Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy Lesson

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 652-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Stone

In most other nations, insurance for medical care is called sickness insurance, and it covers sick people. In the United States, we have “health insurance,” and its major carriers — commercial insurers, large employers, and increasingly government programs — strive to avoid sick people and cover only the healthy. This perverse logic at the heart of the American health insurance system is the key to reform debates.Focusing on sick people versus healthy people might seem a strange way to view the coverage issue. Most discussions of insurance categorize people into other groupings: the insured versus the uninsured; Caucasian whites versus other racial and ethnic groups; men versus women; poor and low-income people versus everybody else; children, adults, and the elderly; or citizens versus immigrants and undocumented aliens. More recently, health researchers have begun talking about “vulnerable populations,” using most of the same demographic groupings and adding other illness-inducing factors such as social isolation, stress, and impoverished neighborhoods. But as I will show, insurance plans now use premiums, cost-sharing, and other design features in ways that indirectly divide each of these groups into the sick and the healthy, to the detriment of the sick. By shifting the costs of illness onto people who use medical care — that is, sick people — market-oriented reforms of the last few decades have eroded insurance in the name of strengthening it.

Author(s):  
Hosung Shin ◽  
Han-A Cho ◽  
Bo-Ra Kim

Since 2009, the National Health Insurance in Korea (NHI) has been implementing a series of policies to expand the scope of dental benefits. This study reviewed the changes in co-payments and dental use patterns before (2008 to 2012) and after (2013 to 2017) the NHI’s dental health insurance reform. The study used Korea Health Panel data of 7681 households (16,493 household members) from a 10-year period (2008–2017). Dental expenditures and equivalent income using square root of household size were analyzed. Dental services were categorized into 13 types and a concentration index and 95% confidence interval using the delta method was calculated to identify income-related inequalities by a dental service. Dental expenditures and the number of dental services used increased significantly, while the proportion of out-of-pocket spending by the elderly decreased. The expenditure ratio for implant services to total dental expenditures increased substantially in all age groups, but the ratio of expenditures for dentures and fixed bridges decreased relatively. The concentration index of implant services was basically in favor of the rich, but there was no longer a significant bias favoring the better-off after the reforms. The dental health insurance reform in Korea appears to contribute not only to lowering the ratio of out-of-pocket to total dental expenses per episode in the elderly but also to improving the inequality of dental expenses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (9S) ◽  
pp. 45-45
Author(s):  
Ledibabari M. Ngaage ◽  
Shan Xue ◽  
Mimi R. Borrelli ◽  
Bauback Safa ◽  
Jens U. Berli ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison K. Hoffman

AbstractThe 2010 federal health insurance reform act includes an individual mandate that will require Americans to carry health insurance. This article argues that even if the mandate were to catalyze universal health insurance coverage, it will fall short on some of the policy objectives many hope to achieve through a mandate if implemented in a fragmented insurance market. To uncover this problem, this article sets forth a novel framework that disentangles three different policy objectives the individual mandate can serve. Namely, supporters of the mandate might hope for it to: (1) facilitate greater health and financial security for the uninsured (“paternalism”); (2) eliminate inefficiencies in health care delivery and financing (“efficiency”); and/or (3) require the healthy to buy insurance to help fund medical care for the sick (“health redistribution”). Health redistribution — the primary focus of this article — is a shifting of wealth from the healthy to the sick through the mechanism of risk pooling. Many see health redistribution as a means to enable all Americans to more equitably access medical care on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of ability or willingness to pay.Drawing on evidence from the implementation of an individual mandate in Massachusetts's health reform in 2006, this article reveals that the fragmented American health insurance market will thwart the mandate's ability to achieve these objectives— in particular the goal of health redistribution. Fragmentation is an atomization of the insurance market into numerous risk pools that has been driven by market competition and regulation. It prevents Americans from sharing broadly in the risk of poor health and, in doing so, entrenches a system where access to medical care remains tied to ability to pay and individualized characteristics. The final section of this article examines how various policies, including some in the new law (e.g., insurance regulation and exchanges) and others not (e.g., expanded public insurance), can reduce fragmentation so that the mandate can successfully serve all desired objectives and in the process gain greater legitimacy over time.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gruber ◽  
Helen Levy

