The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks

2000 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan
2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmine Nahlawi

The 21 August 2013 chemical attack on Ghouta led to the mobilisation of the international community after long international paralysis towards the ongoing conflict in Syria. It is unclear, however, why or under what legal basis states chose to react to Syria’s use of chemical weapons in exclusion to other mass atrocity crimes committed within the country. This article evaluates the legal underpinnings of President Obama’s ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons in Syria in the context of R2P. It notes that while all states condemned the Ghouta attack and called for accountability in this regard, only a minority of states shared the United States’ position that chemical weapons constituted a red line in their own right. Overall, it is maintained that the ‘red line’ phenomenon was case-specific to the Syrian conflict, reflecting geopolitical interests of world powers rather than signifying a new precedent for R2P’s application.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This chapter examines the United States' chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I. In 1917, the United States was rapidly and haphazardly putting together a chemical warfare organization capable of a variety of responsibilities that included performing research, manufacturing war gases and gas masks, training the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to defend themselves against enemy gas, and deploying gas on the battlefield. While the members of the chemical warfare program performed well under the circumstances, more advanced preparation would have improved readiness and mitigated the need for emergency measures. This chapter discusses the use of poison gas and gas masks and the United States' chemical weapons manufacturing operations during World War I.


2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scot Phelps, JD, MPH, CEM, CBCP

This study examined 70 after action reports (AARs) from full-scale chemical weapons exercises held in large cities across the United States by the Office of Domestic Preparedness’ Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP). These exercises were held to determine that, if “hot, warm, and cold” zones were established, did victims stay in the hot zone until they could be decontaminated, and did responders observe the hot-warm-cold zone demarcations? Only 35 percent of reports indicated that responders utilized the zone concept, less than 20 percent of reports indicated that victims were compliant with the zone model, and less than 15 percent of reports indicated that responders properly observed the zones that were created. Results indicate that use of the zone model for a mass terrorism chemical weapons attack (MTCWA) is not well utilized, and that responders operating in the cold zone need personal protective equipment.


2002 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham S. Pearson ◽  
Richard S. Magee

A critical evaluation is made of the chemical weapon destruction technologies demonstrated for 1 kg or more of agent in order to provide information about the technologies proven to destroy chemical weapons to policy-makers and others concerned with reaching decisions about the destruction of chemical weapons and agents. As all chemical agents are simply highly toxic chemicals, it is logical to consider the destruction of chemical agents as being no different from the consideration of the destruction of other chemicals that can be as highly toxictheir destruction, as that of any chemicals, requires the taking of appropriate precautions to safeguard worker safety, public health, and the environment. The Chemical Weapons Convention that entered into force in 1997 obliges all States Parties to destroy any stockpiles of chemical weapons within 10 years from the entry into force of the Conventionby 2007with the possibility of an extension for up to 5 years to 2012. There is consequently a tight timeline under the treaty for the destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons and agentsprimarily held in Russia and the United States. Abandoned or old chemical weaponsnotably in Europe primarily from World War I, in China from World War II as well as in the United Statesalso have to be destroyed. During the past 40 years, more than 20 000 tonnes of agent have been destroyed in a number of countries and over 80 % of this has been destroyed by incineration. Although incineration is well proven and will be used in the United States to destroy over 80 % of the U.S. stockpile of 25 800 tonnes of agent, considerable attention has been paid particularly in the United States to alternative technologies to incineration because of several constraints that are specific to the United States. Much of the information in this report is based on U.S. experienceas the United States had, along with the Russian Federation, by far the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons and agents anywhere in the world. The United States has made much progress in destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons and agents and has also done more work than any other country to examine alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons and agents. However, the national decisions to be taken by countries faced with the destruction of chemical weapons and agents need to be made in the light of their particular national conditions and standardsand thus may well result in a decision to use different approaches from those adopted by the United States. This report provides information to enable countries to make their own informed and appropriate decisions.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

Chemical and biological weapons represent two distinct types of munitions that share some common policy implications. While chemical weapons and biological weapons are different in terms of their development, manufacture, use, and the methods necessary to defend against them, they are commonly united in matters of policy as “weapons of mass destruction,” along with nuclear and radiological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons have the potential to cause mass casualties, require some technical expertise to produce, and can be employed effectively by both nation states and non-state actors. U.S. policies in the early 20th century were informed by preexisting taboos against poison weapons and the American Expeditionary Forces’ experiences during World War I. The United States promoted restrictions in the use of chemical and biological weapons through World War II, but increased research and development work at the outset of the Cold War. In response to domestic and international pressures during the Vietnam War, the United States drastically curtailed its chemical and biological weapons programs and began supporting international arms control efforts such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. chemical and biological weapons policies significantly influence U.S. policies in the Middle East and the fight against terrorism.


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