EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL'S SELF-EXAMINATION ON COOPERATION IN PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 1229-1236
Author(s):  
JIAN-YUE GUAN ◽  
JIN-TU SUN ◽  
YING-HAI WANG
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Average Density ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Pair Approximation ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Self Examination

We study a spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on regular network's one-dimensional regular ring and two-dimensional square lattice. The individuals located on the sites of networks can either cooperate with their neighbors or defect. The effects of individual's self-examination are introduced. Using Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation method, we investigate the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for various values of payoff parameters b and the time interval Δt. The effects of the fraction p of players in the system who are using the self-examination on cooperation are also discussed. It is shown that compared with the case of no individual's self-examination, the persistence of cooperation is inhibited when the payoff parameter b is small and at certain Δt (Δt > 0) or p (p > 0), cooperation is mostly inhibited, while when b is large, the emergence of cooperation can be remarkably enhanced and mostly enhanced at Δt = 0 or p = 1.

scholarly journals Effects of Empty Sites on Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Based on Social Diversity

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Feng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Social Diversity ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Rank Distributions

We study the effects of empty sites in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on social diversity by introducing some empty sites into a square lattice. The results reveal that the empty sites dramatically enhance the cooperation level for a wide range of temptation to defection values if two types of players coexist. By calculating the chances of different type-combinations of the players located on the square lattice, we find that there is an intermediate region where five social ranks are induced to satisfy the certain rank distributions and the cooperation level is significantly enhanced. Moreover, simulation results also show that the moderate gaps among the social ranks can favor cooperation for a larger occupation density.

The effect of memory in prisoner’s dilemma game under multi-strategy update mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (06) ◽  
pp. 2050077
Author(s):  
Hai Zhu ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Qingyang Zhao ◽  
Xing Jin ◽  
Lanping Yu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Open Issue ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Due to the heterogeneity of strategy updating rules progressively destroying the cluster of cooperators, cooperation would be heavily suppressed when players adopt mixed strategy updating rules. Thus, how to improve the emergence of cooperation with the scenario of heterogeneous strategy updating rules becomes an important open issue. In this paper, we introduce the memory factor into the game model, and then study the joint effect of memory and heterogeneous strategy updating rules on the emergence of cooperation. Detailly, in our game model, memory-based imitation and innovation are chosen as two different strategy updating rules. Afterwards, the annealing and quenching rules are specifically used as the methods to mix the proposed two memory-based strategy updating rules. At last, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to demonstrate the significance of our model. The simulation results show that for memory-based imitators, memory is not always effective in promoting cooperation. It’s more like a catalyst. When the proportion of the memory-based imitation is large, it promotes the emergence of cooperation. When the proportion of innovation is large, it accelerates the extinction of cooperation; for overall proportion of cooperation, memory effectively promotes the emergence of cooperation and improves the ability of cooperators to resist high temptation, but memory is a partial optimization, it cannot offset the deterioration of cooperation caused by heterogeneous strategies updating rules, memory only reduces the degree of deterioration. Finally, compared with the annealing rule, the change of quenching rule is more smooth, because it is easier for cooperators to form clusters under the quenching rule. Our investigation sheds some light to the role of memory in prisoner’s dilemma game under heterogeneous strategies updating rules.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document