This chapter addresses a distinct worry about accepting moral testimony: if you cannot gain moral understanding by means of moral testimony, it is better to believe moral truths for nontestimonial reasons than for testimonial reasons. There are two distinct sorts of reasons trusting moral testimony might be unable to deliver moral understanding. The first turns on the thought that it is intrinsically bad to lack moral understanding, and so if moral testimony cannot deliver moral understanding, then forming one’s moral views on the basis of testimony is problematic. The second reason for concern relies on the thought that a lack of moral understanding is fundamentally a practical worry: those who lack moral understanding cannot act as well as those who do understand. This chapter addresses the worry about moral understanding on multiple fronts. It argues that one can indeed get moral understanding from moral testimony: when you are unsure whether some action would be wrong, but are aware of the relevant considerations, testimony whether the action would be wrong can fill this epistemic gap, putting you in a position to have quite a bit of moral understanding. Next, this chapter questions whether any residual unavailable moral understanding is as important as pessimists about moral testimony typically make it out to be. The partial understanding that moral testimony affords is nearly as valuable as complete understanding is. Moreover, even if there is something virtuous about understanding morality entirely on one’s own, there might also be something virtuous about being epistemically dependent upon the moral testimony of others, a topic explored in the next two chapters.
D. Chalmers and J. Perry on Zombie Problem and the Content of Phenomenal Concepts
