Procedural Developments at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamfuh Y.N. Wilson

AbstractThe author seeks to expose the fact that the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath has many lessons for African leaders, especially that modern international criminal law is committed to punishing perpetrators of heinous crimes. The procedural processes at the Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have also operated a successful jurisprudence that has immensely contributed to the development of modern international law. This article looks at the historical context of the genocide, the jurisprudence and case law of the ICTR, the novel concepts that have contributed to the growth of international law, and the significance of rebuilding a post-genocide Rwanda.

Author(s):  
Beth van Schaack

Crimes against humanity have both a colloquial and a legal existence. In daily parlance, the term is employed to condemn any number of atrocities that violate international human rights. As a legal construct, crimes against humanity encompass a constellation of acts made criminal under international law when they are committed within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. In the domain of international criminal law, crimes against humanity are an increasingly useful component of any international prosecutor’s toolbox, because they can be charged in connection with acts of violence that do not implicate other international criminal prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against war crimes (which require a nexus to an armed conflict) and genocide (which protects only certain human groups and requires proof of a specific intent to destroy such a group). Although the concept of crimes against humanity has deep roots, crimes against humanity were first adjudicated—albeit with some controversy—in the criminal proceedings following the World War II period. The central challenge to defining crimes against humanity under international criminal law since then has been to come up with a formulation of the offense that reconciles the principle of sovereignty—which envisions an exclusive territorial domain in which states are free from outside scrutiny—with the idea that international law can, and indeed should, regulate certain acts committed entirely within the borders of a single state. Because many enumerated crimes against humanity are also crimes under domestic law (e.g., murder, assault, and rape), it was necessary to define crimes against humanity in a way that did not elevate every domestic crime to the status of an international crime, subject to international jurisdiction. Over the years, legal drafters have experimented with various elements in an effort to arrive at a workable penal definition. The definitional confusion plaguing the crime over its life span generated a considerable amount of legal scholarship. It was not until the UN Security Council promulgated the statutes of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—that a modern definition of the crime emerged. These definitions were further refined by the case law of the two tribunals and their progeny, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. All these doctrinal developments were codified, with some additional modifications, in a consensus definition in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is now clear that the offense constitutes three essential elements: (1) the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and (2) the intentional commission of an enumerated act (such as an act of murder or torture) (3) by an individual with knowledge that his or her act would contribute to the larger attack. A renewed effort is now afoot to promulgate a multilateral treaty devoted to crimes against humanity based on the ICC definition and these central elements. Through this dynamic process of codification and interpretation, many—but not all—definitional issues left open in the postwar period have finally been resolved. Although their origins were somewhat shaky, crimes against humanity now have a firm place in the canon of international criminal law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Stappert

AbstractThe question of change has emerged as one of the main conceptual and empirical challenges for International Relations' practice turn. In the context of international law, such a challenge is brought into particularly stark relief due to the significant development of legal meaning through more informal, interpretive avenues, including through the judgments of international courts. This paper develops a framework for theorizing how interpretive legal practices generate normative content change in international law. Specifically, it uses the example of the development of international criminal law through the decisions of international criminal courts to analyze how legal interpretation can lead to normative change in practice. Drawing on interviews conducted with judges and legal officers at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), I analyze how a community of legal practice centered around these courts was able to construct and alter legal meaning in international criminal law, and how such a potential for change was curbed by understandings of the interpretive process and the role of international courts dominant among international lawyers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 784-804
Author(s):  
Harmen van der Wilt

Inter-state practice is relatively scarce in the area of human rights and international criminal law. This article ventures to inquire how this has affected the process of identification of customary international law by international criminal tribunals and courts. The main conclusion is that the two components of customary international law – opinio juris and state practice – have become blurred. In search of customary international law, international tribunals have resorted to national legislation and case law of domestic courts. These legal artefacts can be qualified as both evidence of state practice and opinio juris. The author attempts to explain the reasons for this development and holds that, if properly applied, the methodology, while seemingly messy, comports with the nature of international criminal law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 503-510
Author(s):  
SALVATORE ZAPPALA

AbstractThis article is a journey through the life of Antonio Cassese, a giant of international law, no doubt one of the most prominent international lawyers of the twentieth century, and the ‘architect of international criminal justice’. From his first steps in the academic community in Pisa in the early 1960s to his well-known contributions as first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, he became a prolific author and editor of seminal books and commentaries on international law and international criminal law, as well as founder of groundbreaking law journals.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 231-246
Author(s):  
Emily Crawford

In this article, Emily Crawford explores one set of key institutional and legal responses to, and consequences of, the Rwanda genocide – the ictr and the revival of icl that the ictr and the icty heralded. Tracing the development of the concept and institutions of icl, Crawford observes how the case law of the [ad hoc] tribunals, and the ictr in particular, were pivotal in progressively developing the international law of genocide, and the law of non-international armed conflict’.


