What is the purpose of cognition?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
Ben R. Newell

Abstract The purpose of human cognition depends on the problem people try to solve. Defining the purpose is difficult, because people seem capable of representing problems in an infinite number of ways. The way in which the function of cognition develops needs to be central to our theories.

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hoffmann

AbstractCreativity is an important evolutionary adaptation that allows humans to think original thoughts, to find solutions to problems that have never been encountered before and to fundamentally change the way we live. One particular domain of human cognition that has received considerable attention is linguistic creativity. The present paper discusses how the leading cognitive linguistic theory, Construction Grammar, can provide an explanatory account of creativity that goes beyond the issue of linguistic productivity. At the same time, it also outlines how Construction Grammar can benefit from insights from Conceptual Blending.


Author(s):  
Eleonora Bilotta ◽  
Pietro Pantano

Structural models and patterns are vitally important for human beings. From birth, we base our emotional and cognitive representations of the external world on species-specific signals (the human face) and exploit these signals to structure our instinctive behavior. The creation of cognitive patterns to represent the world lies at the very heart of human cognition. It is this process that underlies our efficient use of signs, our ability to communicate with natural languages and to build cognitive artifacts, the way we organize the external world, and the way we organize external events in our memories and our flow of consciousness. Patterns are sometimes called schemas, or models, and discussed in terms of a gestalt (Piaget, 1960; 1970; Koelher, 1974). In the middle ages a pattern meant “the.original.proposed.to.imitation;.the. archetype;.that.which.is.to.be.copied;.an.exemplar” (from the On Line Etymology Dictionary). Modern use dates back to the XVIII century. In 1977 Christopher Alexander introduced a new way of using the term in architecture. For Alexander, a pattern was a model used to encode and organize existing knowledge, avoiding the need to reinvent the knowledge every time it was needed. For Alexander a pattern was “a three part rule, which expresses a relation between a certain context, a problem, and a solution” (Alexander et al., 1977).


Universe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Heller

The aim of this essay is to look at the idea of the multiverse—not so much from the standpoint of physics or cosmology, but rather from a philosophical perspective. The modern story of the multiverse began with Leibniz. Although he treated “other worlds” as mere possibilities, they played an important role in his logic. In a somewhat similar manner, the practice of cosmology presupposes a consideration of an infinite number of universes, each being represented by a solution to Einstein’s equations. This approach prepared the way to the consideration of “other universes” which actually exist, first as an auxiliary concept in discussing the so-called anthropic principle, and then as real universes, the existence of which were supposed to solve some cosmological conundrums. From the point of view of the philosophy of science, the question is: Could the explanatory power of a multiverse ideology compensate for the relaxation of empirical control over so many directly unobservable entities? It is no surprise that appealing to a possibly infinite number of “other universes” in order to explain some regularities in our world would seem “too much” for a self-disciplined philosopher. With no strict empirical control at our disposal, it is logic that must be our guide. Also, what if logic changes from one world to another in the multiverse? Such a possibility is suggested by the category theory. From this point of view, our present concepts of the multiverse are certainly “not enough”. Should this be read as a warning that the learned imagination can lead us too far into the realms of mere possibilities?


Heritage ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 2573-2596
Author(s):  
George Raptis ◽  
Christos Sintoris ◽  
Nikolaos Avouris

Cultural heritage (CH) institutions attract wide and heterogeneous audiences, which should be efficiently supported and have access to meaningful CH content. This introduces numerous challenges when delivering such experiences, given that people have different cognitive characteristics which influence the way we process information, experience, behave, and acquire knowledge. Our recent studies provide evidence that human cognition should be considered as a personalization factor within CH contexts, and thus we developed a framework that delivers cognition-centered personalized CH activities. The efficiency and the efficacy of the framework have been successfully assessed through two user studies, but non-technical professionals (e.g., CH designers) may face difficulties when attempting to use it and create personalized CH activities. In this paper, we present DeCACHe, which supports CH designers in creating cognition-centered personalized CH activities throughout different phases of the design lifecycle. We also report a user study with seventeen professional CH designers, who used our tool to design CH activities for people with different cognitive characteristics.


Author(s):  
Lambros Malafouris ◽  
Chris Gosden

The study of material culture is changing the way we perceive and study the past, as well as how we understand the process of human becoming. This chapter proposes that a focus on the phenomenon of material engagement provides a productive means to situate and integrate evolutionary, historical, and developmental processes. The material engagement approach brings with it a relational conceptualization of human cognition as profoundly embodied, enacted, extended, and distributed. This conceptualisation opens the way to, on the one hand, reanimate the importance of history and development in the study of human cognitive evolution, and on the other hand, allow a new approach to historical analysis, one in which minds and things play a more central role. Specifically, we explore some of the implications of the view that humans and things coconstitute each other for understanding the processes by which human cognitive abilities develop and change in different cultural and historical contexts.


