The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2050162
Author(s):  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Zhihai Rong

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Feng Wu

We study the effects of empty sites in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on social diversity by introducing some empty sites into a square lattice. The results reveal that the empty sites dramatically enhance the cooperation level for a wide range of temptation to defection values if two types of players coexist. By calculating the chances of different type-combinations of the players located on the square lattice, we find that there is an intermediate region where five social ranks are induced to satisfy the certain rank distributions and the cooperation level is significantly enhanced. Moreover, simulation results also show that the moderate gaps among the social ranks can favor cooperation for a larger occupation density.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 180199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Zhen Wang

In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.


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