The dual process model of moral judgement

In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautological, while on the other, I show that the use of dilemmas is not an adequate tool with which to account for moral deliberation.

A Grotian Moment for Animal Sociability?

In this article, I will revert to the categories of ‘fitness’ and ‘sociability’ to ask whether a ‘Grotian moment for animal sociability’ can be conceptualized. Grotius claims that we share a core of fundamental laws with animals. Building upon a passage from Seneca’s De clementia, Grotius calls these laws ‘commune ius animantium’, i.e. the common law of living beings. These shared legal entitlements, based on a shared sense of innate fitness, show that a certain care of maintaining society (‘animal sociability’) is common to all living beings. However, as I will show, humans, as the only beings capable of speech and moral deliberation, remain the only translators and enforcers of this instinct into a language of rights. From this perspective, it can be argued that a ‘Grotian tradition’ of animal rights exists, as Grotius’s reliance on the ‘common law of living beings’ can be interpreted in a progressive manner. However, I will argue that animal sociability qualifies as a ‘non-Grotian moment’: sociability as owed to animals but only in a thin sense, as it requires human judgment to be enforced into strict right. Such a ‘non-Grotian moment’ reveals that the deeply anthropocentric structure of Grotius’ theory is incapable of triggering any paradigm shift, because animals lack the capacity for judgment that is so essential to be a legal person.

Two Conceptions of Moral Realism

This paper considers the comparative merits of two conceptions of real properties, as applied to the moral domain. On the weaker conception, real properties or facts are there anyway, independent of any experience. On the stronger conception, real properties are those not constituted by the availability of some response to them. The question is whether moral realists should restrict themselves to the weaker conception, allowing that a wrong action is one that is such as to elicit blame but not holding that this could constitute wrongness in the object. This paper argues that the weaker conception is inconsistent with the main argument for moral realism, which the author takes to appeal to the phenomenology of moral deliberation.

Die Idee des Schaminstinkts in Kants anthropologischen Schriften

This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics have been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of negative emotions like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Finally, I raise some paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light.

Aristotle’s Account of Moral Perception (EN.VI.8) & Nussbaum’s Priority of the Particular Thesis

Consider a contemporary retrieval of Aristotle’s account of moral perception. Drawing from EN.VI.8, Martha Nussbaum argues that we perceive moral particulars prior to ethical principles. First, I explain her priority of the particular thesis. The virtuous person perceives value in the world, as part of her moral deliberation. This perceptual skill is an important aspect of her virtuous activity, and hence also part of her eudaimonia. Second, I present her priority thesis with a dilemma: our perception of moral particulars is either non-inferential or it is inferential. If Nussbaum accepts a non-inferential interpretation, then she is committed to an unsavory view about moral epistemology –one that invites intuitionism and relativism. But if she accepts a non-inferential account, then the moral particular is no longer prior to the ethical principle. I suggest that her better option is to grab the second horn. This move avoids the problems of the first horn without sacrificing her neo-Aristotelian commitments or her overarching view that the perception of moral particulars is ineliminable to moral deliberation (and eudaimonia). At the same time, this move renders her priority thesis trivial.

Discrimination in the age of artificial intelligence

In this paper, I examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM) aggravates issues of discrimination as has been argued by several authors. For this purpose, I first take up the lively philosophical debate on discrimination and present my own definition of the concept. Equipped with this account, I subsequently review some of the recent literature on the use AI/ADM and discrimination. I explain how my account of discrimination helps to understand that the general claim in view of the aggravation of discrimination is unwarranted. Finally, I argue that the use of AI/ADM can, in fact, increase issues of discrimination, but in a different way than most critics assume: it is due to its epistemic opacity that AI/ADM threatens to undermine our moral deliberation which is essential for reaching a common understanding of what should count as discrimination. As a consequence, it turns out that algorithms may actually help to detect hidden forms of discrimination.

On Individual and Shared Obligations

People who make substantial efforts to help resolve collective practical problems such as that of catastrophic climate change often think that: (1) Together, we can resolve the problem. (2) In virtue of this, we have an obligation to resolve it. (3) In virtue of the importance of the problem and our capacity to resolve it together, we have individual obligations to help resolve it. This “activist perspective” faces philosophical problems: How can the groups that are to solve the problems have obligations given that these groups are not themselves agents? How can members of such groups have obligations to help, given that they have no individual control over whether the problem is resolved? And how can the collective ability to solve a problem be relevant for individual obligations and individual moral deliberation? This chapter develops solutions to each of these problems based on an analysis of individual and shared obligations.

On formal ethics versus inclusive moral deliberation

In this article, I will advocate caution against a formalization of ethics by showing that it may produce and perpetuate unjustified power imbalances, disadvantaging those without a proper command of the formalisms, and those not in a position to decide on the formalisms’ use. My focus rests mostly on ethics formalized for the purpose of implementing ethical evaluations in computer science–artificial intelligence, in particular—but partly also extends to the project of applying mathematical rigor to moral argumentation with no direct intention to automate moral deliberation. Formal ethics of the latter kind can, however, also be seen as a facilitator of automated ethical evaluation. I will argue that either form of formal ethics presents an obstacle to inclusive and fair processes for arriving at a society-wide moral consensus. This impediment to inclusive moral deliberation may prevent a significant portion of society from acquiring a deeper understanding of moral issues. However, I will defend the view that such understanding supports genuine and sustained moral progress. From this, it follows that formal ethics is not per se supportive of moral progress. I will illustrate these arguments by practical examples of manifest asymmetric relationships of power primarily from the domain of autonomous vehicles as well as on more visionary concepts, such as artificial moral advisors. As a result, I will show that in these particular proposed use-cases of formal ethics, machine ethics risks to run contrary to their proponents’ proclaimed promises of increasing the rigor of moral deliberation and even improving human morality on the whole. Instead, I will propose that inclusive discourse about automating ethical evaluations, e.g., in autonomous vehicles, should be conducted with unrelenting transparency about the limitations of implementations of ethics. As an outlook, I will briefly discuss uses formal ethics that are more likely to avoid discrepancies between the ideal of inclusion and the challenge from power asymmetries.Please check and confirm that the authors and their respective affiliations have been correctly identified and amend if necessary.I confirm.Author names: Please confirm if the author names are presented accurately and in the correct sequence (given name, middle name/initial, family name). I confirm. Kindly check and confirm the country name for the affiliation [1] is correct.I confirm.