scholarly journals CAPITAL GAINS: BLUE MACHINES AND RED MACHINES

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (spec01) ◽  
pp. 437-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
LUÍS AGUIAR-CONRARIA ◽  
KARL SHELL
Keyword(s):  
Finite Time ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Intertemporal Allocation ◽  
The One

Capital gains play an essential role in the intertemporal allocation of resources, but they can also fuel self-fulfilling bubbles. The simple case of 2 "identical" capitals is analyzed in an overlapping generations model. The only trajectory in which expectations are realized at every date is the one in which blue machines and red machines have the same price. If ever their prices differ, then there is a "bubble" which must burst in finite time.

scholarly journals On Governance and the Demographic Transition

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 319-330
Author(s):  
Flaubert Mbiekop
Keyword(s):  
Demographic Transition ◽  
Financial Support ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
The Other ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Child Quality ◽  
Mild Conditions ◽  
Weak Institutions ◽  
The One ◽  
Fertility Choices

It is now conventional wisdom that institutions shape household fertility choices, especially in developing countries. However, deeper insights into the mechanisms at play are still needed. This paper develops a game-theoretical framework with a simple overlapping-generations model to show how a typical household may come to prefer bearing and raising numerous children as a savings scheme for retirement and not rely on conventional outlets for saving when facing weak institutions. On the one hand weak institutions increase the risk that individuals may lose their savings if relying on conventional outlets. On the other hand, childbearing as an investment/savings scheme carries with it the risk that disguised or complete unemployment may prevent grown children from providing the expected old-age financial support. The typical household thus trades off between both types of risks, yet with more control in the latter case, as the likelihood of unemployment can be reduced by carefully selecting a child quality-quantity strategy. Mild conditions are sufficient to show that sound institutions induce less fertility and foster private saving and oldage consumption. A simple voting experiment unveils a tricky socio- economic dynamics whereby wealthier households may have stakes supporting weak institutions.

scholarly journals A CLOSED-FORM SOLUTION TO A MODEL OF TWO-SIDED, PARTIAL ALTRUISM

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-239
Author(s):  
Ana Fernandes
Keyword(s):  
Closed Form ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Closed Form Solution ◽  
Form Solution ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Parents And Children ◽  
Saving Rates ◽  
Markov Strategies

This paper presents a closed-form characterization of the allocation of resources in an overlapping generations model of two-sided, partial altruism. Three assumptions are made: (i) parents and children play Markov strategies, (ii) utility takes the CRRA form, and (iii) the income of children is stochastic but proportional to the saving of parents. In families where children are rich relative to their parents, saving rates—measured as a function of the family's total resources—are higher than when children are poor relative to their parents. Income redistribution from the old to the young, therefore, leads to an increase in aggregate saving.

scholarly journals INCOME INEQUALITY, MOBILITY, AND THE WELFARE STATE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Public Programs ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Welfare State

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.

scholarly journals Endogenous Agency Problems and the Dynamics of Rents

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2542-2567
Author(s):  
B Biais ◽  
A Landier
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Complex Tasks ◽  
Complex Skills ◽  
Do So

Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.

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