Study for Application of Safety Soft Control and Information System in Highly-Integrated Control Rooms of CPR1000 NPP

Author(s):  
Xuegang Zhang ◽  
Wei Liu ◽  
Hai Chang ◽  
Jianbo Wen ◽  
Yiqian Wu ◽  
...  

For most of the newly built nuclear power plants, the computerized main control rooms (MCR) are adopted. The soft control, the typical feature of computerized Human-Interface System (HIS) in the computerized main control room and mediated by software rather than by direct physical connections, is comprised of safety and non-safety control interface which provides the operators with manual control for component-level, and allows both continuous control of plant process and discrete control of components in nuclear power plant. The safety soft control and information system (SSCIS) is used to give the safety commands to and check the immediate response of the safety process. This paper describes the application of the system design basis, functionality, communication, operation faceplate and system modes for SSCIS which is firstly introduced in CPR1000 nuclear power plant. The design criteria and basic design features of SSCIS is developed to be as the design basis of the design implementation. The ISG-04 ‘Highly-Integrated Control Rooms-Communications issues (HICRc)’ provides acceptable methods for addressing SSCIS communications in digital I&C system design. The NUREG0700 ‘Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines’ is applied as reference for human factor engineering requirement in the SSCIS design. And the SSCIS design has also fully considered the possible customer usual practice.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hongyun Xie ◽  
Haixia Gu ◽  
Chao Lu ◽  
Jialin Ping

Real-time Simulation (RTS) has long been used in the nuclear power industry for operator training and engineering purposes. And, online simulation (OLS) is based on RTS and with connection to the plant information system to acquire the measurement data in real time for calibrating the simulation models and following plant operation, for the purpose of analyzing plant events and providing indicative signs of malfunctioning. OLS has been applied in certain industries to improve safety and efficiency. However, it is new to the nuclear power industry. A research project was initiated to implement OLS to assist operators in certain critical nuclear power plant (NPP) operations to avoid faulty conditions. OLS models were developed to simulate the reactor core physics and reactor/steam generator thermal hydraulics in real time, with boundary conditions acquired from plant information system, synchronized in real time. The OLS models then were running in parallel with recorded plant events to validate the models, and the results are presented.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoseon Choi ◽  
Seung Gyu Hyun

<p>According to strict criteria step by step for site selection, design, construction and operation, the seismic safety of nuclear power plant (NPP) sites in South Korea are secured by considering design basis earthquake (DBE) level capable of withstanding the maximum ground motions that can occur on the site. Therefore, it is intended to summarize DBE level and its evaluation details for NPP sites in several countries.</p><p>Similar but different terms are used for DBE from country to country, i.e. safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), design earthquake (DE), SL2, Ss, and maximum calculated earthquake (MCE). They may differ when applied to actual seismic design process, and only refer to approximate comparisons. This script used DBE as a representative term, and DBE level was based on horizontal values.</p><p>The DBE level of NPP sites depends on seismic activity of the area. Japan and Western United States, where earthquakes occur more frequently than South Korea, have high DBE values. The DBE level of NPP sites in South Korea has been confirmed to be similar or higher compared to that of Central and Eastern Unites Sates and Europe, which have similar seismic activity.</p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. J. Katona ◽  
A. Vilimi

Nuclear power plants shall be designed to resist the effects of large earthquakes. The design basis earthquake affects large area around the plant site and can cause serious consequences that will affect the logistical support of the emergency actions at the plant, influence the psychological condition of the plant personnel, and determine the workload of the country’s disaster management personnel. In this paper the main qualitative findings of a study are presented that have been performed for the case of a hypothetical 10−4/a probability design basis earthquake for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, Hungary. The study covers the qualitative assessment of the postearthquake conditions at the settlements around the plant site including quantitative evaluation of the condition of dwellings. The main goal of the recent phase of the study was to identify public utility vulnerabilities that define the outside support conditions of the nuclear power plant accident management. The results of the study can be used for the planning of logistical support of the plant accident management staff. The study also contributes to better understanding of the working conditions of the disaster management services in the region around the nuclear power plant.


Author(s):  
Esko Pekkarinen

Modernisation of control rooms of the nuclear power plants has been a major issue during the last few years. With this as a basis, the BWR plants in Sweden and Finland funded, in co-operation with the Halden Project, an experimental HAMBO BWR simulator project based on the Forsmark 3 plant in Sweden. VTT Energy in Finland developed the simulator models for HAMBO with the aid of their APROS tool, while the operator interface was developed by the Halden Project. The simulator and its performance have been described in other publications [1, 2]. On July 25th 2006 there was a short circuit at Forsmark 1 nuclear power plant when manoeuvring equipment in the 400kV-switch yard. Due to the short circuit, the plant suffered an electrical disturbance that led to scram and failure of two out of four diesel generators. The purpose of the study carried out at VTT in 2007 was to assess the capabilities of the HAMBO BWR simulator to handle Forsmark 1 type of events in different nuclear power plants (Forsmark 3 in this case). The Forsmark 1 incident showed (among other things) that the intention to protect certain components (in this case the UPS-system) can in certain situations affect negatively to the safety functions. It is concluded that most of this type of BWR transients may be simulated to a certain extent using the existing HAMBO- and APROS- models. A detailed modelling of the automation and electric systems is required sometimes if the complex interplay between these systems and the process is to be predicted reliably. The modelling should be plant specific and level of detail should be assessed case-by-case (i.e. what kind of transient is in question, what systems are available, what is the main purpose of the analyses etc.). The thermal-hydraulic models of the APROS-code seem to replicate well the real behaviour of thermal-hydraulic process provided that there is enough information about the transient in consideration.


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