Variational Inequalities, System of Functional Equations, and Incomplete Information Repeated Games

2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 516-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Variational Inequalities ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Functional Equations ◽  
System Of Functional Equations

MEASURES OF LOCAL ENTROPIES FOR COMPOSITIVE FUZZY PARTITIONS

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (04) ◽  
pp. 717-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
DORETTA VIVONA ◽  
MARIA DIVARI
Keyword(s):  
Functional Equations ◽  
Fuzzy Measure ◽  
System Of Functional Equations ◽  
Locality Property ◽  
Fuzzy Measures ◽  
Fuzzy Partitions

The aim of this paper is to characterize of the measures of entropies without probability or fuzzy measure for compositive fuzzy partitions, taking into account the so-called locality property. We propose a system of functional equations, whose solutions give some forms of entropies without probability or fuzzy measures.

scholarly journals Common Fixed Point Theorems in Metric Spaces with Applications

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1177-1190
Author(s):  
Pushpendra Semwal
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Fixed Point ◽  
Common Fixed Point ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Functional Equations ◽  
Fixed Point Theorems ◽  
Metric Spaces ◽  
System Of Functional Equations ◽  
Contractive Type ◽  
Common Fixed Point Theorems

In this paper we investigate the existence and uniqueness of common fixed point theorems for certain contractive type of mappings. As an application the existence and uniqueness of common solutions for a system of functional equations arising in dynamic programming are discuss by using the our results.

ON A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONAL EQUATIONS

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Thanh Long ◽  
Nguyen Hoi Nghia ◽  
Nguyen Kim Khoi ◽  
Dinh Van Ruy
Keyword(s):  
Functional Equations ◽  
System Of Functional Equations

A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (12) ◽  
pp. 3817-3835
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Alexander Wolitzky
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Smoothness Condition ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
Number Of Firms

We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. (JEL C72, C73, D83)

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