The Times of Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (01) ◽  
pp. 253-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renisa Mawani

In this essay, I situate Kunal Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900, within a broader set of intellectual currents engaged with questions of time and temporality. Although Parker's book centers on the common law and history and develops specific conceptions of time, in so doing, he invites legal historians and legal scholars to ruminate on the times of law, particularly the temporal relations that law has with itself. Placing Parker in conversation with Henri Bergson and the recent Bergsonian revival in critical theory, I suggest that law has a duration, a formulation that opens other itineraries to consider the dynamic times of law.

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Louise Tee

ADVERSE possession and registered land are unlikely bedfellows–the one originating in the common law idea that a freehold estate results from possession and the other premised upon registration validating title. Indeed, when registration of title was introduced into England and Wales in the nineteenth century, acquisition of title to registered land by adverse possession was prohibited–see section 21 of the Land Transfer Act 1875. However, a more pragmatic approach then ensued, and the Land Registration Act 1925, s. 75, expansively provided that the Limitation Acts should apply to registered land in the same manner and to the same extent as those Acts applied to unregistered land. But technically, of course, this was impossible, and the section detailed a special trust mechanism for registered land alone. Section 75 thus clearly illustrates the inherent difficulties in trying to retain the substantive law of unregistered land within a registered context. Tensions are inevitable, because of the very different conceptual bases of the two systems. In Central London Commercial Estates Ltd. v. Kato Kagaku Ltd., The Times, 27 July 1998, Sedley J. was directly faced with such tension, as he strove to determine the effect of section 75.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (01) ◽  
pp. 264-269
Author(s):  
Kunal M. Parker

In my response to the reviews of my book by Marianne Constable, Shai Lavi, and Renisa Mawani, I situate the argument of Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism within a concern with contemporary forms of historical knowledge. Where contemporary historical knowledge practices subsume their objects of investigation, I adopt the temporality of the object of investigation—namely, the common law—as the structure my book. In different registers, Constable, Lavi, and Mawani urge me to take up more explicitly the foundational questioning about which they care. I welcome their readings. However, given the distinct problematic from which I start, I argue, the book is not in the first instance an argument about the ontology of history or law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-419
Author(s):  
James Oldham

Historically, the clear recognition by the courts that all adults in public intercourse owe a duty of reasonable care to avoid injuring others has been seen as an early nineteenth century development. Occasionally it is recognized that what is known about the emergence of the tort of negligence in English law comes almost entirely from the printed reports of civil (plea side) cases tried in the three common law courts (King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer). It was not until the 1790s that regular printed reports of jury trials (or nisi prius cases, as they were called) began, and even then, enlightenment from the nisi prius reports was limited. Most of those reports were sketchy, and very few included instructions given to the jury by the trial judge. More importantly, the reports covered only a small fraction of the jury trials that were conducted by the common law courts. The overwhelming majority of civil jury trials ended with the jury verdict (or an occasional nonsuit), with no post-trial proceedings, and what happened in many thousands of these plea-side jury trials in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has been something of a black hole in the historical record.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (02) ◽  
pp. 84-93
Author(s):  
Bebeto Ardyo

The increasement of human needs in society goes hand in hand with the development of technology. To meet these needs, there must be interaction between people which sometimes has the potential to cause disputes. That’s why a contract is needed. The existence of a contract guarantees legal certainty regarding protection of the rights of the parties and also the obligations that they must fulfill. There are several stages of contract formation which consist of pre-contract and agreement between the parties. According to the system in the Book III of Indonesia’s Code of Civil Law, consensus is the base for the formation of contract that means once the agreement has reached between the parties then a contract is formed. Indonesia’s Code of Civil Law doesn’t yet regulate pre-contract stages of contract formation, even though these stages are equally important. The regulation of pre-contract stages are usually set in the common law system, but along with the times, the regulation of pre-contract stages should also be regulated in the civil law system. As a comparison, Het Nieuw Burgerlijke Wetboek (New Civil Code of Netherlands) has already regulated that pre-contract stages, although the Netherlands is a country that implements civil law system. The pre-contract stages are very important to be regulated in Indonesia because there are many potential pre-contractual issues. This paper aims to formulate the outline of what needs to be regulated in the pre-contract regulations. Keywords : Interaction, Contract, Formation, Civil Code  


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (01) ◽  
pp. 238-244
Author(s):  
Marianne Constable

Kunal Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism shows how nineteenth‐century thinkers thought about law and history differently than do post‐Holmesian modernist sociolegal scholars, whose ahistorical law appears contingent on politics, power, or will. Understanding time and history to be essential to law, nineteenth‐century jurists conceived of a common law that was able to work with and to shape democracy, Parker argues. Contra modernist histories then, Parker claims that the common law was not a reactionary force that stood in the way of democracy and economy. His history of legal thought before modernism suggests, further, the predicament of antifoundationalist modern law and modernist scholars: stripped of time and without its own history, how can law be anything other than politics, power, or will?


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-290
Author(s):  
Colm Peter McGrath ◽  
◽  
Helmut Koziol ◽  

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Edyta Sokalska

The reception of common law in the United States was stimulated by a very popular and influential treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, published in the late 18th century. The work of Blackstone strengthened the continued reception of the common law from the American colonies into the constituent states. Because of the large measure of sovereignty of the states, common law had not exactly developed in the same way in every state. Despite the fact that a single common law was originally exported from England to America, a great variety of factors had led to the development of different common law rules in different states. Albert W. Alschuler from University of Chicago Law School is one of the contemporary American professors of law. The part of his works can be assumed as academic historical-legal narrations, especially those concerning Blackstone: Rediscovering Blackstone and Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. Alschuler argues that Blackstone’s Commentaries inspired the evolution of American and British law. He introduces not only the profile of William Blackstone, but also examines to which extent the concepts of Blackstone have become the basis for the development of the American legal thought.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (7) ◽  
pp. 18-21
Author(s):  
K Indira Priyadarshini ◽  
Karthik Raghupathy ◽  
K V Lokesh ◽  
B Venu Naidu

Ameloblastic fibroma is an uncommon mixed neoplasm of odontogenic origin with a relative frequency between 1.5 – 4.5%. It can occur either in the mandible or maxilla, but predominantly seen in the posterior region of the mandible. It occurs in the first two decades of life. Most of the times it is associated with tooth enclosure, causing a delay in eruption or altering the dental eruption sequence. The common clinical manifestation is a slow growing painless swelling and is detected during routine radiographic examination. There is controversy in the mode of treatment, whether conservative or aggressive. Here we reported a 38 year old male patient referred for evaluation of painless swelling on the right posterior region of the mandible associated with clinically missing 3rd molar. The lesion was completely enucleated under general anesthesia along with the extraction of impacted molar.


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