The World Trading System, the International Legal System and Multilevel Choice

Author(s):  
Joel P. Trachtman
1996 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 140
Author(s):  
Richard N. Cooper ◽  
Bernard Hoekman ◽  
Michel Kostecki

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-95
Author(s):  
Feiyue Li

Abstract The idea of ‘fairness’ may be viewed as fundamental to a nation’s participation in the development of the international legal system governing climate change. As the second-largest economy and the largest Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitter in the world, China’s actions on climate change are critical to the global response. Indeed, international cooperation on climate change is unlikely to succeed without China’s active engagement. Therefore, China’s perception of the fairness of responsibility allocation will significantly influence its attitudes toward its international climate responsibilities. However, limited work has been done to date to concretely examine China’s perspective of the fairness of responsibility allocation and to understand its fairness discourses and practices of climate responsibility in a dynamically evolved process. This article aims to fill that gap in the literature by elucidating how China perceives the fair allocation of climate responsibility and how its fairness discourses and practices have evolved over the course of the three phases of international climate change negotiations. It will be shown that China has perceived the factors of historically accumulated emissions, per capita emissions and capability to lie at the very core of its understanding of fairness.


2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 877-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Bagwell ◽  
Robert W Staiger

We provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that govern the use of subsidies to domestic production. Our analysis highlights the impact of the new subsidy disciplines that were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO. While GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed as weak and inadequate, our results suggest that the key changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.


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