scholarly journals Contractual Efficiency of PPP Infrastructure Projects: An Incomplete Contract Model

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Lei Shi ◽  
Lu Zhang ◽  
Masamitsu Onishi ◽  
Kiyoshi Kobayashi ◽  
Dashuang Dai
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Incomplete Contract ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Special Purpose Vehicle ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

This study analyses the contractual efficiency of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects, with a focus on two financial aspects: the nonrecourse principal and incompleteness of debt contracts. The nonrecourse principal releases the sponsoring companies from the debt contract when the special purpose vehicle (SPV) established by the sponsoring companies falls into default. Consequently, all obligations under the debt contract are limited to the liability of the SPV following its default. Because the debt contract is incomplete, a renegotiation of an additional loan between the bank and the SPV might occur to enable project continuation or liquidation, which in turn influences the SPV’s ex ante strategies (moral hazard). Considering these two financial features of PPP infrastructure projects, this study develops an incomplete contract model to investigate how the renegotiation triggers ex ante moral hazard and ex post inefficient liquidation. We derive equilibrium strategies under service fees endogenously determined via bidding and examine the effect of equilibrium strategies on contractual efficiency. Finally, we propose an optimal combination of a performance guarantee, the government’s termination right, and a service fee to improve the contractual efficiency of PPP infrastructure projects.

scholarly journals Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
David Rowell ◽  
Son Hong Nghiem ◽  
Luke B. Connelly
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

A perverse ‘net’ effect? Health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard in Ghana

2012 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zelalem Yilma ◽  
Luuk van Kempen ◽  
Thomas de Hoop
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Evaluation of Infrastructure Projects: From a Perspective of Optimal Contract

2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 103-121
Author(s):  
Jun-ya FUKUMOTO
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Post Evaluation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Ex Ante Moral Hazard Pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) di Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fajar Nurhaditia Putra
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Smoking Behavior ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
National Health Insurance System ◽  
Risky Health Behaviors ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

AbstrakPenelitian ini memberikan kontribusi berupa studi empiris ex ante moral hazard pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) di Indonesia. Kami menemukan bahwa kepemilikan Program JKN memiliki hubungan negatif dengan aktivitas fisik dan hubungan positif dengan pengeluran rokok individu. Selanjutnya dengan menghitung efek marginal kami mendapatkan bahwa Program JKN mengurangi probabilitas individu untuk melakukan aktivitas fisik sebesar 2.7% dan mengurangi intensitas melakukan aktivitas fisik. Program JKN juga ditemukan berhubungan positif pengeluaran rokok individu bagi perokok. Hasil analisis menyatakan bahwa ada indikasi terjadinya ex ante moral hazard pada Program JKN karena terdapat hubungan yang positif antara kepemilikan JKN dan probabilitas individu melakukan perilaku kesehatan berisiko seperti aktivitas fisik dan perilaku merokok.Abstract This paper contributes to the empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard on the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) in Indonesia. We find that JKN participation has a negative relationship with physical activity and positive relationship with smoking spending. Furthermore, by calculating marginal effect we obtained that JKN participation reduce the probability of physical activity by 2.7% and also reduce the intensity of individual physical activity. For the smoker, JKN Participation is expected increase in their spending for smoking. The result indicates that there is an evidence of ex ante moral hazard since there is a positive relationship between JKN participation and risky health behaviors such as physical activity and smoking behavior.

scholarly journals Multiple Losses, EX ANTE Moral Hazard, and the Implications for Umbrella Policies

2005 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Breuer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals PCV109 PRESCRIPTION DRUG INSURANCE AND EX ANTE MORAL HAZARD

2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. A415-A416
Author(s):  
N Khan ◽  
R Kaestner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Prescription Drug ◽  
Drug Insurance ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Prescription Drug Insurance

scholarly journals How Individual Characters Affect the Ex ante Moral Hazard of Basic Medical Insurance: Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Ji Luo ◽  
Yuanxiang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Medical Insurance ◽  
Basic Health Insurance ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Basic Health ◽  
Basic Medical Insurance ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Basic Medical

How individual characters affect the ex ante moral hazard of basic medical insurance still remain academically debatable. This paper based on divergent individual characters of insurers to analyze the roles of basic health insurance on the ex ante moral hazard. It found health level, marital status, income level and age are the key individual factors affecting ex ante moral hazard of basic health insurance. But the roles of rural-urban difference and gender are not obvious. It gives supplementary explanations to the medical service expenditure, waste of medical resources and other issues, and also put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.

scholarly journals Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 174-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gharad Bryan ◽  
Dean Karlan ◽  
Jonathan Zinman
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of selection on repayment likelihood, selection on susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. Implementing our method in South Africa we find no evidence of screening but large enforcement effects. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)

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