The International Investment Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-177
Author(s):  
Joshua Karton

Abstract This article explores the sources, nature, and implications of an arbitrator’s duty to decide according to the governing law in investor-state arbitrations. It advances a contractarian conception of arbitral authority in investor-state arbitration, whereby the agreement of the states parties to the investment treaty is the source of both the arbitrator’s power to make decisions and the primary constraint on that power: the duty to apply the law. It argues that the choice of law provisions in investment treaties have a constitutional character for arbitral tribunals, such that a failure to apply the chosen law constitutes an excess of the tribunal’s powers which, if manifest, justifies annulment or non-enforcement of the award. The article concludes by considering the implications of this contractarian theory of arbitral powers and duties for arbitrators, disputing parties, and states seeking to reassert control over the investor-state dispute settlement system.

Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter focuses on investment treaty dispute settlement, examining the nature of conflicts between investors and states and the various means provided by treaties to resolve them. In general, investor–state disputes governed by treaties occur because a host state has taken a ‘measure’ that allegedly violates that state's treaty commitments on the treatment it has promised to accord to investments protected by that treaty. Before the advent of investment treaties, investors basically had three methods to seek resolution of their disputes with host states: (a) direct negotiation with host state governments; (b) domestic courts in the host country; and (c) diplomatic protection by their home states. In order to establish a stable, rule-based system for international investment, treaties provide means to resolve disputes about the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Most investment treaties provide four separate dispute settlement methods: (1) consultations and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration between contracting states; (3) consultations and negotiations between covered investors and host governments; and (4) investor–state arbitration.


Author(s):  
Kittichaisaree Kriangsak

This chapter discusses the dispute settlement system under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The dispute settlement system under UNCLOS was drafted with the main purpose of achieving the uniform and effective interpretation and application of UNCLOS, as the compromises it embodied would otherwise be vulnerable to unilateral interpretation. UNCLOS sets up two international organizations: the International Seabed Authority (Authority) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The Authority is the organization through which States Parties to UNCLOS organize and control activities in the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the Area), particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area. ITLOS, the dispute settlement mechanism specifically created by UNCLOS, allows urgent issues to be tackled swiftly through seeking provisional measures of protection from a court or tribunal as well as a functional approach. The chapter then considers ITLOS's place within the dispute settlement regime under UNCLOS; entities with access to ITLOS; other international agreements besides UNCLOS that confer jurisdiction on ITLOS; ITLOS's relationship and interaction with the other principal choices of dispute settlement mechanisms; and the pros and cons of using ITLOS instead of other forums.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-393
Author(s):  
Yoshifumi Tanaka

Abstract The jurisdiction ratione materiae of an international court or tribunal in a particular dispute settlement system relies on a sensitive balance between the safeguard of the consensual basis of jurisdiction and the need for the effective settlement of international disputes. Thus, the scope of the jurisdiction ratione materiae of an international court or tribunal constitutes a crucial issue in international adjudication. This issue was vividly raised in the 2020 Enrica Lexie Incident arbitration between Italy and India. In this case, the arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea held that it had jurisdiction to decide the issue of immunity that necessarily arose as an incidental question in the application of the Convention. However, the validity of the Tribunal’s approach needs careful consideration. Therefore, this article critically examines the Arbitral Tribunal’s approach in the Enrica Lexie Incident arbitral award.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-547
Author(s):  
Eirini-Erasmia Fasia

Abstract The article argues that the Law of the Sea Convention’s (LOSC) dispute settlement system (DSS) is attuned only to certain types of disputes (bilateral) and does not allow for the effective enforcement of obligations erga omnes reflected in the Convention. Mechanisms established to address enforcement of communitarian norms specifically are scarce in international law and the traditional bilateral structure of adjudicatory dispute settlement circumscribes the ability of states to act as advocates of the international community to which obligations erga omnes are owed. The article identifies the obligations erga omnes reflected in the LOSC and assesses the extent to which its dispute settlement framework is suited to address their breach. It is submitted that some of the community interest obligations of the LOSC are “left behind” by the function of the system itself.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Ahmed Arafa ◽  
Dexiang Guo

Berserk resentment of the existing framework regulating the international investment protection system and the operating of investment tribunals have direct to a prevalent perception that there is an immediate need for reform. This is especially pronounced having to do with Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), where there is an overall perception that it is not anything but an unfair and unbiased arbitration system available to decide disputes between states and foreign investors. Therefore, ISDS has been obtained a reputation for being non-transparent, one-sided, and contradictory in all decisions made by ISDS tribunals. The European Union (EU) has responded to this need, by proposing an international investment court; in this research, an attempt is making to look at this court, according to the European Union’s proposal. Moreover, the research explores the potential in creating this international investment court since a system can be drastically altered. However, some criticism can be addressed by international investment courts. However, specific steps can be taken to improve the international community’s investor-state dispute settlement system by re-valuating all the objectives and goals to solve international investment disputes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-211
Author(s):  
Agata Zwolankiewicz

Both branches of international economic law – international investment and trade law are currently in crisis. Many reforms have been proposed to cure the shortcomings of their dispute resolution mechanisms. Distinctive though they are, it seems that the newest EU’s proposal to establish the Multilateral Investment Court is heavily inspired by the dispute settlement system which exists in the World Trade Organization. The new system has been introduced to replace the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism existing in most investment treaties. In this article, the author assesses the objectives of the reform through the prism of successes and failures of the WTO dispute settlement system. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas GUILFOYLE

AbstractThe conventional wisdom has been that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] Part XV dispute settlement system is narrowly restricted and this reflects the drafters’ intent. Thus, tribunals should cautiously interpret Part XV, giving broad effect to its jurisdictional limitations. The unanimous award inSouth China Seadeals this approach a blow. Indeed, it assumes a fundamentally different orientation to interpreting UNCLOS: one which implicitly takes the foremost principle of Part XV as being its compulsory and comprehensive character. This approach is rooted in a very different understanding of UNCLOS as a “package deal” and the consensus it reflects. Indeed, I argue that any interpretation of ambiguous provisions of UNLCOS is necessarily coloured by one’s view of the struggles involved in its negotiation. Further evidence of this difference of approach inSouth China Seais found, in particular, in its treatment of the regime of islands.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document