Leibniz's Horrendous and Unthinkable World: A Critique of Leibniz's ‘Best Possible World' Theodicy

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Hadsell
Sophia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Cohen

Author(s):  
David Pearson

As the United States emerged triumphant from the Cold War and became the world’s sole superpower, the 1990s underground punk renaissance challenged the narrative that democratic capitalism was the best possible world. It did so by transforming punk musical style, politics, and culture to speak to new conditions and revolutionize the punk scene from the inside out. An outline of punk’s history and musical development, as well as an exposition of original methods of musical analysis for punk rhythms, riffs, timbres, and vocals, provide the necessary background for understanding 1990s punk.


Author(s):  
Lucy Sheaf

The “Confessio philosophi” is an early dialogue in which Leibniz engages with what he takes to be the central task of theodicy: to uphold the justice of God. It evinces his commitment to the claim that ours is the best possible world, and offers an account of how such a world could include damnation. Various answers to the question why God is justified in permitting sin are suggested in the dialogue. These are addressed in this chapter, which also highlights a threat to God’s justice raised by the doctrine of eternal damnation which is given surprisingly little attention. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the place of the “Confessio philosophi” in Leibniz’s lifelong theodicy project.


1993 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Jolivet

Al-Kindī's views concerning time are dispersed in different places in his works, but they are to be found principally in his On First Philosophy and De quinque essentiis (Sermo de tempore). Yes, he does follow Aristotle, but he insists on the homogeneity of the instant and of time; he also distances himself from the Philosopher by denying the eternity of the world a parte ante as well as a parte post. On the other hand, in his accounts of the realization of possible things and of the organization of the cosmos, he presents certain views that sometimes tend toward the principle of plenitude, and sometimes toward the doctrine of the best possible world, and here one can discern a principle that is distinctly theological.


2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 206-208
Author(s):  
Mari Hvattum

I've always thought that Leibniz's monadology offers comfort during parallel session conferences. Assuring us that each monad reflects the whole, although from its particular point of view, Leibniz makes the sanguine case that one can make sense of things even if one's viewpoint is sadly singular. In the mad rush from one paper session to the next, knowing that at best one gets to hear a third of what is being said, it helps to invoke a bit of Leibnizian optimism. And indeed, Dublin seemed like a best possible world during the three days of the Defining Space conference taking place in October 2007. Generously hosted and meticulously organised, the University College Dublin-led event succeeded not only in attracting more than eighty papers that contributed to elucidate the concept of space in relation to architecture, art, and the city, but also in creating an atmosphere of conviviality and intellectual generosity which gave the event an unusual sense of sharing.


1980 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Basinger ◽  

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Wee

Both Descartes and Leibniz are on record as maintaining that acting freely requires that the agent ‘could have done otherwise.’ However, it is not clear how they could maintain this, given their other metaphysical commitments. In Leibniz's case, the arguments connected with this are well-rehearsed: it is argued, for example, that Leibnizian doctrines such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the thesis that God must will the best possible world preclude that the human could ever do other than she did. The question of whether Descartes can maintain that the agent is able to do otherwise in the face of his wider metaphysical commitments has received comparatively little attention. However, Chappell has recently noted that Descartes's thesis that God is the ‘total cause’ of everything seems to preclude the possibility of human freedom (where this includes the ability to do otherwise).


1999 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-307
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Maya Krishnan

Abstract In this article I argue that the Critical Kant endorses the claim that God creates the best possible world, and that this claim is best understood as committing him to the view that God creates an infinitely valuable world. Kant’s understudied Critical theory of the best possible world differs significantly from his better-known quasi-Leibnizian pre-Critical account insofar as it uses an axiological rather than ontological metric for the goodness of worlds. The axiological metric introduces unique challenges for a Kantian account of the best possible world. These challenges are in turn resolved via an infinite value interpretation.


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