Bidding Strategies for Flexible and Inflexible Generation in a Power Market Simulation Model

Author(s):  
Anke Weidlich ◽  
Thomas Künzel ◽  
Florian Klumpp
Energies ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 494
Author(s):  
Ramiz Qussous ◽  
Nick Harder ◽  
Anke Weidlich

Power markets are becoming increasingly complex as they move towards (i) integrating higher amounts of variable renewable energy, (ii) shorter trading intervals and lead times, (iii) stronger interdependencies between related markets, and (iv) increasing energy system integration. For designing them appropriately, an enhanced understanding of the dynamics in interrelated short-term physical power and energy markets is required, which can be supported by market simulations. In this paper, we present an agent-based power market simulation model with rule-based bidding strategies that addresses the above-mentioned challenges, and represents market participants individually with a high level of technical detail. By allowing agents to participate in several interrelated markets, such as the energy-only market, a procurement platform for control reserve and a local heat market representing district heating systems, cross-market opportunity costs are well reflected. With this approach, we were able to reproduce EPEX SPOT market outcomes for the German bidding zone with a high level of accuracy (mean absolute percentage error of 8 €/MWh for the years 2016–2019). We were also able to model negative market prices at the energy-only market realistically, and observed that the occurrence of negative prices differs among data inputs used. The simulation model provides a useful tool for investigating different short-term physical power/energy market structures and designs in the future. The modular structure also enables extension to further related markets, such as fuel, CO2, or derivative markets.


2018 ◽  
Vol 246 ◽  
pp. 02036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Yang ◽  
Weibin Huang ◽  
Guangwen Ma ◽  
Shijun Chen ◽  
Gang Liu ◽  
...  

Under the background of the electricity market reform, if the multi-owner cascade hydropower stations bid separately, the overall competitive advantages of river basin cannot be exerted, and the overall benefits cannot achieve the maximization. Based on the operation characteristics of cascade hydropower stations and the rule of competitive bidding, this paper established a bi-level optimal model for bidding game in day-ahead market, and used the Nash equilibrium principle of the game theory and genetic algorithm to solve this model, the optimal bidding strategies of the multi-owner cascade hydropower stations have been solved under the circumstances of bidding by oneself and alliance. The results from the calculating examples showed that the unified price declaration of the multi-owner cascade hydropower stations in day-ahead market can improve the overall and individual generation efficiency, and proved the effectiveness and feasibility of the combined bidding strategy in power market.


Author(s):  
Wang Gaoqin ◽  
Chen Ailin ◽  
Lü Jianhu ◽  
Zhang Hong ◽  
Zheng Yaxian

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