Informed Consent: Physician Inexperience is a Material Risk for Patients

2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 478-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Veerapen

The Canadian law governing informed consent was significantly influenced by the decision of its Supreme Court in Reibl v. Hughes, a case that involved a physician’s failure to warn the patient about the risk of stroke after carotid endarterectomy. Even though most Canadian plaintiffs after Reibl have continued to lose informed consent cases, it is likely that the judgement in this case has significantly influenced the manner in which physicians now approach the discussion of risk while obtaining consent not only in Canada but also in several other jurisdictions.The development of informed consent law in the United States similarly became one of the drivers for change in physicians’ practices of information disclosure to their patients. The effect of Reibl on clinical practice is an outstanding example of the law’s positive influence on medical practice, especially in protecting patient autonomy during collaborative medical decision-making.

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (12) ◽  
pp. 1133-1144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana L. Alden ◽  
John M. Friend ◽  
Angela Y. Lee ◽  
Marieke de Vries ◽  
Ryosuke Osawa ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jessica Berg ◽  
Emma Cave

This chapter discusses patient autonomy, capacity, and consent involving children. It first provides a general overview of children’s rights with respect to making medical decisions in both the United States and Europe. The chapter then discusses the best interests standard (which is usually applied in cases of minors) and how to consider capacity in the context of children. In the discussions of European approaches, the chapter covers relevant international and regional human rights law. The jurisdiction of England and Wales are used as examples. The chapter also provides a general overview of US state approaches and federal law. The chapter concludes by noting some new areas of medical decision-making which challenge the traditional models.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-283
Author(s):  
Himani Bhakuni

There is a well-established common law doctrine for ascertaining information disclosure in informed consent claims within the treatment context that governs the doctor–patient relationship. But there is no such doctrine in clinical research governing the researcher–participant relationship in India. India, however, is not exceptional in this regard. Common law countries like the United States and Canada at most have sparse, non-systematised, criteria for such cases; arguably, a doctrine for research is at its nascent stage. But the adequacy of the existing criteria for settling informed consent claims in research has hardly ever been discussed. Furthermore, a specific discussion on the applicability of this ‘nascent doctrine’ to India is non-existent. This article discusses both. The article examines case law from India and other common law jurisdictions that hint at developments in this area. It suggests that Indian courts need to move abreast with other jurisdictions to better protect India’s patients and research participants.


2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-205
Author(s):  
Jay M. Baruch

Contrary to popular belief, a patient’s signature on a piece of paper does not constitute informed consent. This article describes the ethical framework of consent in the context of the larger process of informed decision making. The elements of informed consent are examined in practical terms. Common pitfalls are addressed, with strategies to help anticipate and resolve possible dilemmas. These important tools are integral to all levels of medical decision making, including those at the end of life. (J Am Podiatr Med Assoc 94(2): 198-205, 2004)


1981 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela R. Holder ◽  
John W. Lewis

Informed consent, as the courts define it, is the patient's right to know, before agreeing to a procedure, what the procedure entails — the hazards, the possible complications, and expected results of the treatment. The patient must understand any reasonable alternatives to the proposed procedure, including, in most cases, the results that can be predicted from nontreatment. The choice among alternative risks involves value judgments falling outside the scope of medical decision-making, including the patient's views on social, economic, and other personal factors of which health professionals cannot possibly be aware.The negotiations necessary to obtain the patient's informed consent are the responsibility of the person who will perform the procedure. If a physician is in charge, the physician may delegate the discussion to another but retains the legal responsibility to make sure the patient understands.


Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

In the preceding chapter we spoke of the requirement for informed consent in absolute terms, as something that was an invariable component of medical decision making. Over the years, courts have come to recognize that there are a number of situations in which physicians are permitted to render treatment without patients’ informed consent. Even under the earlier simple consent requirement, consent to treatment was not required in all situations. There are different kinds of situations in which requiring disclosure and obtaining consent could be detrimental to the patient, such as in an emergency or when the disclosure itself would harm the patient, and therefore in these situations informed consent is not required. Patients may also waive, or give up, the right to be informed and/or to consent. Here the concern is not with promoting health values but with promoting autonomy. Informed consent may also be dispensed with in a fourth set of cases, those of legally required treatment, in which the harm from requiring informed consent is not necessarily to the patient (or the patient alone) but to other important societal interests (e.g., civil commitment of the dangerous mentally ill—see Chapter 11—or forced treatment of patients with infectious disease). In addition, informed consent requirements are modified when a patient is incompetent (see Chapter 5). Each of these exceptions contains the potential for undermining the values sought to be implemented by the informed consent doctrine: self-determination and informed decision making. Exceptions that are too broadly defined and applied are a threat to these values. On the other hand, these exceptions are an important vehicle for the interjection into the decisionmaking process of another set of values, society’s interest in promoting the health of individuals. When judiciously defined and applied, the exceptions accord health-related values their due. However, the exceptions can be, and sometimes have been, defined so broadly as to dilute, if not dissolve, the fundamental duties imposed by the doctrine and to undermine its essential purpose of assuring patient participation in medical decision making (1).


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