scholarly journals EMOTIONAL STRATEGIES AS CATALYSTS FOR COOPERATION IN SIGNED NETWORKS

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1450011 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMONE RIGHI ◽  
KÁROLY TAKÁCS
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Emotional Content ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
High Likelihood ◽  
Signed Networks ◽  
Favorable Conditions ◽  
Very High

The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on signed networks. The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as well as with agent strategies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on the emotional content embedded in network signs. We show that this strategy acts as a catalyst and creates favorable conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we found evidence that the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with relatively high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While a low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems to limit its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in nonsigned networks, cooperation becomes more prevalent in denser topologies.

scholarly journals Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa ◽  
Joe Yuichiro Wakano ◽  
Yasuo Ihara
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Fixation Probability ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Repeated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they tolerate in a given round of a repeated game. Reciprocators are quicker to detect defectors to withdraw further cooperation when less generous, and better at maintaining a long-term cooperation in the presence of rare defectors when more generous. A previous analysis on a stochastic evolutionary model of the n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma has shown that the fixation probability of a single reciprocator in a population of defectors can be maximized for a moderate level of generosity. However, the analysis is limited in that it considers only tit-for-tat-type reciprocators within the conventional linear payoff assumption. Here we extend the previous study by removing these limitations and show that, if the games are repeated sufficiently many times, considering non-tit-for-tat type strategies does not alter the previous results, while the introduction of non-linear payoffs sometimes does. In particular, under certain conditions, the fixation probability is maximized for a “paradoxical” strategy, which cooperates in the presence of fewer cooperating opponents than in other situations in which it defects.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Personal Cost ◽  
Model Setting

The existence of cooperation demands explanation in terms of natural selection. Prisoner’s dilemma is a framework often used when studying the evolution of cooperation. In prisoner’s dilemma, most previous studies consider the situation wherein an individual who cooperates will give an opponent an amount b at a personal cost of c, where b > c > 0 while an individual who defects will give nothing. This model setting is convenient; however, previous studies have not considered the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and different cost while in reality, it is natural to consider that a different player has a different benefit and different cost. Here, we raise the following question: Taking that a different individual has a different benefit and a different cost into consideration, what strategy is likely to evolve? In this paper, we focus on the direct reciprocity and analyze the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. We obtain the condition for the evolution in the general case. And in addition, we have revealed that under a specific condition as the interaction repeats longer and the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger and the cooperating probability is more sensitive to the benefit the opponent provides, the establishment of cooperation is more likely.

The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2050162
Author(s):  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Zhihai Rong
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Living Environment ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Kagome Lattice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Kagomé Lattice ◽  
Population Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

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