1988 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Patrick Raines ◽  
Clarence R. Jung

This essay examines Frank Knight's view of monopolies in a market economy through an exegesis of his writings. A cogent development of Frank Knight's theory of monopolies is conspicuously absent in the economic literature. His prominence in the discipline and the influence his work has had on others establish his views as significant in the intellectural history of the theory of capitalist competition. The study focuses on Knight's characterization of monopolies and his views as to the appropriateness of coercive repressive regulatory policies. Also, capitalistic monopolies are discussed in the context of Knight's critical attitude toward economic and philosophic dogma and his disdain for centralized economic planning. The following section deals with the Knightian view of the nature of monopolies and categorization of types of monopolies. Then, the philosophical basis for Knight's position onmonopolies is presented. Specifically, the concentration of economic power in capitalism is explained in terms of Knight's perceptions of social reformers, static equilibrium analysis, and economic planning.


2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-726

Dennis R. Appleyard of Davidson College reviews “Famous Figures and Diagrams in Economics” edited by Mark Blaug and Peter Lloyd. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins “Fifty-eight papers examine figures and diagrams commonly used in economic theory, their roles in economic analysis, and their histories. The figures and diagrams discussed fall under the categories of basic tools of demand and supply curve analysis; welfare economics; special markets and topics; basic tools of general equilibrium analysis; open economies; macroeconomic analysis and stabilization; and growth, income distribution, and other topics. Blaug is Professor Emeritus at the University of London and the University of Buckingham. Lloyd is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Economics at the University of Melbourne. Index. Subject Descriptor(s): History of Economic Thought through 1925: General B10 History of Economic Thought since 1925: General B20 Microeconomics: General D00 Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics: General E00”


2021 ◽  
Vol Volume XIV Issue 1-2 (Articles) ◽  
Author(s):  
Turan Yay

This study aims to evaluate the ideas on the scope and method of economics of Joseph Schumpeter who is one of the important economists of the 20th century. The study consists of four sections: In the first section we underline the interesting points of his life to understand the roots, background, or 'vision' of his thought system. In the second section, we will examine his methodological views that he asserted in his first (but translated into English only in 2010) book. Third section will be concerned with his 'analysis of economics' which refers to his critics of Leon Walras's general equilibrium analysis (as static) and his own alternative (dynamics analysis of capitalist economies) about the central subject matter of economics. In the fourth section we will treat his approach about the development/evolution process of economic thought in time. The study concludes with a brief assessment: Schumpeter is one of the rare economists who can build his own thought system in the history of economics, and he embraced a pluralist perspective in the field of the methodology of economics.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHUHEI KURIZAKI

This paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy. Conventional audience-cost models suggest that state leaders must go public with their threats in international crises because leaders cannot tie their hands if signals are issued privately. I present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience. The equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat, albeit of limited credibility, can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat. The analysis suggests that secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational inefficacy. Secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war. The logic of efficient secrecy helps shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises. The Alaska Boundary Dispute illustrates this logic.


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