COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Keyword(s):
In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner's dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment.
1999 ◽
Vol 30
(2/3)
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pp. 179-193
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2016 ◽
Vol 63
(5)
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pp. 263-277
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2020 ◽
2020 ◽