Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Wee
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Face ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

Both Descartes and Leibniz are on record as maintaining that acting freely requires that the agent ‘could have done otherwise.’ However, it is not clear how they could maintain this, given their other metaphysical commitments. In Leibniz's case, the arguments connected with this are well-rehearsed: it is argued, for example, that Leibnizian doctrines such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the thesis that God must will the best possible world preclude that the human could ever do other than she did. The question of whether Descartes can maintain that the agent is able to do otherwise in the face of his wider metaphysical commitments has received comparatively little attention. However, Chappell has recently noted that Descartes's thesis that God is the ‘total cause’ of everything seems to preclude the possibility of human freedom (where this includes the ability to do otherwise).

Leibniz on the Grounds of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Pikkert
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
A Value ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Best Possible World

Abstract I examine several alleged grounds of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz’s philosophy. These include the nature of a requisite and a sufficient condition, the nature of truth, and the nature of harmony. I argue that Leibniz does not ground the PSR in any of these ways. Instead, he is committed to a value-based grounds of the PSR: God creates the best possible world, and the fact that the PSR obtains in this world contributes to it being the best. I conclude by considering some objections to this way of grounding the PSR.

scholarly journals Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: Exploring a Glut-Theoretic Account

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 770
Author(s):  
Michael DeVito
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

This essay marks the first steps towards a viable glut-theoretic (contradictory) solution to the longstanding foreknowledge and free will dilemma. Specifically, I offer a solution to the dilemma that accommodates omniscience (foreknowledge) and human freedom (as the ability to do otherwise) in a simple, flat-footed way. This goal is accomplished via viewing the theological fatalist argument not as a problem, but as a sound argument: omniscience and human free will are contradictory and by dropping to a weaker underlying account of logical consequence, we can embrace them in their full-throated, robust (though contradictory) interpretations. That said, the primary aim of this paper is one of exploration: how does a subclassical solution to the foreknowledge and free will dilemma stack up in comparison to the traditional solutions on offer in the literature. This essay represents the beginning of such an exploration.

scholarly journals The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Blake McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

I examine Leibniz’s version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with respect to free will, paying particular attention to Peter van Inwagen’s argument that this principle leads to determinism. Ultimately I conclude that Leibniz’s formulation is incompatible with free will. I then discuss a reformulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason endorsed by Alexander Pruss that, I argue, manages to both retain the strength of Leibniz’s formulation and remain consistent with free will.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

The Provenance of Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Vision
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Material Base ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Intrinsic Nature ◽  
Fundamental Particles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

Unlike brute ‘entities’, if conscious states (c-states) are brute, it will be a consequence of their primitive—viz., not admitting further elaboration—connection to their material base, what is commonly known as emergence. One might suppose the chief challenge to emergence comes from various materialist counter-proposals. However, given the distinctive character of c-states, a class of critics describe even materialist reductions as objectionable forms of emergentism. Instead, their fallback position is a reinvigorated panpsychism: consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the most fundamental particles. In this chapter the author examines that form of panpsychism, tracing its roots to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and to suggestions aired in Bertrand Russell’s struggles with the issue. He concludes that this panpsychism fails, leaving the field to materialism and emergentist dualism.

Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

II. The Question of God in the Struggle for Racial Justice

Horizons ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
Christopher Pramuk
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Whole Body ◽  
Racial Justice ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face

In March 1943, having narrowly escaped Europe three years earlier, Abraham Joshua Heschel published “The Meaning of This War,” his first essay in an American publication. The essay shows, quite remarkably, his full command of literary English. It also shows, as biographer Edward Kaplan remarks, that Heschel “had found his militant voice.” “Emblazoned over the gates of the world in which we live,” the essay begins, “is the escutcheon of the demons. The mark of Cain in the face of man has come to overshadow the likeness of God. There have never been so much guilt and distress, agony and terror. At no time has the earth been so soaked with blood.” Heschel's extraordinary life's witness, his whole body of work, traverses precisely this anthropological and theological knife's edge: The mark of Cain in the face of man has come to overshadow the likeness of God. Where is God? Or better, Who is God? in relation to the rapacious misuse and idolatrous distortion of human freedom? Or simply, Is God?

Creating the Best Possible World: Some Problems from Parfit

Sophia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Possible World ◽  
Best Possible World
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