THE COMPETITIVE CONDITION OF U.S. BANKING MARKETS AND THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL REFORM

1977 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold A. Heggestad ◽  
John J. Mingo
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Fumitoshi Mizutani

Abstract The main purpose of this study is to evaluate factors affecting passenger rail demand, with special attention to the effects of structural reform/regulation and competition. In order to do this, we use data obtained from 30 OECD countries for the 24 years from 1990 to 2013. As structural reform/regulation and competition variables, we take the OECD’s five kinds of regulatory indices: (i) overall, (ii) entry, (iii) public ownership, (iv) vertical integration, and (v) market structure; and for competition variables, we take (vi) rail passenger-freight ratio, (vii) rail share, and (viii) high-speed train ratio. As estimation methods, both the fixed effect model and the Hausman-Taylor estimation model are used. The major findings are as follows. First, competition as competitiveness (i.e. the share of rail, passenger over freight ratio) increases passenger demand. And the existence of high-speed trains increases passenger demand. Second, overall, entry regulation, and market structure have no significant effect on demand. Third, public ownership affects passenger demand positively. Last, vertical integration reduces passenger demand.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Gogolin ◽  
Ivan Lim ◽  
Francesco Vallascas

1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Posner

The constraints imposed on Chile’s democratic transition by the military regime, plus the impact of structural reform and the political renovation of the dominant parties of the center and left, have made the traditional party allies of the popular sectors unable or unwiIIing to represent those constituents in the political arena. This argument is substantiated through an overview of pacted democratic transitions, an analysis of the evolution of party-base relations in Chile, and a consideration of the institutional impediments to further democratic reform.


1992 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Stidham ◽  
Robert A. Carp ◽  
Donald R. Songer ◽  
Donean Surratt

Author(s):  
Hans Degryse ◽  
Paola Morales-Acevedo ◽  
Steven Ongena

This chapter merges recent findings from the empirical banking literature with conventional insights from work on banking competition and regulation. It first reviews and assesses the different methodological approaches pursued to address banking competition. While market structure indicators are easily computable, they may not be overly informative about the competitive conditions in banking markets. The literature now focuses on “non-market structure” indicators such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the (adjusted) Lerner index, or the Boone indicator. The chapter then structures the discussion on the empirical findings based upon a framework that finds its roots in the different theories of financial intermediation. Other approaches to infer banking competition are also discussed, in particular, the impact that regulation and information sharing between banks may have on banking competition.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document