How has the economic risk of health spending changed over time for U.S. households? We describe trends in aggregate health spending in the United States and how private insurance markets and public insurance programs have changed over time. We then present evidence from Consumer Expenditure Survey microdata on how the distribution of household spending on health—that is, out-of-pocket payments for medical care plus the household's share of health insurance premiums—has changed over time. This distribution has shifted up over time—households spend more on medical care and insurance than they used to—but for the purposes of measuring change in risk, it is not the mean but the dispersion of this distribution that is of interest. We consider two measures of dispersion that serve as proxies for household risk: the standard deviation of the distribution of household health spending and the ratio of the 90th percentile of spending to the median (the so-called “90/50 gap”). We find, surprisingly, that neither has increased despite the rapid rise in aggregate health spending. This conclusion holds true for broad subgroups of the population (for example, the nonelderly as a group) but not for some narrowly-defined subgroups (for example, low-income families with children). We next consider how much risk households should face, from the perspective of economic efficiency. Household risk may not have changed much over the past several decades, but do we have any evidence that this level represents either too much or too little risk? Finally, we discuss implications for public policy—in particular, for current debates over expanding health insurance coverage to the uninsured.


Author(s):  
Sabrina Ching Yuen Luk

This article uses a refined version of historical institutionalism to critically examine the complex interplay of forces that shape the health insurance reform trajectory in China since the mid-1980s, problems that plague the current multi-layered social medical insurance system and solutions to these problems. It shows that achieving universal health coverage (UHC) requires the government to ensure financing equity between urban and rural insured participants, access to affordable health care and the financial sustainability of medical insurance funds. Facing the challenges of rapidly aging population, the government implements a pilot scheme that integrates medical and nursing care for the elderly and a pilot long-term care insurance scheme for disabled elderly. It is expected that these two pilot schemes can provide better financial protection and quality of medical services for the elderly.


2021 ◽  
Vol Publish Ahead of Print ◽  
Author(s):  
Ledibabari Mildred Ngaage ◽  
Shan Xue ◽  
Mimi R. Borrelli ◽  
Bauback Safa ◽  
Jens U. Berli ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 436-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy K. Mariner

Health reform debates in the United States are typically conducted using the language of insurance. President Barack Obama described his hopes for expanding access to care as “health insurance reform.” Both proponents and opponents of reform debated the merits of reform proposals leading to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 in insurance terms. Yet, disagreements over the structure of reform reveal deep differences in what proponents and opponents of reform mean by insurance and the role it should play in mediating access to health care. Scholars of insurance law are likely to describe insurance somewhat narrowly as a risk spreading device. Industry representatives, among others, often view conventional indemnity insurance as the norm. From this perspective, reforms that move too far beyond underwriting risks can be seen as undermining actuarial fairness, threatening the very idea of insurance and possibly the industry itself.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Gould

In 2005, the percentage of Americans with employer-provided health insurance fell for the fifth year in a row. Workers and their families have been falling into the ranks of the uninsured at alarming rates. The downward trend in employer-provided coverage for children also continued into 2005. In the previous four years, children were less likely to become uninsured as public sector health coverage expanded, but in 2005 the rate of uninsured children increased. While Medicaid and SCHIP still work for many, the government has not picked up coverage for everybody who lost insurance. The weakening of this system—notably for children—is particularly difficult for workers and their families in a time of stagnating incomes. Furthermore, these programs are not designed to prevent low-income adults or middle- or high-income families from becoming uninsured. Government at the federal and state levels has responded to medical inflation with policy changes that reduce public insurance eligibility or with proposals to reduce government costs. Federal policy proposals to lessen the tax advantage of workplace insurance or to encourage a private purchase system could further destabilize the employer-provided system. Now is a critical time to consider health insurance reform. Several promising solutions could increase access to affordable health care. The key is to create large, varied, and stable risk pools.


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