Covert Intervention as a Moral Problem

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Beitz

Today's international community may well view covert action and democracy as mutually exclusive policies. This article examines the practice of covert action in American foreign policy in light of events of the mid-1970s and 1980s, focusing on the scandalous misuse of executive authority and lack of accountability associated with covert means. Often manipulative and sometimes anonymous, covert operations raise critical morality concerns in a democratic society. Whether “any form of accountability is likely to be sufficient to bring the unauthorized use of executive power under control” is the crucial issue to be addressed when examining the practicality of covert actions by the executive branch.

Author(s):  
Valentina Aronica ◽  
Inderjeet Parmar

This chapter examines domestic factors that influence American foreign policy, focusing on the variety of ways in which pressure groups and elites determine and shape what the United States does in the international arena. It first considers how US foreign policy has evolved over time before discussing the US Constitution in terms of foreign policy making and implementation. It then explores institutional influences on foreign policy making, including Congress and the executive branch, as well as the role of ‘orthodox’ and ‘unorthodox’ actors involved in the making of foreign policy and how power is distributed among them. It also analyzes the Trump administration’s foreign policy, taking into account the ‘Trump Doctrine’ and the US strikes on Syria.


1998 ◽  
Vol 7 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 127-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Davis

AbstractHistorians of foreign relations rarely consider the issue of immigration policy to be part of their field. Yet, immigration policy has much relevance for the study of the history of recent American foreign policy. The standards by which one nation chooses to admit immigrants can have an important effect on the sensitivities and attitudes of another nation, as was demonstrated in the tension that marked U.S.-Japanese relations after passage of the Asian Exclusion Act in 1924. Moreover, the movement of refugees escaping persecution, war, oppression, discrimination, and natural disasters can have an impact, both positive and negative, on a “receiving” nation’s economy, society, and political stability. In the recent history of the United States, debates over immigration policy have been guided in large part by foreign policy concerns. This is particularly true when considering the postwar debate between the executive branch and Congress about opening America’s doors to Asians.


1951 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-250
Author(s):  
Lawrence H. Chamberlain

Both of these books deal with foreign policy and they are alike in their common concern with the organizational rather than the substantive aspect of that policy. Both authors believe in democracy and in our own particular American brand of democracy. Although both feel that existing arrangements need modification, neither desires a complete scrapping of our basic governmental structure. But while Professor McCamy puts his faith in the executive branch and feels that the answer lies in an energizing and streamlining of the administrative process which will better equip the President and his subordinates for (a) determining sound policy and (b) persuading Congress to accept—or not reject—that policy, Professor Dahl argues that the more basic need is to equip Congress so that its wisdom and judgment can be added to that of the executive in the attainment of a mutually determined policy.


1984 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce W. Jentleson

Changes in the domestic politics of East-West energy trade policy indicate a more general transformation of the domestic politics of American foreign policy. In the postwar period the basic, consensual pattern of congressional bipartisanship, executivebranch unity, interest-group collaboration, and a supportive public has been replaced by the conflictual pattern of an assertive Congress, a fragmented executive branch, antagonistic interest groups, and a divided public. These contrasting patterns are manifestations of structural changes in the domestic political economy. Along both political and economic dimensions, and differentiated according to whether the locus of pressure was group-specific or more general, what had been basic foundations of consensus became by the early 1970s fissures of conflict. Of particular significance were the weakening of the macropolitical foundations (the basic accord on foreignpolicy objectives and strategies) in the wake of both Vietnam and detente and the increased marginal value of the economic costs, both diffuse (macroeconomic) and particularistic (microeconomic), to be paid for economic coercion. In this transformed context, the state's support-building instruments of ideology and economic compensation were insufficient to build consensus. As a result, in this issue area and perhaps more generally, high levels of domestic constraints on the conduct of American foreign policy have become the rule rather than the exception.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Lieberman

In their recent book,The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that American support for Israel does not serve American interests. Nevertheless, they observe that American foreign policy regarding the Middle East, especially in recent years, has tilted strongly toward support for Israel, and they attribute this support to the influence of the “Israel lobby” in American domestic politics. Their book is principally an attempt to make a causal argument about American politics and policymaking. I examine three aspects of this argument—its causal logic, the use of evidence to support hypotheses, and the argument's connection with the state of knowledge about American politics—and conclude that the case for the Israel lobby as the primary cause of American support for Israel is at best a weak one, although it points to a number of interesting questions about the mechanisms of power in American politics. Mearsheimer and Walt's propositions about the direct influence of the Israel lobby on Congress and the executive branch are generally not supported by theory or evidence. Less conclusive and more suggestive, however, are their arguments about the lobby's apparent influence on the terms and boundaries of legitimate debate and discussion of Israel and the Middle East in American policymaking. These directions point to an alternative approach to investigating the apparent influence of the Israel lobby in American politics, focusing less on direct, overt power over policy outcomes and more on more subtle pathways of influence over policy agendas and the terms of policy discourse.


Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron

This chapter details how the Cold War Paradigm mindset became institutionalized within the executive branch following the end of World War II. The threat from communism, both external and internal, provided the foundation from which Truman would alter American foreign policy through the Truman Doctrine, but also would focus internally in seeking to stop communist and subversive activities domestically. Once institutionalized, the Cold War Paradigm demonstrates how Truman's actions became a learned response to threats, which altered information policies within the executive branch. Congress heavily supported Truman's actions during this period, as members of Congress also learned and responded to threats. However, the Internal Security Act of 1950 created a rift between the president and Congress over control of government information, setting up an ongoing power struggle that would lead to Eisenhower's creation of executive privilege and Congress's response with the creation of the Moss Subcommittee on government information.


Author(s):  
Michael Foley

This chapter examines the U.S. foreign policy process which encompasses the executive, Congress, and intelligence. It first considers American foreign policy as a primary agency of government adaptation before discussing the role of the executive as the lead agency of systemic evolution in response to foreign policy needs, taking into account the executive prerogative and judicial recognition of inherent executive power. It then describes the political and technical difficulties experienced by Congress in matching the executive in foreign policy. It also explores the ramifications of 9/11 and the war on terror for American foreign policy and concludes with an overview of U.S. foreign policy under Barack Obama.


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