Power

This chapter explores ambition for power in politics and the workplace. Control over others can be advantageous in its own right and also in the wealth and recognition that it often confers. Although most politicians link their need for power to the service of public interests, the evidence often suggests otherwise. Drawing on prominent examples, such as Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, John McCain, and Donald Trump, and those who served them, the chapter explores how prioritizing power can subvert principle and the institutional checks necessary to prevent abuse. By contrast, examples such as Nelson Mandela show how those who use power to empower others can serve the highest ideals of social justice. Power in the workplace can also serve stakeholder and societal interests, but it is too often sabotaged by egoistic interests, needs for control, and bullying behaviors. The chapter concludes with strategies to increase accountability for abusive conduct.

Lyndon’s Lackey?

After criticizing Lyndon Johnson as a Senate leader, Drew Pearson became a strong supporter of his presidency, remaining sufficiently close to be jeered as “Lyndon’s lackey.” Access to the president provided a fountain of information but complicated his efforts to report candidly. If he wrote anything complimentary, critics charged that LBJ had dog-collared him. If he wrote anything unfavorable, Johnson protested bitterly. Although Pearson encouraged Johnson to withdraw American troops from South Vietnam, he supported the widening war. Anti-war activists accused him of selling out to Johnson, and his own wife picketed the White House. Pearson held his dissent until 1968, shortly before Johnson announced he would not run for reelection. The column assailed Robert F. Kennedy for approving the wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. It also conducted an extensive anti-corruption campaign against Senator Thomas Dodd, which resulted in Dodd’s censure by the Senate.

Supreme Court Nominations at the Bar of Political Conflict: The Strange and Uncertain Career of the Liberal Consensus in Law

Nominations to the US Supreme Court have become increasingly important and contentious in America politics in recent decades. Reasons include the growing significance of constitutional law to the prospects of political power, accompanied by historical developments in the relative power of the competing party coalitions that have placed even more focus on the composition of the Court. Meanwhile, partisan conflict and stalemate have grown in the party systems and among We the People. In The Long Reach of the Sixties, Laura Kalman explores how the nomination struggles of Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon set the stage for the contemporary conflict besetting nominations and American politics more generally. Building on Kalman’s book, this review essay discusses the political and jurisprudential causes and implications of this conflict, with an eye toward what might lie ahead.

“The Magna Carta to Liberate Our Cities”

Starting in 1964, the U.S. federal government under President Lyndon Johnson passed an ambitious reform program that included social security, urban renewal, anti-poverty initiatives, and civil rights legislation. In cities like Los Angeles, these reforms fueled urban revitalization efforts in communities affected by economic decline. These reforms closed the gap between local residents and government officials in California and even subsequently brought the city’s African American and Mexican American population into greater political proximity. Looking closely at the impact of the Chicano Movement on the Model Cities Program, a federal initiative designed specifically for urban development and renewal, this article brings the role of U.S. government policy in shaping social justice priorities in Los Angeles, and the U.S. Southwest more broadly, into sharper view.

An Ounce of Prevention

The recent social upheaval in the wake of George Floyd’s death is reminiscent of the country’s turmoil in the late 1960s. In response to that social upheaval, President Lyndon Johnson charged what came to be known as the Kerner Commission with investigating the riots’ causes across 20 major American cities and recommending what could be done to prevent their reoccurrence. Among the most prominently mentioned causes of the riots was “inadequate recreation areas and facilities” in impoverished urban areas (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 104). In its recommendations, however, the Kerner Commission largely ignored the importance of recreation areas and facilities. Our commentary discusses why that was the case then, and why that should not be the case now.

From War to War, 1956–67

Despite the Israeli myths, the 1967 war was not “a war of no choice.” Before the war, Israeli political and military hawks hoped to use another war to seize the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Israel deliberately provoked Syria into war. Egypt was forced by its alliance with Syria to come to its assistance, but did not intend to start a war with Israel. U.S and Israeli intelligence knew this and anticipated that Israel would easily defeat Egypt, even if the Egyptians attacked first. Though strongly pro-Israel, Lyndon Johnson did not want the U.S. to be drawn into the war. Therefore, the Israeli military attack on Egypt in June 1967 was not forced on Israel. During the war Israel seized the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. After the war Israel decided to keep its conquests and to ignore signals from the Arab states for compromise peace settlements.