scholarly journals People’s Intuitions About Innateness

Open Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 101-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Berent ◽  
Melanie Platt ◽  
Gwendolyn M. Sandoboe

Few questions in science are as controversial as the origins of knowledge. Whether knowledge (e.g., “objects are cohesive”) is partly innate has been debated for centuries. Here, we ask whether our difficulties with innate knowledge could be grounded in human cognition itself. In eight experiments, we compared reasoning about the innateness of traits that capture knowledge (cognitive traits) with noncognitive (sensorimotor and emotive) traits. Experiments 1–4 examined adult and infant traits; Experiment 5 presented detailed descriptions of published infant experiments. Results showed that people viewed cognitive traits as less likely to be innate in humans—the stronger the association with “thinking,” the lower the rating for “innateness.” Experiments 6–8 explored human, bird, and alien traits that were presented as innate. Participants, however, still considered cognitive traits as less likely to emerge spontaneously (i.e., be innate). These results show that people are selectively biased in reasoning about the origins of knowledge.

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon M. Reader ◽  
Steven M. Hrotic

AbstractEvolutionary questions require specialized approaches, part of which are comparisons between close relatives. However, to understand the origins of human tool behavior, comparisons with solely chimpanzees are insufficient, lacking the power to identify derived traits. Moreover, tool use is unlikely a unitary phenomenon. Large-scale comparative analyses provide an alternative and suggest that tool use co-evolves with a suite of cognitive traits.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
JPOFT Guimaraes ◽  
J Bralten ◽  
CU Greven ◽  
B Franke ◽  
E Sprooten ◽  
...  

AbstractInvestigating the contribution of biology to human cognition has assumed a bottom-up causal cascade where genes influence brain systems that activate, communicate, and ultimately drive behavior. Yet few studies have directly tested whether cognitive traits with overlapping genetic underpinnings also rely on overlapping brain systems. Here, we report a step-wise exploratory analysis of genetic and functional imaging overlaps among cognitive traits. We used twin-based genetic analyses in the human connectome project (HCP) dataset (N=486), in which we quantified the heritability of measures of cognitive functions, and tested whether they were driven by common genetic factors using pairwise genetic correlations. Subsequently, we derived activation maps associated with cognitive tasks via functional imaging meta-analysis in BrainMap (N=4484), and tested whether cognitive traits that shared genetic variation also exhibited overlapping brain activation. Our genetic analysis determined that six cognitive measures (card sorting, no-go continuous performance, fluid intelligence, processing speed, reading decoding and vocabulary comprehension) were heritable (0.3<h2<0.5), and genetically correlated with at least one other heritable cognitive measure (0.2<ρg<0.35). The meta-analysis showed that two genetically-correlated traits, card sorting and fluid intelligence (ρg=0.24), also had a significant brain activation overlap (ρperm=0.29). These findings indicate that fluid intelligence and executive functioning rely on overlapping biological features, both at the neural systems level and at the molecular level. The cross-disciplinary approach we introduce provides a concrete framework for data-driven quantification of biological convergence between genetics, brain function, and behavior in health and disease.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Berent ◽  
Melanie Platt ◽  
Gwendolyn M. Sandoboe

Few questions are as controversial as the origins of knowledge. Here, we examine whether reasoning about innate ideas is shaped by systematic cognitive biases. Previous research suggests that humans possess core knowledge systems that distinguish minds and matter (Dualism), and they assign living things an immutable material essence (Essentialism). These two systems collide in reasoning about cognitive nativism. If, in naïve psychology (a) cognitive traits are immaterial (per Dualism), whereas (b) innate traits must be material (per Essentialism), then (c) cognitive traits cannot be innate. Experiments 1-8 support each of these three hypotheses. These results show for the first time that reasoning about innateness is causally linked to the perceived immateriality of cognitive traits and the materiality of innate traits. While our findings (from adults) cannot ascertain the origin of these biases, they do open up the possibility that our difficulties to reason about innate ideas might be grounded deep within human cognition itself.


2020 ◽  
pp. 89-95
Author(s):  
Iris Berent

Having shown that innate knowledge is a viable scientific hypothesis with considerable evidence in its support, the next three chapters examine laypeople’s intuitions about innate knowledge. We describe a series of experiments that contrasts people’s intuitions about the origins of cognitive traits (those that capture knowledge) and noncognitive traits (either sensory, motor, or emotive capacities). Results show that people believe that cognitive traits are not innate. People maintain these convictions even when they are provided with detailed descriptions of experiments from infant research (those reviewed in previous chapters), complete with an explanation of the rationale and method; while science clearly suggests these principles are present in newborns, people insist that they aren’t. Other results demonstrate that our antinativist intuitions are a bias, as people maintain these intuitions despite explicit evidence to the contrary, and even when they are presented with innate knowledge of nonhuman species. These results show that people are systematically and selectively biased against innate ideas.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
Ben R. Newell

Abstract The purpose of human cognition depends on the problem people try to solve. Defining the purpose is difficult, because people seem capable of representing problems in an infinite number of ways. The way in which the function of cognition develops needs to be central to our theories.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.


Author(s):  
Kim Uittenhove ◽  
Patrick Lemaire

In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that strategy performance on a given trial is influenced by the difficulty of the strategy executed on the immediately preceding trial, an effect that we call strategy sequential difficulty effect. Participants’ task was to provide approximate sums to two-digit addition problems by using cued rounding strategies. Results showed that performance was poorer after a difficult strategy than after an easy strategy. Our results have important theoretical and empirical implications for computational models of strategy choices and for furthering our understanding of strategic variations in arithmetic as well as in human cognition in general.


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