QuadSeal: Quadruple Balancing to Mitigate Power Analysis Attacks with Variability Effects and Electromagnetic Fault Injection Attacks

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Darshana Jayasinghe ◽  
Aleksandar Ignjatovic ◽  
Roshan Ragel ◽  
Jude Angelo Ambrose ◽  
Sri Parameswaran
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Aging Effects ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Power Analysis Attacks ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Differential Fault Analysis ◽  
Secret Keys ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Side channel analysis attacks employ the emanated side channel information to deduce the secret keys from cryptographic implementations by analyzing the power traces during execution or scrutinizing faulty outputs. To be effective, a countermeasure must remove or conceal as many as possible side channels. However, many of the countermeasures against side channel attacks are applied independently. In this article, the authors present a novel countermeasure (referred to as QuadSeal ) against Power Analysis Attacks and Electromagentic Fault Injection Attacks (FIAs), which is an extension of the work proposed in Reference [27]. The proposed solution relies on algorithmically balancing both Hamming distances and Hamming weights (where the bit transitions on the registers and gates are balanced, and the total number of 1s and 0s are balanced) by the use of four identical circuits with differing inputs and modified SubByte tables. By randomly rotating the four encryptions, the system is protected against variations, path imbalances, and aging effects. After generating the ciphertext, the output of each circuit is compared against each other to detect any fault injections or to correct the faulty ciphertext to gain reliability. The proposed countermeasure allows components to be switched off to save power or to run four executions in parallel for high performance when resistance against power analysis attacks is not of high priority, which is not available with the existing countermeasures (except software based where source code can be changed). The proposed countermeasure is implemented for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and tested against Correlation Power Analysis and Mutual Information Attacks attacks (for up to a million traces), and none of the secret keys was found even after one million power traces (the unprotected AES circuit is vulnerable for power analysis attacks within 5,000 power traces). A detection circuit (referred to as C-FIA circuit) is operated using the algorithmic redundancy presented in four circuits of QuadSeal to mitigate Electromagnetic Fault Injection Attacks. Using Synopsys PrimeTime, we measured the power dissipation of QuadSeal registers and XOR gates to test the effectiveness of Quadruple balancing methodology. We tested the QuadSeal countermeasure with C-FIA circuit against Differential Fault Analysis Attacks up to one million traces; no bytes of the secret key were found. This is the smallest known circuit that is capable of withstanding power-based side channel attacks when electromagnetic injection attack resistance, process variations, path imbalances, and aging effects are considered.

Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Cipher Chip

2014 ◽  
Vol 1044-1045 ◽  
pp. 1498-1502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Sheng Wang ◽  
Dao Gang Ji ◽  
Yang Zhang ◽  
Kai Yan Chen ◽  
Kai Song
Keyword(s):  
Fault Injection ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Secret Information ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Cipher chips, such as microprocessors, are playing the important role in most cryptosystems, and implementing many public cryptographic algorithms. However, Side channel attacks pose serious threats to Cipher chips. Optical Side channel attack is a new kind of method against cipher chips. Two methods are presented in this paper, which shows how to implement optical fault injection attacks against RSA and AES algorithms running on AT89C52 microchip, and demonstrates how to exploit secret information under attack.

scholarly journals Blind Cartography for Side Channel Attacks: Cross-Correlation Cartography

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Sauvage ◽  
Sylvain Guilley ◽  
Florent Flament ◽  
Jean-Luc Danger ◽  
Yves Mathieu
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Cross Correlation ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
Near Field ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
The Past ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Areas Of Interest ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Side channel and fault injection attacks are major threats to cryptographic applications of embedded systems. Best performances for these attacks are achieved by focusing sensors or injectors on the sensible parts of the application, by means of dedicated methods to localise them. Few methods have been proposed in the past, and all of them aim at pinpointing the cryptoprocessor. However it could be interesting to exploit the activity of other parts of the application, in order to increase the attack's efficiency or to bypass its countermeasures. In this paper, we present a localisation method based on cross-correlation, which issues a list of areas of interest within the attacked device. It realizes an exhaustive analysis, since it may localise any module of the device, and not only those which perform cryptographic operations. Moreover, it also does not require a preliminary knowledge about the implementation, whereas some previous cartography methods require that the attacker could choose the cryptoprocessor inputs, which is not always possible. The method is experimentally validated using observations of the electromagnetic near field distribution over a Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA. The matching between areas of interest and the application layout in the FPGA floorplan is confirmed by correlation analysis.

scholarly journals Extending Glitch-Free Multiparty Protocols to Resist Fault Injection Attacks

2018 ◽  
pp. 394-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Okan Seker ◽  
Abraham Fernandez-Rubio ◽  
Thomas Eisenbarth ◽  
Rainer Steinwandt
Keyword(s):  
Performance Analysis ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Security Level ◽  
Multiparty Computation ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Security Proof ◽  
Multiparty Protocols ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Side channel analysis and fault attacks are two powerful methods to analyze and break cryptographic implementations. At CHES 2011, Roche and Prouff applied secure multiparty computation to prevent side-channel attacks. While multiparty computation is known to be fault-resistant as well, the particular scheme used for side-channel protection does not currently offer this feature. This work introduces a new secure multiparty circuit to prevent both fault injection attacks and sidechannel analysis. The new scheme extends the Roche and Prouff scheme to make faults detectable. Arithmetic operations have been redesigned to propagate fault information until a new secrecy-preserving fault detection can be performed. A new recombination operation ensures randomization of the output in the case of a fault, ensuring that nothing can be learned from the faulty output. The security of the new scheme is proved in the ISW probing model, using the reformulated t-SNI security notion. Besides the new scheme and its security proof, we also present an extensive performance analysis, including a proof-of-concept, software-based AES implementation featuring the masking technique to resist both fault and side-channel attacks at the same time. The performance analysis for different security levels are given for the ARM-M0+ MCU with its memory requirements. A comprehensive leakage analysis shows that a careful implementation of the scheme achieves the expected security level.

