Book Reviews: The General Assembly in World Politics, The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects, Political Writings, on Duties, Policraticus, Political Writings, Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture, Statism and Anarchy, Patriarcha and other Writings, Social Choice Theory, Social Choice: A Framework for Collective Decisions and Individual Judgements, Individualism: Theories and Methods, Capitalism and Individualism: Reframing the Argument for the Free Society, Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief, Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies, Political Theory and Postmodernism, Equality and Partiality, Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory, Political Argument: A Reissue with a New Introduction, The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood, Essays in Political Philosophy, Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, Staking a Claim: Feminism, Bureaucracy and the State, The Sexual Contract, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory, beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare, Social Change, Social Welfare and Social Science, Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie, The Symbolic Presidency: How Presidents Portray Themselves, Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan, The President in the Legislative Arena, Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam, into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, Kremlin in Transition

1992 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 358-377
Author(s):  
Ennals ◽  
Bernard Crick ◽  
Iain McLean ◽  
Ian Forbes ◽  
Zygmunt Bauman ◽  
...  
Politics ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Vanhuysse

In this article, Amartya Sen's seminal proof of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal is briefly reviewed. I then discuss the reception of this alleged ‘liberal paradox’ within the fields of political theory and welfare economics. In particular, I examine the criticisms made by Brian Barry, and their wider implications for the field of social choice theory. It is argued that the various criticisms made on Sen's characterisation of liberty are fundamental, and that Sen's subsequent defence of his position is unconvincing. Moreover, there remain some wider doubts as to the usefulness of social choice theory's SWF approach to individual rights and freedoms.


1988 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Morrow

This paper analyzes the implications of social choice theory for the study of world politics. A view of the world system as a social choice mechanism leads to the observation that the outcomes of world politics are determined neither by structure nor by preferences alone, but rather by their interaction. Structural change occurs only when the actors cannot achieve their preferences through the current system. Three particular social choice mechanisms are analyzed to determine which conditions of Arrow's theorem they violate. The argument is illustrated by examining two salient theoretical works, Waltz's Theory of International Politics and Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics. The critique of Waltz illustrates that structure alone cannot determine outcome; the critique of Gilpin examines how structural change occurs in world politics and underlines the importance of preferences in such changes.


Author(s):  
Christian List

In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democracy cannot be reduced to voting alone, but that it requires deliberation. In formal social choice theory, by contrast, the study of democracy has focused primarily on the aggregation of individual opinions into collective decisions, typically through voting. While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results identifying conflicts between different intuitively plausible desiderata. In recent years, there has been a growing dialogue between the two literatures. This paper discusses the connections between them. Important insights are that (i) deliberation can complement aggregation and open up an escape route from some of its negative results; and (ii) the formal models of social choice theory can shed light on some aspects of deliberation, such as the nature of deliberation-induced opinion change.


Author(s):  
Iain McLean

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document