2004 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto

The tragedy which befell Rwanda in 1994 deserves a special place in the bloodstained pages of history. The Rwandan genocide merits distinction primarily because of its shocking ef ficiency, its scale and its proportional dimensions among the victim population. The Security Council's resolution establishing the ICTR articulates a set of decisions, assumptions, wishes, and objectives. Primarily, the States that voted in favour of the creation of the ICTR indicated that the root of the problem was individual violations of international criminal law. Only one State that voted for the resolution did not equate ipso facto ICTR actions with justice. That State considered the ICTR only one of the many tasks at hand for the international community. The ICTR was merely a vehicle of justice, 'but it is hardly designed as a vehicle for reconciliation . . . Reconciliation is a much more complicated process' (Czech Republic). Interestingly, Rwanda, which voted against the resolution, spoke of the problem in terms of a culture of impunity . The UN paid little to no heed to the subtle, but extremely different way in which the problem was characterized and the implications this would have on the type of tool needed to deal with that problem.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-681
Author(s):  
ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT

The editorial board of the Leiden Journal of International Law is pleased to announce a debate on a very important but underexposed topic in international criminal law: witness proofing. Witness proofing is an accepted and well-established practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It entails setting up a meeting between a party to the proceedings and a witness, usually shortly before the witness is to testify in court, the purpose of which is to prepare and familiarize the witness with courtroom procedure and to review the witness's evidence. Recently a trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) prohibited witness proofing. On 30 November 2007, Trial Chamber I held in the Lubanga case that the possibility of witness proofing is not expressly provided for in the ICC Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that no general principle exists in national or international criminal law that would require the ICC to adhere to such a practice. Moreover, and this is the most interesting argument, the trial chamber held that the ICC Statute ‘moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc tribunals’ and that as a result witness proofing is not easily transferable to the ICC.


2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Kendall ◽  
Sarah M. H. Nouwen

Pour qu’un héritage soit réellement grand, il faut que la main du défunt ne se voie pas.In 2014, a year of memorial ceremonies commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) marked its own twentieth year with the launch of a “legacy website.” With the closing of the Tribunal scheduled for December 2015, the question of its legacy had become increasingly pressing. The website premiered a video that “celebrates the accomplishments of the ICTR” in a “visually compelling” style. Blurring the distinction between documentary account and film trailer, the video begins with iconic images of the African continent: a boy rolling a hoop down a dirt road; laborers ferrying wares; women in colorful dresses tending children. These scenes of daily life are interrupted by images of men wielding machetes and corpses, interspersed with the figure of the radio, reminding the viewer that the 1994 genocide was encouraged through broadcasts inciting Hutus to take up arms against their Tutsi neighbors. The video lists the Tribunal’s contributions to international criminal law, but also describes a much broader impact: “a record of legal reform in Rwanda, and outreach, education, legal training, and healing.” Young boys leap into a body of water to punctuate the final term, suggesting the hope of a new Rwanda. The narrator proclaims, “today in Rwanda, it’s safe to listen to the radio again: the sound is of a nation rebuilding.” The film’s final words reach beyond the Rwandan context, affirming that ours is “a world pushing forward despite great imperfection, each day closer to a time when international law offers justice to all people, everywhere.”


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 920-943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Palmer Olsen ◽  
Stuart Toddington

Ninety per cent of international courts’ (ICs) legal decisions have been issued within the last two decades. This increase in case law - along with other significant changes in the operation of ICs - signals a new form of judicialised international law. This change is best described as a shift from a 'static' regime of contractual relations between sovereign states to a more 'organic' regime of 'living law'. In criminal law, this development is exemplified by the reasoning of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. In examining the institutional undercurrents that accompany these changes important questions arise: through what social processes is legitimacy imputed to ICs? How do ICs handle or avoid crises in legitimacy? In the context of recent critiques of judicial reasoning in international criminal law, the article suggests that the analysis of case law from ICs must become as dynamic and agile as contemporary international law itself.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Elewa Badar

AbstractEven though more than a decade has passed since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the law of the most fundamental concept in international criminal law – mens rea – remains unsettled. Through its jurisprudence, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has made enormous efforts to assign different degrees of mens rea for different categories of crimes under its Statute. The present study is an attempt to clarify several issues with regard to the law of mens rea as developed in the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Among these issues are the following: what precisely is to be understood by the terms "specific intent", "special intent", "dolus specialis", or "surplus intent"? Similarly, what are the precise meanings of the terms "deliberately", "intention", "intent", "intentionally", "wilful or wilfully", "knowledge", and "wanton" as provided for in the ICTY Statute or as employed by the Chambers within its judgments.


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