Semantic and Pragmatic Implications of Inaccurate Translations of Shari’a-Court Phrases & Sentence Extracts into English

The present paper aims to highlight the semantic and pragmatic implications of the inaccurate English translations of Gazan shari’a-court phrases and sentence extracts. The researchers analyze the translations of five shari’a-court phrases and five sentence extracts from shari’a-court documents of different shari’a courts in Gaza Strip. The descriptive analytical approach was adopted to conduct this research paper. The texts used in this paper are extracted from a thesis on the linguistic difficulties Palestinian translators face when rendering shari’a-court terms in which the researchers participated as a master student and a supervisor. When selecting the source texts, the researchers consulted an assistant professor in law to identify the legal phrases and sentential extracts which require specific familiarity with shari’a-court terms. Then, the selected texts were given to four Palestinian sworn translators who rendered the translations which were afterwards analyzed by the researchers in light of explanations of the legal meaning of the shari’a-court terms by the law specialist. The findings of the selected translations, five phrases and five sentential extracts from fifty phrases and thirty-five sentential extracts in the original thesis, show that the inaccurate translations of shari’a-court terms have semantic and pragmatic implications which are mainly reflected in semantic loss and pragmatic ambiguity which lies in lack of specific reference to intended persons. The researchers recommend integrating specific contents in legal translation courses to better familiarize student translators and trainee translators with the semantic complexity of shari’a-court terms and the practical methods which can be adopted to translate such terms into English. Attention should also be given to the legal terms which are characterized by culture-based meanings.

A Sham Legal Phenomenon: The Concept and Legal Composition

Introduction: in recent decades, there has been an increase in the number of legal phenomena in which nominal properties do not correspond to the real ones. So, even such terms as, for example, the nominal value of an asset and the like began to be included in the laws. The discrepancy between nominal and real properties has long been typical for sham transactions. Therefore, the researchers considered it appropriate to extend the rules on such transactions to the legal phenomena of various branches. So, in tax law, it is proposed to talk about a sham counterparty and apply the legal consequences to the real one. It is also important that in recent years the concept of “sham object” has appeared in the acts of financial and administrative law. The accumulation of relevant circumstances predetermined the purpose of the study – based on the generalization of the construction of a sham transaction to reveal the composition of the concept of “sham legal phenomenon”. Results: the prerequisites for the formulation of the concept of “sham legal phenomenon” are revealed. The expediency of introducing this concept into the legal circulation is characterized. The relevance of extrapolating the construction of a sham transaction to sham legal phenomena is justified. It is shown that the elements of the composition of a sham legal phenomenon are the covering phenomenon claimed by the participants as real; the covered (real) legal phenomenon; the legal consequences of the covered phenomenon; the participants of the legal phenomenon seeking to achieve the legal consequences characteristic of the covered phenomenon. The rule on the legal meaning of the consequences of the covered legal phenomenon is formulated. The scope of application of the results is the theory of law, the branch legal sciences, scientific legal research, law enforcement, law-making. Conclusions: it is necessary to study the scale, causes and consequences of the prevalence of sham legal phenomena in various branches of law.

Weapons in Legal Rituals: Between Myth and Reality

This article seeks to explore the significance of weapons in legal rituals mentioned in sources, such as sagas and laws. Similarities in the phrasing of various types of sources give reason to believe that it is possible to determine certain uses of weapons in Viking Age legal rituals. Such rituals, which shared essential features with legal procedure, consisted of sequences of activities involving phrasing, objects, and gestures to mark a transition from one legal status to another, and they could also convey, and act as preservers of, legal meaning. Examples show that oaths were sworn on weapons, and that they conferred legal validity at the assembly (vápnatak). Old Norse mythology explained and legitimised key values in society, and through it everyday people found a template for how to use weapons in legal rituals. Rituals are however dynamic, and hence the ritual objects may change over time. In the Viking Age weapons were objects laden with meaning, and it was probably the introduction of Christianity that led to them being banned from further use in legal ritual.

The Electronic Seal as a Solution to Prove the Intent of a Legal Entity

Because the digital environment does not recognise national borders and with transactions increasingly taking place across them, an electronic environment that affords interoperability is important for the competitiveness of the European Union. Debate about whether the identification of individuals in the digital environment should be a norm and obligation or, instead, the digital environment should be available as a form of expression of our privacy and anonymity has not waned. Although legal entities act through natural persons, solutions are available whereby a natural person’s e-signature may be replaced in an electronic environment by an electronic seal, or e-seal, of a legal entity. Although the general requirements related to e-seals were established in Estonian legislation already in 2009 and on EU level with the eIDAS Regulation in 2016, the legal meaning of an e-seal has remained unclear in most EU countries, even Estonia, where the uptake of such solutions is widespread. In light of this context, the article examines in which cases the e-seal of a legal entity could be equal in legal meaning to a hand-written signature or an e-signature of a natural person. Thus, the article addresses challenges visible in Estonian and EU-level legal acts that have left the legal meaning of the e-seal unclear. As some EU member states have declared a legal meaning for e-seals divergences among the regulatory approaches examined lead to issues that erode interoperability and the mutual recognition of e-seals in cross-border transactions, both of which would be expected from a genuine digital single market. From the examples of other Member States, a recommendation that the Estonian legislator amend the private-law acts is offered, with recommended wording that should eliminate the gaps in law. In private-law transactions, non-compliance with the form requirements provided by law or agreed upon between the parties generally results in the nullity of the transaction. According to the law currently in force, failure to comply with a requirement for a hand written signature (written form) or with equivalent requirements connected with electronic form as provided for by law constitutes non-compliance with a formal requirement. Should the Estonian legislation be changed in accordance with the suggestions presented, paying attention to its level when using the e-seal remains crucial. At the same time, it is important to take into account the purpose of the formal requirement, the actual intention of the parties, and the principle of good faith when deciding on the consequences, whether of the current law or of potential changes. When one is using a tool other than the parties' agreement (be it an e-signature or an e-seal), it is important to consider the purpose of the agreement if wishing to determine the parties' actual intention and analyse the legal entity's behaviour and, hence, whether the transaction has been performed.

