The Little State Department: McGeorge Bundy and the National Security Council Staff, 1961-65

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW PRESTON
Author(s):  
Nadejda K Marinova

The chapter analyzes the George W. Bush administration’s utilization of two Lebanese diaspora NGOs: the World Council for the Cedars Revolution (WCCR) and the International Lebanese Committee for UNSCR 1559 (ILC 1559). The two organizations represented activists who withdrew from the World Lebanese Cultural Union after May 2005, when the World Lebanese Cultural Union had returned to a cultural and social agenda. WCCR and ILC 1559 activists continued reiterating support for the administration’s policy toward Syria and Lebanon with Washington think tanks, hosted conferences with members of Congress, and met with officials at the National Security Council and State Department. The chapter provides another example of host-government (in this instance, US) policymakers using diasporas to further mutually beneficial agendas, in a more low-key fashion than the American Lebanese Coalition prior to 2005.


1985 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Simon

In the spring of 1981 I designed and taught what I considered, at the time, a "high risk" seminar for seventeen junior and senior political science majors. There were to be no textbooks, no lectures, no examinations and no term papers, those hallmarks of the traditional college course. Nevertheless, when the thirteen week course was over, the students were exhausted and claimed that they had never worked so hard in their college careers.The adventure that my students (and I) undertook was a semester long simulation of the United States National Security Council (NSC), dealing with actual global events as they happened. As Washington dealt with a problem, we dealt with the same problem. The simulation was initially offered during the deteriorating situation in Iran and instability in the Gulf region.


2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles David

This article examines the performance of the U.S. National Security Council as a policy-making body vis-à-vis the southern African conflict under the Nixon and Ford Administrations. It discusses and verifies the hypothesis that the institutionalized System of the NSC gives the President a way of seriously improving his policies, by analyzing (within a structured and formalized framework) the range of options and alternatives, free of negative bureaucratic influences. Furthermore, it shows the impact that the presidential decisions had over the orientation of the southern African conflict from 1969 to 1976.


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