Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

scholarly journals Learning dynamics explains human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma on networks

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (94) ◽  
pp. 20131186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Cimini ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Social Factors ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Cooperative behaviour lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, recent experimental findings on networked Prisoner's Dilemma games suggest that conditional cooperation also depends on the previous action of the player—namely on the ‘mood’ in which the player is currently in. Roughly, a majority of people behave as conditional cooperators if they cooperated in the past, whereas they ignore the context and free ride with high probability if they did not. However, the ultimate origin of this behaviour represents a conundrum itself. Here, we aim specifically to provide an evolutionary explanation of moody conditional cooperation (MCC). To this end, we perform an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players' behavioural traits—ranging from standard processes used in game theory based on pay-off comparison to others that include non-economic or social factors. Our results show that only a dynamic built upon reinforcement learning is able to give rise to evolutionarily stable MCC, and at the end to reproduce the human behaviours observed in the experiments.

Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Dalibor Roháč
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
The Difference

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of A Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_part_2) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest-competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Research Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 175-248
Author(s):  
Alex John London
Keyword(s):  
Research Ethics ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Medical Professionals ◽  
Research Participants ◽  
Ethical Norms

This chapter reviews a series of arguments that purport to show that there is an inherent moral dilemma in research with humans and that this conflict produces a corresponding social dilemma, known as the prisoner’s dilemma. If these arguments are sound, it would show that dual requirements of the egalitarian research imperative outlined in chapter 4 cannot be satisfied in practice. This chapter argues that these arguments fail and that their intuitive force in this area is bolstered by two dogmas of research ethics: the claim that the ethical norms in this area derive from the role-related obligations of medical professionals and the claim that research is an inherently utilitarian undertaking. This chapter demonstrates that rejecting those dogmas creates a space for reconciling the production of socially valuable information with respect for research participants as free and equal.

EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL'S SELF-EXAMINATION ON COOPERATION IN PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 1229-1236
Author(s):  
JIAN-YUE GUAN ◽  
JIN-TU SUN ◽  
YING-HAI WANG
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Average Density ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Pair Approximation ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Self Examination

We study a spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on regular network's one-dimensional regular ring and two-dimensional square lattice. The individuals located on the sites of networks can either cooperate with their neighbors or defect. The effects of individual's self-examination are introduced. Using Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation method, we investigate the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for various values of payoff parameters b and the time interval Δt. The effects of the fraction p of players in the system who are using the self-examination on cooperation are also discussed. It is shown that compared with the case of no individual's self-examination, the persistence of cooperation is inhibited when the payoff parameter b is small and at certain Δt (Δt > 0) or p (p > 0), cooperation is mostly inhibited, while when b is large, the emergence of cooperation can be remarkably enhanced and mostly enhanced at Δt = 0 or p = 1.

scholarly journals Core–periphery segregation in evolving prisoner’s dilemma networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunkyu Sohn ◽  
Jung-Kyoo Choi ◽  
T K Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Self Organization ◽  
Interaction Structure ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

Abstract Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for prosperous societies. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the interplay between game strategy and interaction structure by which evolutionary dynamics leads to self-organization of dense cooperative networks has not been understood. Our prisoner’s dilemma experiments with exit and partner choice options show that core–periphery segregation of cooperators and defectors drives the emergence of cooperation. Cooperators’ Quit-for-Tat and defectors’ Roving strategy lead to a highly asymmetric core and periphery structure. Densely connected to each other at the core, cooperators successfully isolate defectors at the periphery and earn larger payoffs.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document