Estimating a bilateral J‐curve between the UK and the Euro area: An asymmetric analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-237
Author(s):  
Mohsen Bahmani‐Oskooee ◽  
Huseyin Karamelikli
Keyword(s):  
J Curve ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 757-769
Author(s):  
Nektarios A. Michail
Keyword(s):  
J Curve ◽  

2002 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 54-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell

The UK has to make a decision on membership of EMU in the next two years. The monetary and fiscal regimes in the Euro Area and in the UK do not differ greatly. However, we argue that membership of EMU will increase the stability of the economy and the credibility of the policy framework, and hence will enhance the prospects for growth and higher incomes and employment. There appear to be no major problems associated with joining EMU at around 1.50 euros to the pound, although there are risks to the UK if the euro appreciates against the dollar after we have entered. However, the costs associated with this risk have to be offset against the probability of the significant output gains that could come from EMU membership in the medium term.


Subject The fallout in Central-eastern Europe (CEE) from Brexit. Significance While CEE government bond markets are being supported by investor expectations of further monetary stimulus in response to the uncertainty stemming from the UK decision to leave the EU ('Brexit'), the zloty is suffering from both its status as one of the most actively traded emerging market (EM) currencies and concerns about the policies of Poland's new nationalist government. A sharp Brexit-induced slowdown in the euro-area economy would put other CEE currencies and equity markets under strain. Impacts The ECB's full-blown QE is helping keep government and corporate bond yields in vulnerable southern European economies historically low. Uncertainty generated by Brexit reduces the scope for further US interest rate hikes later this year, lifting sentiment towards EM assets. The Brexit vote will increase investors' sensitivity to political risks, auguring badly for Poland. Poland has already suffered a downgrade to its credit rating mainly as a result of the interventionist policies of the PiS government.


2007 ◽  
Vol 199 ◽  
pp. 82-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran McMorrow ◽  
Werner Roger

Since the mid-1990s the growth performance of the Euro Area as a whole, despite some good individual country performances, has failed to keep pace with developments elsewhere in the EU (including the UK) and also in the US. This is especially the case for a number of the larger Euro Area economies. Despite an encouraging performance in terms of its labour input trends, there has been a significant, offsetting, deterioration in the Euro Area's underlying productivity performance. This is driven in large part, worryingly, by a marked downward shift in the growth rate of total factor productivity. Looking to the future, no significant recovery is predicted in the Euro Area's underlying economic performance over the period 2007–11. While the policy challenge is a serious one, the Euro Area as a whole can take comfort from the fact that the gains from a successful refocusing of its overall reform agenda could be considerable. For example, the progressive introduction of the five key measures linked to the Lisbon strategy (i.e. the services directive; reduction of the administrative burden; improving human capital; 3 per cent R&D target; and increases in the employment rate) could boost the Euro Area's economic and employment growth rates by more than ½ a percentage point annually for more than a decade. Such an outturn would give the Euro Area a potential growth rate of around 2½ per cent, a rate of growth which in per capita terms would be broadly comparable to that of the US over the 2007–15 time period and, on the basis of current trends and policies, slightly better than that of the UK.


Significance The Greek crisis has exposed Germany's euro-area dominance more clearly than ever -- to both Germany's partners and Germany, and to the discomfort of both. Merkel's decisions in the crisis have reflected in part her wish to buy time until after the 2017 German and French elections, and her belief in the continuing importance of the Franco-German relationship. Impacts Belying German hopes the three-year Greek deal will buy time until after 2017, October could see a new clash over debt relief and the IMF. Given the alternatives in Paris, Merkel will hope more strongly than usual for a new French president from her own party family. Waiting for stronger leadership in Paris could risk fuelling French eurosceptics' charges that France lacks influence. Seeing major 'future EU' initiatives only after the 2017 German and French polls, Berlin would like the UK EU referendum also over by then. Germany's wish to postpone major EU reforms will limit the scope of any pre-referendum deal with London.


Significance The UK government says it is determined that free movement of people from the EU will end after Brexit. Impacts An upcoming immigration White Paper will provide greater clarity about the UK government’s approach. Proposals to reform the EU's Posted Workers Directive could trigger Eastern European opposition, deepening the east-west divide. Stricter post-Brexit UK immigration policies could lead to labour shortages and skills gaps in sectors such as agriculture and health. Improving euro-area economic prospects could encourage EU nationals living in the United Kingdom to return to the continent.


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