Algorithmic disclosure rules

During the past decade, a small but rapidly growing number of Law&Tech scholars have been applying algorithmic methods in their legal research. This Article does it too, for the sake of saving disclosure regulation failure: a normative strategy that has long been considered dead by legal scholars, but conspicuously abused by rule-makers. Existing proposals to revive disclosure duties, however, either focus on the industry policies (e.g. seeking to reduce consumers’ costs of reading) or on rulemaking (e.g. by simplifying linguistic intricacies). But failure may well depend on both. Therefore, this Article develops a `comprehensive approach', suggesting to use computational tools to cope with linguistic and behavioral failures at both the enactment and implementation phases of disclosure duties, thus filling a void in the Law & Tech scholarship. Specifically, it outlines how algorithmic tools can be used in a holistic manner to address the many failures of disclosures from the rulemaking in parliament to consumer screens. It suggests a multi-layered design where lawmakers deploy three tools in order to produce optimal disclosure rules: machine learning, natural language processing, and behavioral experimentation through regulatory sandboxes. To clarify how and why these tasks should be performed, disclosures in the contexts of online contract terms and privacy online are taken as examples. Because algorithmic rulemaking is frequently met with well-justified skepticism, problems of its compatibility with legitimacy, efficacy and proportionality are also discussed.

Noncompliance with SEC regulations: evidence from timely loan disclosures

We use required 8-K filings around major borrowings to shed light on firms’ choices of whether to comply with SEC disclosure rules. Exploiting within-firm variation, we find that firms are more likely to hide loans with high spreads and tight financial covenants. We further find that firms appear to exploit the ambiguity of the definition of materiality, as they are more likely to selectively disclose (hide) “immaterial” loans when interest rates are low (high). Firms are less likely to hide loans when investors anticipate borrowing during asset acquisition, when firms are followed by more equity analysts or receive more investor attention, and when the firms’ stock prices are more volatile. Lastly, we provide evidence that the SEC does not rigorously enforce compliance with 8-K loan disclosures.

16. Disclosure and Inspection

This chapter considers the definition of ‘disclosure’, its purpose, its extent, and the process whereby it is implemented. It also looks at other types of disclosure and the times at which such disclosure may take place—some of which may be before litigation has been commenced. The formal provisions for disclosure are contained in the Civil Procedure Rules 31 and the accompanying Practice Direction. The formal disclosure rules apply to cases in the fast track and the multi-track. They do not automatically apply to the small claims track. Disclosure has been much in the legal press recently, and the new draft disclosure rules are discussed.

Disclosure, Security, Technology

Criminal disclosure rules in all common law jurisdictions are organized around the same sets of conflicting aims. Pre-trial evidence disclosure is essential to fair and accurate adjudication. Yet certain types of information, such as identities of undercover operatives and ongoing law enforcement surveillance, must be kept confidential. Beyond these tensions, disclosure practices face new challenges arising primarily from evolving technology and investigative tactics. This chapter describes divergent approaches across common law jurisdictions—especially among U.S. states—to these challenges and offers explanations for their differences. It also sketches the technology-based challenges that discovery schemes face and offers options, or tentative predictions about their resolution. Differences often turn on who decides whether to withhold information from the defense—judges or prosecutors—and when certain information must be disclosed. Broader disclosure regimes tend to put greater trust in judicial capacity to dictate or at least review hard questions about the costs, benefits, and timing of disclosure; narrower systems leave more power in prosecutors’ hands. Technology has multiplied challenges for disclosure policy by vastly increasing evidence-gathering tactics and thus the nature and volume of information. Disclosure rules adapted fairly easily to the rise much forensic lab analysis. But fast-growing forms of digital evidence is more problematic. Defendants may lack the time to examine volumes of video and technical resources to analyze other data; sometimes prosecutors do as well. The chapter identifies some possible solutions emerging through technology and law reform, as well as trend toward greater judicial management of pre-trial disclosure.

Schematy podatkowe a tajemnica zawodowa wybranych zawodów zaufania publicznego

The institution of Mandatory Disclosure Rules was regulated in polish Tax Code in 2019. This implementation was made due to Council Directive 2018/822. Although these polish legal norms have clearly been problematic. It is claimed that professional secrecy of profession like for example: lawyers, legal advisors, tax advisors can be affected by the obligation to report some kind of tax schemes even without getting exemption from professional secrecy by client. The aim of this paper is to show that these regulations can be not constitutional in term of art. 17 of Polish Constitution.