scholarly journals An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 370-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongmin Chen ◽  
David E.M. Sappington
Author(s):  
Marc Baudry ◽  
Adrien Hervouet

AbstractThis article deals with the impact of legal rules on incentives in the seeds sector to create new plant varieties. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D effort. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration in a catalog or minimum standards as commercialization rules. The main result is that the combination of catalog registration and PBRs adopted in Europe is hardly supported by the model calibrated on data for wheat in France.


2000 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Thomas Bruss ◽  
Davy Paindaveine

Let I1,I2,…,In be a sequence of independent indicator functions defined on a probability space (Ω, A, P). We say that index k is a success time if Ik = 1. The sequence I1,I2,…,In is observed sequentially. The objective of this article is to predict the lth last success, if any, with maximum probability at the time of its occurrence. We find the optimal rule and discuss briefly an algorithm to compute it in an efficient way. This generalizes the result of Bruss (1998) for l = 1, and is equivalent to the problem of (multiple) stopping with l stops on the last l successes. We then extend the model to a larger class allowing for an unknown number N of indicator functions, and present, in particular, a convenient method for an approximate solution if the success probabilities are small. We also discuss some applications of the results.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

Software patents have received a great deal of attention in the academicliterature. Unfortunately, most of that attention has been devoted to theproblem of whether software is or should be patentable subject matter. Withroughly 40,000 software patents already issued, and the Federal Circuitendorsing patentability without qualification, those questions are for thehistory books. The more pressing questions now concern the scope to beaccorded software patents. In this paper, we examine the implications ofsome traditional patent law doctrines for innovation in the softwareindustry. We argue that patent law needs some refinement if it is topromote rather than impede the growth of this new market, which ischaracterized by rapid sequential innovation, reuse and re-combination ofcomponents, and strong network effects that privilege interoperablecomponents and products. In particular, we argue for two sorts of new rulesin software patent cases.First, we advocate a limited right to reverse engineer patented computerprograms in order to gain access to and study those programs and toduplicate their unprotected elements. Such a right is firmly established incopyright law, and seems unexceptional as a policy matter even in patentlaw. But because patent law contains no fair use or reverse engineeringexemption, patentees could use the grant of rights on a single component ofa complex program to prevent any "making" or "using" of the program as awhole, including those temporary uses needed in reverse engineering. Whilepatent law does contain doctrines of "experimental use" and "exhaustion,"it is not at all clear that those doctrines will protect legitimate reverseengineering efforts. We suggest that if these doctrines cannot be readbroadly enough to establish such a right, Congress should create a limitedright to reverse engineer software containing patented components forresearch purposes.Second, we argue that in light of the special nature of innovation withinthe software industry, courts should apply the doctrine of equivalentsnarrowly in infringement cases. The doctrine of equivalents allows afinding of infringement even when the accused product does not literallysatisfy each element of the patent, if there is substantial equivalence asto each element. The test of equivalence is the known interchangeability ofclaimed and accused elements at the time of (alleged) infringement. Anumber of factors unique to software and the software industry - a cultureof reuse and incremental improvement, a lack of reliance on systems offormal documentation used in other technical fields, the short effectivelife of software innovations, and the inherent plasticity of code -severely complicate post hoc assessments of the "known interchangeability"of software elements. A standard for equivalence of code elements thatignores these factors risks stifling legitimate, successful efforts todesign around existing software patents. To avoid this danger, courtsshould construe software claims narrowly, and should refuse a finding ofequivalence if the accused element is "interchangeable" with prior art thatshould have narrowed the original patent, or if the accused improvement istoo many generations removed from the original invention.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249124
Author(s):  
Hyoung Jun Kim ◽  
Su Jung Jee ◽  
So Young Sohn

In the rapidly changing high-tech industry, firms that produce multi-generational products struggle to consistently introduce new products that are superior in innovativeness. However, developing innovative products in a short time sequence period is likely to cause quality problems. Therefore, considering time and resource constraints, two kinds of strategies are commonly employed: sequential innovation strategy, sequentially introducing a new generation of technology product at every launch interval, ensuring timely innovativeness but with relatively uncertain quality, or quality strategy, intermittently introducing a new generation of products, together with a derivative model between generations to enhance the quality. In this study, we propose a framework for a cost–benefit analysis that compares these two strategies by considering competition between firms within a generation as well as that within a firm across multiple generations (i.e., cannibalization) throughout the launch cycle of high-tech products. We apply our proposed framework to the smartphone market and conduct a sensitivity analysis. The results are expected to contribute to strategic decision-making related to the introduction of multi-generational technology products.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederik Janssen ◽  
Johannes Fürnkranz

2004 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 483-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Allaart

Optimal stopping rules are developed for the correlated random walk when future returns are discounted by a constant factor per unit time. The optimal rule is shown to be of dual threshold form: one threshold for stopping after an up-step, and another for stopping after a down-step. Precise expressions for the thresholds are given for both the positively and the negatively correlated cases. The optimal rule is illustrated by several numerical examples.


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