Beyond Grain and Grandeur: An Answer to Critics and an Agenda for Future Research

2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 117-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moravcsik

Moravcsik's reply to the six commentaries deals with sources omitted from the original article, the use of evidence in his analysis of the Fouchet Plan and the “empty chair” crisis, and broader critiques of (and proposed alternatives to) the commercial interpretation of French policy on European integration during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Moravcsik concedes some of the points raised by the critics and offers a more qualified and nuanced restatement of his argument, but he sticks to his basic contention that “commercial interests were a dominant and sufficient motivation for French policy in Europe.”

Author(s):  
Arne Niemann ◽  
Philippe C. Schmitter

This chapter focuses on neofunctionalism, one of the earlier theories of regional integration. Neofunctionalist theory was first formulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but began to receive increasing criticism from the mid-1960s, particularly because of several adverse empirical developments, the culmination of which was the Empty Chair crisis of 1965–66 when French President Charles de Gaulle effectively paralysed the European Community. With the resurgence of the European integration process in the mid-1980s, neofunctionalism made a substantial comeback. After providing an overview of neofunctionalism’s intellectual roots, the chapter examines early neofunctionalism’s core assumptions and hypotheses, including its central notion of ‘spillover’. It then considers the criticisms that have been levelled against it before turning to later revisions of the theory. It also evaluates some most-likely cases and concludes with an analysis of the case of European Union enlargement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-154
Author(s):  
João Gualberto Marques Porto Júnior

A relação entre o Reino Unido e os países do continente foi marcada ao longo da história por diversos desencontros e disputas. Não foram poucas as guerras travadas entre os britânicos e outras nações europeias. A própria integração europeia inicia-se sem o Reino Unido que apenas na década de 1960 decidiu integrar as comunidades, sendo durante anos impedido pela Franca de Charles de Gaulle. A adesão tardia em 1973 não minimizou as diferenças, tendo novamente havido tensões na década seguinte durante a gestão Margaret Thatcher. As diferenças do casal estranho continuaram após a criação da União Europeia em 1992 e tiveram na decisão do Brexit apenas o desfecho de uma relação distante e tumultuada.ABSTRACTThe relation between the United Kingdom and the countries from "the continent” has been characterized by several disputes and differences along history. A large number of wars were fought between the British and other European nations. Even the European integration started without the United Kingdom, that only decided to take part in the communities in the sixties, being, however, blocked by de Gaulle’s France. Britain’s late accession to the European Communities in 1973 did not reduce the differences with its European neighbors and several tensions emerged during Margaret Thatcher’s government during the eighties. The differences between the odd couple continued after the creation of the European Union in 1992 and the “Brexit” simply represents the natural outcome of a distant and tumultuous relationship.Palavras-chave: Integração europeia, Reino Unido, BrexitKeywords: European integration, United Kingdom, BrexitDOI: 10.12957/rmi.2015.24641Recebido em 08 de Julho de 2016 / Received on July 8, 2016.


2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 4-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moravcsik

The concluding segment of this two-part article explores two key episodes in French foreign policy under President Charles de Gaulle: (1) France's veto of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and (2) de Gaulle's decisions to provoke and then resolve the “empty chair” crisis of 1965–1966. These two cases, like the two examined in Part 1 of this article, demonstrate the fundamental importance of economic considerations in de Gaulle's policy toward the EEC. De Gaulle was a democratic politician first and a geopolitical visionary second. His experience tells us a great deal about the limits imposed by modern democratic politics on any leader who might hope to make statecraft serve an idiosyncratic political vision. The article concludes with an analysis of possible counterarguments and a discussion of the proper use of historical evidence.


2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moravcsik

The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965–1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Berens

The empty chair policy of 1965 marked a severe institutional crisis for the then European economic community. Was the cause of divergences in the European conceptions of the two main actors Charles de Gaulle and Walter Hallstein? And what role did the Luxembourg compromise, that resolved this crisis, play? Is there proof of the right of veto, which became common in the coming years? Alexander Berens, who holds a doctorate in history, addresses these issues in depth and deals with other questions.


Author(s):  
Arne Niemann ◽  
Zoe Lefkofridi ◽  
Philippe C. Schmitter

This chapter focuses on neofunctionalism, one of the earlier theories of regional integration. Neofunctionalist theory was first formulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but began to receive increasing criticism from the mid1960s, particularly because of several adverse empirical developments, the culmination of which was the Empty Chair crisis of 1965–66 when French President Charles de Gaulle effectively paralysed the European Community. With the resurgence of the European integration process in the mid1980s, neofunctionalism made a substantial comeback. After providing an overview of neofunctionalism’s intellectual roots, the chapter examines early neofunctionalism’s core assumptions and hypotheses, including its central notion of ‘spillover’. It then considers the criticisms that have been levelled against it before turning to later revisions of the theory. Finally, this chapter applies the theory critically to explain the nature and probable outcome of the sovereign debt crisis.


Radiopraxis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. E74-E92
Author(s):  
Susanne Anton ◽  
Erik Stahlberg ◽  
Jan Peter Goltz

Das Bauchaortenaneurysma (BAA) als eine fokale Erweiterung aller Wandschichten der Aorta abdominalis ist ein komplexes und lebensbedrohliches Krankheitsbild – Albert Einstein und Charles de Gaulle sind an einer Ruptur verblutet. Eine endovaskuläre Aortenreparatur (EVAR) oder offen-chirurgische Therapie haben das Ziel, das Rupturrisiko niedrig zu halten bzw. zu eliminieren und die Lebenserwartung des Patienten zu verbessern.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 70-81
Author(s):  
David Ramiro Troitino ◽  
Tanel Kerikmae ◽  
Olga Shumilo

This article highlights the role of Charles de Gaulle in the history of united post-war Europe, his approaches to the internal and foreign French policies, also vetoing the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Community. The authors describe the emergence of De Gaulle as a politician, his uneasy relationship with Roosevelt and Churchill during World War II, also the roots of developing a “nationalistic” approach to regional policy after the end of the war. The article also considers the emergence of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereinafter - CAP), one of Charles de Gaulle’s biggest achievements in foreign policy, and the reasons for the Fouchet Plan defeat.


1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-106
Author(s):  
Anton W. DePorte
Keyword(s):  

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