The Legal Meaning of a Detailed Spatial Plan in the Context of the Fundamental Right of Ownership

The article represents an effort to determine what the legal meaning of a detailed plan is within the context of the fundamental right of ownership. A detailed plan could be understood under Estonian law as a restriction of the fundamental right of ownership or, alternatively, could come under the legal concept of ‘designing the fundamental right of ownership’. The distinction between these two legal concepts is important because they fall under two separate schemes of legal regulation in light of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, which differ from each other considerably. If a detailed plan and the conditions laid down therein fall under the ‘restriction of the fundamental right of ownership’ legal concept, the detailed plan and its conditions must be compliant with the requirements foreseen by the Constitution for any establishment of a restriction to a fundamental right. This question is still unresolved in Estonian law. To aid in finding a solution that addresses the main research question, the article presents answers for the following sub-questions: i) what the legal effect and meaning of a detailed plan is, ii) how to understand the legal concept of ‘restriction of the fundamental right of ownership’ and how to distinguish between that legal concept and the other one, and iii) what the scope of the protection of the fundamental right of ownership is in light of public construction law.

Concepts as Tools of Legal Reasoning – How Pragmatics May Promote the Rationality of International Legal Discourse and the Work of Legal Scholars

Concepts are an important element of the way international lawyers think and talk about international law. They materialise as conceptual terms, such as ‘jurisdiction’, ‘self-defence’ and ‘abuse of rights’. To enable a critical evaluation of international law and legal discourse, it is important that single instances of use of such terms be fully understood. This task presupposes a full recognition of the social meaning of legal utterances. Conceptual terms are uttered not only to describe the law, but also to affect the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of readers and listeners. International lawyers are acquainted with this social side of legal meaning but lack a theory firmly grounded in pragmatic research that can help them systematically describe and investigate it. This article provides precisely such a theory. Crucially, it also explains how the suggested theory of meaning may promote the rationality of international legal discourse and the work of legal scholars.

Metaphors of International Law

This chapter explores international law in search of its hidden and not-so-hidden metaphors. Along the way, it discovers a world inhabited by states, where rules are picked when ripe, where trade keeps boats forever afloat on rising tides. But it also unveils a world in which voices are silenced, inequality ignored, and hands washed of responsibility. Part of a shared cognitive system, metaphors provide a language to describe the law’s operation, help international lawyers identify legal subjects and doctrinal categories, and provide normative justifications for the law. Exploring metaphors’ operation at these levels, this chapter describes how metaphors help construct a shared, tangible universe of legal meaning. But it also reveals how metaphors help hide international law’s dark side, blind international lawyers to alternative worlds, and prejudge legal outcomes. Metaphors, key, nearly invisible building blocks of the international law we know, become key also to its demolition, restoration, or remodelling.

The Plain Meaning Rule: A Quibble about Nomenclature and a Lot More

In the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory, the proper understanding of the plain meaning rule (or literal rule) of statutory interpretation remains unclear. In its most basic iteration, the rule states that, where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the words must be given their natural and ordinary signification; there is no room for interpretation. That notwithstanding, to this day, even the meaning of the rule, as opposed to its application, still sometimes sparks debate in the Commonwealth. In 2015, a judge of the Grand Court in Cayman held that once a provision in a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court does not need to read the provision in its broader context. In a subsequent case, in 2018, a court of coordinate jurisdiction disagreed. It ruled that, even where a provision appears to be clear and unambiguous, a court must still read the statute in its fuller context in order to decipher the legal meaning in that particular context. This article discusses the plain meaning rule with a view to elucidating its proper understanding while questioning the appropriateness of its continuing nomenclature especially in light of developments in recent decades.

Influence of the Principle of Exhaustion of Exclusive Rights on the State of Competition in Commodity Markets

The article about the discussion on the legal meaning of the principle of exhaustion of the exclusive right to a trademark, including from the point of view of its impact on the state of competition in the commodity markets. The analysis of the legal nature of the principle of exhaustion of the exclusive right to a trademark is carried out, its essential and functional significance is determined. The actual application of this principle has been investigated, including practice of the Russian antimonopoly body in cases of unfair competition on the part of rightholders who prohibit the parallel import of their products. Studied judicial practice on the legality of parallel imports. The problem of the balance of interests of copyright holders, “parallel” importers and consumers is considered, the “pluses” and “minuses” of consolidation in the legislation of the national and regional principles of the exhaustion of the exclusive right to a trademark are assessed.

Rethinking the Meaning of Ordinary Meaning in Light of the ICJ’s Jurisprudence

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls for consideration of the ordinary meaning as the starting point in the process of interpretation. Although the linguistic concept of ordinary meaning is founded on the idea that the meaning of a sentence is directly imposed by the norms of language so that interpreters are provided with an objective standard which is external to their subjectivity, this article demonstrates that the interpretive jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has departed from the imperatives of the ordinary meaning doctrine. Rather, the Court, mindful of the problem that no mere sequence of words can represent actual legal meaning, has moved towards construction of ordinary meaning.