scholarly journals Further defence of legal age change: a reply to the critics

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 471-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joona Räsänen
Keyword(s):  

In ‘Moral case for legal age change’, I argue that sometimes people should be allowed to change their age. I refute six immediate objections against the view that age change is permissible. I argue that the objections cannot show that legal age change should always be prohibited. In this paper, I consider some further objections against legal age change raised by Iain Brassington, Toni Saad and William Simkulet. I argue that the objections fail to show that age change should never be allowed.

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 461-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joona Räsänen

Should a person who feels his legal age does not correspond with his experienced age be allowed to change his legal age? In this paper, I argue that in some cases people should be allowed to change their legal age. Such cases would be when: (1) the person genuinely feels his age differs significantly from his chronological age and (2) the person’s biological age is recognised to be significantly different from his chronological age and (3) age change would likely prevent, stop or reduce ageism, discrimination due to age, he would otherwise face. I also consider some objections against the view that people should be allowed to change their legal age and find them lacking.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (9) ◽  
pp. 636-637
Author(s):  
Joona Räsänen

Lippert-Rasmussen and Petersen discuss my ‘Moral case for legal age change’ in their article ‘Age change, official age and fairness in health’. They argue that in important healthcare settings (such as distributing vital organs for dying patients), the state should treat people on the basis of their chronological age because chronological age is a better proxy for what matters from the point of view of justice than adjusted official age. While adjusted legal age should not be used in deciding who gets scarce vital organs, I remind the readers that using chronological age as a proxy is problematic as well. Using age as a proxy could give wrong results and it is better, if possible, for states to use the vital information directly than use age as a proxy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 465-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toni C Saad

Räsänen has attempted to make a moral case for permitting some people to change their legal age: if someone considers that their chronological age does not correspond to their emotional age or biological age, and they face age-based discrimination as a result, they may change the legal record of their age. This response considers some of the problems with Räsänen’s paper, including its reliance on equivocation. It concludes that what is billed as a moral argument turns out to be a conflicted case for deception which relies on a nihilistic outlook on reality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (9) ◽  
pp. 634-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ◽  
Thomas Søbirk Petersen
Keyword(s):  

In a recent JME article, Joona Räsänen makes the case for allowing legal age change. We identify three problems with his argument and, on that basis, propose an improved version thereof. Unfortunately, even the improved argument is vulnerable to the objection that chronological age is a better proxy for justice in health than both legal and what we shall call official age.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Kemper ◽  
Christopher Gyngell ◽  
Julian Savulescu
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-227
Author(s):  
Emma Milne
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wike Seekles ◽  
Guy Widdershoven ◽  
Paul Robben ◽  
Gonny van Dalfsen ◽  
Bert Molewijk

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Y B Tan ◽  
Bastiaan C ter Meulen ◽  
Albert Molewijk ◽  
Guy Widdershoven

Ethical dilemmas in general are characterised by a choice between two mutually excluding options neither of which is satisfactory, because there always will be a form of moral damage. Within the context of medicine several ethics support services have been developed to support healthcare professionals in dealing with ethical dilemmas, including moral case deliberation. In this article, we describe how moral case deliberation works in daily practice, illustrated with a case example from the neurology ward. The article is meant as an introduction to moral case deliberation according to the dilemma method. We show its relevance to the clinic and the context needed to put it into practice.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document