scholarly journals Detecting Faults in Inner-Product Masking Scheme - IPM-FD: IPM with Fault Detection

10.29007/fv2n ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Cheng ◽  
Claude Carlet ◽  
Kouassi Goli ◽  
Jean-Luc Danger ◽  
Sylvain Guilley
Keyword(s):  
Fault Detection ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
Inner Product ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Embedded Devices ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Word Level ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks are two typical threats to cryptographic implementations, especially in modern embedded devices. Thus there is an insistent demand for dual side-channel and fault injection protections. As it is known, masking scheme is a kind of provable countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Recently, inner product masking (IPM) was proposed as a promising higher-order masking scheme against side-channel analysis, but not for fault injection attacks. In this paper, we devise a new masking scheme named IPM-FD. It is built on IPM, which enables fault detection. This novel masking scheme has three properties: the security orders in the word-level probing model, bit-level probing model, and the number of detected faults. IPM-FD is proven secure both in the word-level and in the bit-level probing models, and allows for end-to-end fault detection against fault injection attacks.Furthermore, we illustrate its security order by linking it to one defining parameters of linear code, and show its implementation cost by applying IPM-FD to AES-128.

scholarly journals Fault Attacks Made Easy: Differential Fault Analysis Automation on Assembly Code

2018 ◽  
pp. 96-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Breier ◽  
Xiaolu Hou ◽  
Yang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Fault Injection ◽  
Fault Analysis ◽  
Data Flow Graph ◽  
Assembly Code ◽  
The Past ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Differential Fault Analysis ◽  
Software Implementations ◽  
Fault Injection Attack ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Over the past decades, fault injection attacks have been extensively studied due to their capability to efficiently break cryptographic implementations. Fault injection attack models are normally determined by analyzing the cipher structure and finding exploitable spots in non-linear and permutation layers. However, this level of abstraction is often too high to distinguish vulnerable parts of software implementations, due to specific operations and optimizations. On the other hand, manually analyzing the assembly code requires non-negligible amount of time and expertise. In this paper, we propose an automated approach for analyzing cipher implementations in assembly. We represent the whole assembly program as a data flow graph so that the vulnerable spots can be found efficiently. Fault propagation is analyzed in a subgraph constructed from each vulnerable spot, allowing equations for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) to be automatically generated. We have created a tool that implements our approach: DATAC – DFA Automation Tool for Assembly Code. We have successfully used this tool for attacking PRESENT- 80, being able to find implementation-specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited in order to recover the last round key with 16 faults. Our results show that DATAC is useful in finding attack spots that are not visible from the cipher structure, but can be easily exploited when dealing with real-world implementations.

scholarly journals Shaping the Glitch: Optimizing Voltage Fault Injection Attacks

2019 ◽  
pp. 199-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Bozzato ◽  
Riccardo Focardi ◽  
Francesco Palmarini
Keyword(s):  
Power Supply ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Injection Technique ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Sensitive Data ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Side Channels ◽  
Security Checks ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Voltage fault injection is a powerful active side channel attack that modifies the execution-flow of a device by creating disturbances on the power supply line. The attack typically aims at skipping security checks or generating side-channels that gradually leak sensitive data, including the firmware code. In this paper we propose a new voltage fault injection technique that generates fully arbitrary voltage glitch waveforms using off-the-shelf and low cost equipment. To show the effectiveness of our setup, we present new, unpublished firmware extraction attacks on six microcontrollers from three major manufacturers: STMicroelectronics, Texas Instruments and Renesas Electronics that, in 2016 declared a market of $1.5 billion, $800 million and $2.5 billion on units sold, respectively. Among the presented attacks, the most challenging ones exploit multiple vulnerabilities and inject over one million glitches, heavily leveraging on the performance and repeatability of the new proposed technique. We perform a thorough evaluation of arbitrary glitch waveforms by comparing the attack performance against two other major V-FI techniques in the literature. Along a responsible disclosure policy, all the vulnerabilities have been timely reported to the manufacturers.

On the Construction of Binary Optimal LCD Codes with Short Length

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (08) ◽  
pp. 1237-1245
Author(s):  
Qiang Fu ◽  
Ruihu Li ◽  
Fangwei Fu ◽  
Yi Rao
Keyword(s):  
Fault Injection ◽  
Low Complexity ◽  
Short Length ◽  
Upper And Lower Bounds ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Lcd Codes ◽  
New Codes ◽  
Lcd Code ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

A [Formula: see text]-ary linear code [Formula: see text] is called a linear complementary dual (LCD) code if it meets its dual trivially. Binary LCD codes play a significant role for their advantage of low complexity for implementations against side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks. In this paper, the problem of finding LCD codes over the binary field is discussed. Many new codes and new bounds are presented, as well as a table of optimal LCD codes (or upper and lower bounds on such codes) of length up to 30 bits.

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