“Civil service reform,” which has become the nickname for
public sector management reform in the parlance of development
economics, has only recently and grudgingly been accepted by those who
advise on policy in the poor countries. Even then, the approach is
somewhat paternalistic in that it emphasises externally-designed rules
and processes for management, organisation, audit and accountability. It
recognises the role of people in terms of noting that incentives and
employment policies matter but only in terms of right-sizing the
government and second to the need to spread budgetary resources over the
politically chosen level of employment. What it does not accept is that
and the drive to manage the public sector better has to be led and
implemented by the domestic talent and in that they must have both the
incentive and the honour of doing just that. This paper argues that the
main reason that the public sector management has suffered in many of
the poor countries is that incentives have been allowed to erode rapidly
as public sector employment was viewed politically as a means of
providing welfare.
Issues in the Designing of Public Sector Reform