precedent, and a survey of Louisiana judges. Part of the examination included reviewing Louisiana judicial opinions on various issues to determine if there were differences in valuing precedent based on area of law or topic. It also included reviewing judicial opinions from the United States Supreme Court and New York state courts to compare these courts’ approaches to the use of precedent with those of the Louisiana courts. The article is based on a paper presented to the Third Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, which was held in Jerusalem, Israel in June 2011, and the author’s prior writings on the subject.

EU-China economic ties will become more distant

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Medical Equipment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
European Public ◽  
Economic Ties ◽  
Over Time

Significance The pandemic has exposed Europe’s dependence on China for medical equipment, the vulnerability of European firms to Chinese takeovers and China’s lack of transparency in general. The resulting deterioration of European governments’ views of China increases the likelihood that EU-China economic relations will become somewhat more distant over time. Impacts The EU’s view of China is aligning more with that of the United States, but differences in aims and tactics impede cooperation. The election of Joe Biden as US president in November would strengthen Western cohesion and cooperation over China. European public opinion on China is likely to become more negative over time.

Paradigm Lost: The Dutch Dilemma

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice Punch ◽  
Bob Hoogenboom ◽  
Tom Williamson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Zero Tolerance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Crime Reduction ◽  
Dutch Society ◽  
Community Oriented Policing ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
The Right

In the 1970s the Dutch police developed a paradigm of policing that married ideas from the United States on community-oriented policing to a strongly social and democratic role for the police in society. From the early 1990s there was a gradual shift to the right in Dutch society that was reflected in concerns about crime and safety. The paradigm came under scrutiny. Then Dutch officers began to visit New York in considerable numbers and returned with ideas on ‘zero tolerance’. This ‘tough’ approach to crime reduction appears to conflict with Dutch ‘tolerance’ in criminal justice. The paper argues that there is reluctance to abandon that original paradigm, ambivalence about the new concepts from abroad but, above all, an inability to develop a new, comprehensive paradigm. This may well be true elsewhere and we assume that modern policing needs to be based on a well-thought paradigm on the police role in society.

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