2013 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Lester

One of the primary goals of human spaceflight has been putting human cognition on other worlds. This is at the heart of the premise of what we call space exploration. But Earth-controlled telerobotic facilities can now bring human senses to other worlds and, in that respect, the historical premise of exploration, of boots on the ground, no longer clearly applies. We have ways of achieving remote presence that we never used to have. But the distances over which this must be achieved, by humans based on the Earth, is such that the speed of light seriously handicaps their awareness and cognition. The highest quality telepresence can be achieved not only by having people on site, but also by having people close, and it is that requirement that truly mandates human spaceflight. In terms of cost, safety, and survival, getting people close is easier than getting people all the way there. It is suggested here that to the extent that space exploration is best accomplished by achieving a sense of real human off-Earth presence, that presence can be best achieved by optimally combining human spaceflight to mitigate latency, with telerobotics, to keep those humans secure. This is culturally a new perspective on exploration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-39
Author(s):  
Murat Kaş

The structure of human cognition and the means of apprehension is suitable only for partly and gradually conceiving reality. This limitation has led to a certain distance between appearance and reality. This means that there will always be a gap between the judgments of the mind about the external world and its contents, which are entities, cases, facts, and states. This partiality and partiteness of human understanding has produced the truth-maker problem with regard to mind judgments. Muslim scholars who admit the correlation between the structure of reality and the categories of the mind but reject the notion of the construction and the determination of reality by the mind refer to the realm that is independent of the mind’s personal judgments as nafs al-amr. This realm is concerned with the all degrees of reality, namely—from the existent to the non-existent, from the necessity to the contingency and impossibility, from the absolute to the relative, from the material to the non-physical, from the external to the mental, and from the real entities to the abstracted ones—which step into the shot of human cognition or not. Carrying the concept of nafs al-amr from the logical plane to the metaphysical realm that intersects epistemology and ontology has led to debates that pave the way for various treatments. In particular, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) nafs al-amr epistle that posited it to the cosmic sphere resulted in criticisms of this conception of nafs al-amr, and these criticisms are the same ones directed to the Avicennian theory of emanation and its epistemological implications. Scholars who use this concept free from any metaphysical presumption and implication argue against his leap from the logical to the cosmic sphere. During the following period, this tension occasioned debates that led to the approaches that refer to the various degrees of reality, i.e., to the cosmic spheres, the spiritual realms, and the divine realms. This work aims to create a map of treatments, arguments and problems with regard to the concept of nafs al-amr.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (139) ◽  
pp. 251
Author(s):  
Pedro Pricladnitzky

Resumo: Neste artigo, pretendo examinar a maneira como Malebranche compreende a intencionalidade, característica das cognições humanas, e a sua relação com o desenvolvimento da teoria das ideias apresentada na Recherche de la Verité. Contrariando uma posição presente em diversos intérpretes de Malebranche, apresento uma interpretação na qual as sensações podem ser consideradas intencionais para Malebranche e que, dessa forma, a sua análise não conduz ao argumento que defende as modificações da alma como não representacionais.Abstract: In this text, I intend to examine the way Malebranche understands intentionality, a characteristic of human cognition, and its relation to the development of the theory of ideas presented in Recherche de la Verité. In opposition with several of Malebranche’s critics, I offer an interpretation in which sensations can be considered intentional for the author and, therefore, his analysis cannot be regarded as a starting point for the argument that modifications of the soul are not representational.


Author(s):  
Andrea Bender ◽  
Sieghard Beller ◽  
Douglas L. Medin

Causality is a core concept of human cognition, but the extent to which cultural factors constrain, trigger, or shape the way in which humans think about causal relationships has barely been explored. This chapter summarizes empirical findings on the potential for cultural variability in the content of causal cognition, in the way this content is processed, and in the context in which all this occurs. This review reveals cultural variability in causal cognition along each of these dimensions and across physical, biological, and psychological explanations. Specifically, culture helps defining the settings in which causal cognition emerges, the manner in which potential factors are pondered, and the choices for highlighting some causes over others or for expressing them in distinct ways. Future tasks include the need to re-conceptualize ‘culture’ and to overcome blind spots in research strategies such as those linked to disciplinary boundaries and the ‘home-field disadvantages’ in cross-cultural comparisons.


Pragmatics ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter A.M. Seuren

This paper aims at an explanation of the discrepancies between natural intuitions and standard logic in terms of a distinction between NATURAL and CONSTRUCTED levels of cognition, applied to the way human cognition deals with sets. NATURAL SET THEORY (NST) restricts standard set theory cutting it down to naturalness. The restrictions are then translated into a theory of natural logic. The predicate logic resulting from these restrictions turns out to be that proposed in Hamilton (1860) and Jespersen (1917). Since, in this logic, NO is a quantifier in its own right, different from NOT-SOME, and given the assumption that natural lexicalization processes occur at the level of basic naturalness, single-morpheme lexicalizations for NOT-ALL should not occur, just as there is no single-morpheme lexicalization for NOT-SOME at that level. An analogous argument is developed for the systematic absence of lexicalizations for NOT-AND in propositional logic.


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