De 德 in the Zuozhuan 《左傳》

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Yuri Pines

Abstract This article surveys the usages of the term de 德 in the Zuozhuan《左傳》. It demonstrates the term’s hermeneutical richness: de could refer to charismatic power, to political potency, to proper decorum, to mildness and kindness in domestic or interstate affairs, to individual morality, and so forth. Behind this richness, though, we may discern a clear predominance of political usages of de and paucity of references to de as personal moral virtue. Notably, Zuozhuan never refers to de in the context of moral self-cultivation. The article discusses the reasons for this peculiarity.

Author(s):  
Diane Jeske

Thomas Jefferson and Edward Coles were men of similar background, but the former remained a slaveholder while the latter emancipated his slaves. Examining the ways in which people such as Jefferson, who perform wrong and even evil actions, attempt to justify those actions both to others and to themselves illuminates the mistakes that we ourselves make in moral reasoning. The study of moral philosophy can help us to identify and correct for such mistakes. In applying the tools of moral philosophy to case studies of Nazi death camp commandants, American slaveholders, and a psychopathic serial killer, the author demonstrates how we can become better moral deliberators, thereby fulfilling our duties of due care in moral deliberation, moral self-scrutiny, and the development of moral virtue. These case studies serve as extended real-life thought experiments of moral deliberation gone wrong, and can show us how four impediments to effective moral deliberation—cultural norms and pressures, the complexity of the consequences of our actions, emotions, and self-deception—can be identified and overcome by the study and use of moral philosophy. Thus, the study of moral philosophy ought to be incorporated into moral education so that its tools become common currency in moral deliberation, discussion, and debate.


Author(s):  
Diane Jeske

The actions of Thomas Jefferson, slaveholder, and Edward Coles, emancipator of slaves, pose critical questions about how people justify their complicity in evil practices. In this introductory chapter, the author lays out how she will examine four significant impediments to good moral deliberation: cultural norms and pressures, the complexity of consequences, emotions, and self-deception. She explains how she will illuminate the errors of bad people and show how they mirror errors that we ourselves commonly make. Thus, the moral philosophy presented here is an important tool in identifying such errors and can assist in fulfilling our duties of due care in moral deliberation, moral self-scrutiny, and the development of moral virtue. The author previews the case studies of bad people, such as Nazis and slaveholders, that she cites in later chapters, and she shows how the studies can act as extended thought experiments about the nature of moral reasoning and of effective moral education.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-105
Author(s):  
Andrey V. Prokofyev ◽  

The paper analyzes the conception of shame of the British sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson. It rests on the understanding of moral virtue as a representation of benevolence and the iden­tification of shame with the misery from the unfavorable opinions of others. For Hutcheson, shame complements honour as a second part of the particular human capacity that linked to the moral sense. In ‘An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue’, Hutch­eson is arguing with Bernard Mandeville about the role of shame and honour in the genesis of morality. He tries to show that the general approval of benevolence and the love of public good cannot be born out of self-love and a sensitivity to public opinion. He uses three argu­ments: a) shame is an immediate evil, b) shame is inseparable from the moral sense, b) their link is independent from public opinion. In addition, Hutcheson demonstrates that the sense of honour and shame can deviate from the moral sense in par­ticular instances via some asso­ciations. Hutcheson’ attitude to these deviations is uncertain and ambivalent. In ‘A System of Moral Philosophy’, honour and shame accompany not only the moral sense but also the sense of decency and dignity. This treatise also contains a brief polemics with Aristotle on the role of emotions generated by opinions of others in the pro­cess of moral self-improve­ment. Hutcheson’s conception of shame is a step in the develop­ment of socialized interpreta­tion of this emotion. Theoretically, it is interesting as an attempt to analyze origins of the particular lists of subjects of shame.


Author(s):  
Nina Strohminger ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Bai ◽  
Grace Ching Chi Ho ◽  
Jin Yan

Author(s):  
Aurelian Craiutu

Political moderation is the touchstone of democracy, which could not function without compromise and bargaining, yet it is one of the most understudied concepts in political theory. How can we explain this striking paradox? Why do we often underestimate the virtue of moderation? Seeking to answer these questions, this book examines moderation in modern French political thought and sheds light on the French Revolution and its legacy. The book begins with classical thinkers who extolled the virtues of a moderate approach to politics, such as Aristotle and Cicero. It then shows how Montesquieu inaugurated the modern rebirth of this tradition by laying the intellectual foundations for moderate government. The book looks at important figures such as Jacques Necker, Germaine de Staël, and Benjamin Constant, not only in the context of revolutionary France but throughout Europe. It traces how moderation evolves from an individual moral virtue into a set of institutional arrangements calculated to protect individual liberty, and explores the deep affinity between political moderation and constitutional complexity. The book demonstrates how moderation navigates between political extremes, and it challenges the common notion that moderation is an essentially conservative virtue, stressing instead its eclectic nature. Drawing on a broad range of writings in political theory, the history of political thought, philosophy, and law, the book reveals how the virtue of political moderation can address the profound complexities of the world today.


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