The Impact of Rating Recalibration on Municipal Bond Yield Spreads

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Kriz ◽  
Yan Xiao
2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-405
Author(s):  
Ali Nejadmalayeri ◽  
Sheri Faircloth ◽  
Jeanne Wendel ◽  
Surya Chelikani

2020 ◽  
pp. 2150005
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Marks ◽  
Chenguang Shang

We show an inverse relation between the use of short-term debt and stock market liquidity. This finding is robust to a battery of control variables, alternative measures of the key variables, and various identification strategies. A difference-in-difference (DiD) approach suggests that the relation between debt maturity structure and stock liquidity may be causal. The impact of stock liquidity on debt maturity is stronger in the presence of large institutional holdings and when borrowers are subject to greater refinancing risk. We also provide evidence that firms with liquid stock tend to issue longer-term bonds and enjoy lower bond yield spreads. Overall, our results support the view that the governance function of stock market liquidity reduces the necessity of debt market monitoring, which allows firms to shift toward longer-term debt to avoid the costs and risk of frequent refinancing.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Nejadmalayeri ◽  
Sheri Faircloth ◽  
Jeanne Wendel ◽  
Surya Chelikani

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuhong Zhao ◽  
Dave A. Ziebart

We test the impact of CEO overconfidence on the cost of debt and the impact of SOX on overconfidence via CEO selection. Our CEO overconfidence measure is based on the degree of optimism in management earnings forecasts, and the measure for the cost of debt is bond yield spreads. Our evidence supports that the market discounts CEO overconfidence by increasing the cost of borrowing. Moreover, we find that the financial market also incorporates past CEO overconfidence into bond pricing. We document that the board prefers to appoint a more rational CEO over an overconfident CEO. Our findings are consistent with Banerjee et al.’s (2015) argument that an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence in terms of investment and risk exposure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-138
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Gomez-Bengoechea ◽  
Alfredo Arahuetes

Purpose This paper aims to provide an empirical analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the Eurozone from 2000 until August 2012, when the Outright Monetary Transactions programme was launched. Design/methodology/approach The authors constructed an unbalanced panel with quarterly data from 2000 Q1 to 2012 Q2 for the 12 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The authors propose a model that explains spreads through the main categories of variables observed in the literature. The relationship between variables is analysed using ordinary least squares and quantile regressions. As discussed by the authors, quantile regressions provide a more precise estimation, given the huge heterogeneity across counties that can be observed in the Eurozone. Findings Results show that the relationship between sovereign risk and macroeconomic fundamentals is affected by a strong country sentiment effect. The impact of country sentiment on sovereign risk is larger for those countries that were already experiencing higher spreads. Regardless the impact that European Central Bank’s (ECB) intervention had on sovereign risk from 2012, quantile regression results suggest that policy recommendations and goals should be adapted to each country’s market perception. Originality/value The results obtained improve on previous findings on this topic (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012) in two ways. First, they show that even introducing every category of determinants found in the literature in the main specification, fundamentals can only partially explain the evolution of sovereign risk in the Eurozone. Second, they find there is a country-sentiment effect that affects the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and sovereign risk. Furthermore, the paper finds that the country-sentiment effect is larger for countries facing high spreads.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (01) ◽  
pp. 1850003 ◽  
Author(s):  
May Xiaoyan Bao ◽  
Yixin Liu

We examine the impact of Level 3 assets held by nonfinancial companies on credit risk. Specifically, we investigate how the pricing uncertainty of Level 3 assets is reflected in credit ratings, corporate bond yield spreads, and incidences of bond covenants. We find that higher holdings of Level 3 assets are associated with lower credit ratings, higher yield spreads, especially for Level 3 assets sample, and incidences of bondholder-friendly covenants in the bond issues. Our findings are robust to the treatment of sample selection bias and the influence of macroeconomic factors. In addition, our direct test on the relation between the holdings of Level 3 assets and a firm’s distance-to-default shows that higher holdings of Level 3 assets reduce a firm’s distance-to-default. Overall, our findings support the view that Level 3 assets are perceived as increasing credit risk in the bond market.


2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denisa Proksová ◽  
Mária Bohdalová

Abstract Euro Area sovereign bond yield spreads fell significantly after the creation of the monetary union and moved in unison until the recession of 2008, when investors’ risk pricing changed considerably. Rising bond yield spreads caught the attention of economists who tried to find the factors influencing their size. Evolution of bond spreads was mostly related to various macroeconomic factors as well as the soundness of the countries’ banking sectors and a general level of risk aversion in the financial markets. Analysis presented in this paper compares bond yield spreads of Euro Area member countries and relates them to their debt levels as well as the liquidity of the securities and a general level of risk aversion. Apart from the usual variables, we also analysed differences in purchasing power to assess the impact of the common monetary policy in the pre-crisis period. After adjusting the model to better explain movements of linear regression residuals, we could not prove a systematic assessment of the above-mentioned factors except for time periods of high market volatility. We explain sudden changes in the importance of idiosyncratic factors as consequences of policies of the European Central Bank and other European Union institutions following such time periods, which, as our analysis suggests, distorted pricing of risk in the markets.


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