Priority Monism and Junk

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie Taylor
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Samuel Lebens

"Jewish Nothing-elsism" is the school of thought according to which there is nothing else besides God. This school is sometimes and erroneously interpreted as pantheistic or acosmic. In this paper I argue that Jewish Nothing-elsism is better interpreted as a form of “panentheistic priority holism”, and still better interpreted as a form of “idealistic priority monism”. On this final interpretation, Jewish Nothing-elsism is neither pantheist, panentheist, nor acosmic. Jewish Nothing-elsism is Hassidic idealism, and nothing else. Moreover, I argue that Jewish Nothing-elsism follows from some very basic assumptions common to almost every theist. All theists should be Nothing-elsers.


Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Could it be the case that all of us as individual human subjects stand to one another as Caeiro stands to Reis and Reis to Campos: just as they are the multiple heteronyms of one and the same subject, Fernando Pessoa, so too we are all heteronyms of one and the same subject, a single cosmic subject? There is a famous line in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which might be interpreted as saying something of the sort—tat tvam asi: you are that, that single cosmic subject, brahman. For the eighth-century Vedāntic philosopher Śaṅkara, whose reading of the Upaniṣads would much later establish itself in the popular imagination, the similarity is further reinforced because he provides a context of phenomenological simulation similar to dreaming and imagining, namely, māyā, ‘cosmic illusion’. Let me call the view that individual human subjects are heteronyms of a single cosmic self ‘heteronymic cosmopsychism’. Heteronymic cosmopsychism is different from the comparatively more common variety of cosmopsychism according to which the grounding relation between the single cosmic self and the multiplicity of individual selves is mereological, not heteronymic. Heteronymic cosmopsychism agrees with priority monism in rejecting a monistic existence thesis, differing from it only as to the nature of the grounding relation, sidestepping the problems that bedevil priority cosmopsychism because its grounding relation is not one of decomposition.


2014 ◽  
Vol 172 (8) ◽  
pp. 2025-2031 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Steinberg
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Philip Goff

This chapter explores and defends a form of cosmopsychism: the combination of panpsychism and priority monism (the latter being the view that there is only one fundamental individual). The crucial advantage of cosmopsychism is that it offers a solution to the Subject Irreducibility Problem, discussed in the last chapter. After developing the view in response to various challenges, an empirical argument is advanced against emergentism. If this argument is sound, then it leads to cosmopsychism as the only anti-emergentist view that can solve the Subject Irreducibility Problem. Finally, the chapter responds to “the incredulous stare”: the sense that cosmopsychism is just too crazy to be believed. It is argued that this reaction is due to cultural associations; in fact, both comospychism and physicalism are motivated by the same anti-emergentist instincts.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Siegel
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 177 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Calosi
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Perler

AbstractDoes Spinoza accept finite individuals as really existing things? Or does he endorse the thesis that the substance is the only thing with real existence? This paper argues that his monism does not rule out the existence of individuals that have dependent, yet real existence. Spinoza defends a form of priority monism, taking the substance to be the foundation of all finite individuals, and thereby rejects existence monism. On his view, finite individuals are “power parts”: being founded in the substance, they have their active power from it. The paper argues for this thesis by analyzing Spinoza’s definition of parts. Moreover, it pays close attention to his functional individuation of parts that makes it possible to individuate different types of “power parts” at different levels.


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