Uncertainty in Information Market Games

Author(s):  
Saadia El Obadi ◽  
Silvia Miquel

A new product can be produced and sold in a market thanks to the entrance of a patent holder into the market. This market is divided into submarkets controlled by only some firms and the profit attainable in each submarket is uncertain. In this paper, this situation is studied by means of cooperative games under interval uncertainty. We consider different ways of allocating the interval profit among the firms. One of these is the interval [Formula: see text]-value, which is defined for interval games satisfying some conditions. Efficient interval solutions in terms of the market data are provided.

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 198-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Shapiro

Since the Supreme Court's eBay decision in 2006, the U.S. has employed a hybrid patent remedy system that mixes property and liability rules. When the patent owner and the infringer are competitors, the courts typically issue a permanent injunction requiring the infringer to cease its infringing activities. In contrast, when the patent owner and the infringer are not competitors, the courts often allow the infringer to continue its infringing activities so long as it pays specified ongoing royalties to the patent holder. This article studies the incentives for invention and for new product development in such a hybrid system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saadia El Obadi ◽  
Silvia Miquel

1989 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Muto ◽  
J. Potters ◽  
S. Tijs

Author(s):  
S. Z. ALPARSLAN GÖK ◽  
R. BRANZEI ◽  
S. TIJS

This paper introduces and studies a class of cooperative interval games suitable to model market situations with two corners where players face interval uncertainty regarding the outcome of cooperation. In one corner there is a powerful player called the big boss; the other corner contains players that need the big boss to benefit from cooperation. Various characterizations of big boss interval games are given. The interval core of a big boss interval game is explicitly described, bi-monotonic allocation schemes using interval core elements are introduced, and it is shown that each element of the interval core of a big boss interval game is extendable to such a scheme. Two value-type interval solution concepts are defined on the class of big boss interval games which generate for each such game the same interval core allocation which is extendable to a bi-monotonic interval allocation scheme.


1983 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chakravarthi Narasimhan ◽  
Subrata K. Sen

1983 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chakravarthi Narasimhan ◽  
Subrata K. Sen

This paper presents a critical review of nine models using test market data to evaluate the performance of a new brand in an inexpensive, frequently purchased product category. The models are evaluated on both theoretical criteria (e.g., the mathematical structure of the model) and on managerial dimensions (e.g., the type of sales data required and the degree of commercial acceptance of the model). Based on these criteria, three of the models are particularly useful. The paper concludes with a discussion of future directions for research in the area of test market models.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1030-1032 ◽  
pp. 1726-1732
Author(s):  
Zuo Feng Gao ◽  
Chao Han ◽  
Jing Wu

This paper focuses on the Banzhaf value for cooperative games where the set of players is restraint on augmenting systems and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. The interval Banzhaf value for cooperative interval games on augmenting systems is put forward on the basis of corresponding axiomatic system and operations of interval numbers. Moreover, some properties of the interval Banzhaf value are given. Finally, a practical example is offered to illustrate the validity and feasibility of this method on these kinds of cooperative interval games.


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